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This dissertation is based on two years of field research in Sudan, in Khartoum; the 
three capitals of Darfur; and Bentiu, Unity State, at the border between North and South 
Sudan. Building on a now substantial literature in critical humanitarian studies, my work 
focuses on the emergence of new economic forms, circuits, and entitlements that accompany 
humanitarian aid. These include the influx of ration cards, trade routes that deliberately 
shadow humanitarian convoys and draw in aid recipients, and entitlements based on kinship 
ties to injured or displaced victims of conflict. For well over a decade anthropologists have 
studied the social and political work humanitarianism does in excess of its stated intention to 
relieve the suffering of civilians in regions of national and political disasters. As numerous 
scholars have shown, humanitarian discourses and practices intentionally and unintentionally 
transform local and regional political values and institutions by altering the social relations 
that subtend them. I pursue how these transformations intervene into core categories of how 
people understand themselves to have status in a social world. 
The manuscript focuses on the one ways in which people and events are evaluated as 
having status within humanitarian logics. It explores the nexus between this logics and the 
creation of novel economic subjects, values, and institutions that are neither foreign nor local, 
neither neoliberal nor traditional. They are, rather, a glimpse of something the manuscript 
refers to as humanitarian economies, with all dimensions of the economic intended. These 
include new forms of dependency and altered structures of political authority. But they also 
include new strategies of local speculation based on humanitarian rubrics of recognizing 
 
 
need. For instance, I track the circulation and resale of objects of material necessity, such as 
grain, cooking oil, or work tools distributed by aid agencies. I demonstrate the ways in which 
such objects begin to function as general equivalents; they become a form of currency, and a 
vehicle for the storage, accumulation and transmission of wealth. But on the other hand, the 
manuscript is just as focused on the circulation of universal values of protection, and their 
transformation as local actors pick them up and deploy them in their social worlds. 
In other words, as local actors come to understand how humanitarian actors assess 
crisis, they produce a second order assessment of where aid is likely to go and thus what 
would be a profitable investment. They also produce second order deployments of how injury 
and livelihood is evaluated. Such practices transform basic dynamics of social entitlement. 
And they also change how people think of themselves and their neighbors as economic and 
political subjects. Meanwhile, critical infrastructures – from irrigation channels to pharmacy 
supply routes to radio transmitters – become the objects of heightened ethical scrutiny. 
Infrastructure comes to stand in for good governance, stability, and sustainable political 
relationships. What we witness is the emergence of what I call a speculative investment in 
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Introduction: Objects of Humanitarianism 
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David Scott has observed that;  
“It may be one of the paradoxical features of conceptual 
antagonisms that the determined rival to an existing hegemon, 
beginning with a bold and dramatic sense of contrast, and of critical 
distinctiveness, grows over the long course of seeking to overcome 
its nemesis, to much look like it” (Scott 2003). 
Before its own ascent to hegemon, the human, as a political concept, took its 
current shape against many rivals. By Hanna Arendt’s estimation it was forged, with the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, to ensure that; “Man, and not god’s commands or the 
customs of history, should be the source of law” (Arendt 2000). This guarantee becomes 
necessary, so Arendt, at the moment when the social and biological protections on which 
people had historically relied where inserted into the political order and thus, subject to 
political modifications. 
The figure of the human is thus arrayed in conceptual antagonism against both 
transcendental authority and contingent legal protections. It is forged to wrest the grounds 
of legal authority away from both commandment and from contingency – from 
discontinuous histories that leave people vulnerable to the interpretation of custom, to the 
logics of citizenship, to circumstance. But from this inception to its contemporary 
instantiation in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its elaboration in legal 
and political instruments, the itinerary of the idea has not only taken its own place among 
the hegemonic concepts of art but has also, in doing so, borrowed copiously from the 
transcendent grounds it once did combat with, and deferred just as often to the caprice of 
its own historically unfolding – changing, according to need and expedient what 
protections and privileges might mean. 
In response to these developments, and the practices of humanitarianism that they 
underwrite, this thesis sets out to account for the consequences of a political project with 
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the human as its central and axiomatic political object. More specifically, this manuscript 
gives an account of the world-making force of humanitarian practices as I observed them 
at work in Sudan. It is organized around qualitative empirical accounts of the rapid 
transformations brought about by rights interventions and endeavors to shore up “the 
human” against the myriad crises with which it is faced.  
The argument is built out of concrete accounts of the transformation that this 
defensive humanism entails. It treats rapid and uncontrolled expansions of cities in the 
centers of aid’s circulation. It traces the emergence of questions about what bodies are 
made to count, where, and under what conditions their death or disappearance is 
recognized. It tracks the changes in personal status that surreptitiously accompany the 
expansion or contraction of critical infrastructures. And finally, it challenges core 
assumptions of the contemporary humanitarian construal of how the life world of crisis is 
materially arranged, and asks whether these assumptions are adequate for understanding 
what is at stake in humanitarian activities. 
Coming to think about humanitarian practices in Sudan in particular was not 
always an obvious choice from the framing of the larger question this project stakes out. 
But the particulars of Sudanese history proved it to be a felicitous place to pursue these 
inquiries. When I began to concern myself with Sudan, the country was a few years into 
fulfilling the terms of a shaky peaces agreement that had ended roughly three decades of 
civil war between the Northern government and a Southern rebellion. As one of its 
provisions, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement stipulated that the South would be 
allowed to hold a referendum on independence in 2011. In the interim, while the CPA 
had provided for a complex rubric for power sharing, it was left to both the National 
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Congress Party in control of the Northern Government and the SPLM that would 
heretofore hold all substantial power in the South to “make unity attractive.” 
What this endeavor amounted to was an attempt to make the rights protections 
and entitlements that had been the subject of such intense humanitarian attention 
throughout the civil wars into a subject that could be agreed on within the terms of debate 
set out by national belonging. It was an attempt, after 20 years and counting of intense 
humanitarian attention to the lives of Southern Sudanese, to transfer the “responsibility to 
protect” (and all other responsibilities and affordances on which it depended) to a 
national government. The history of Operations Lifeline Sudan had been one of the 
longest histories of the endeavor (and failure, if that concept is at all operative here) of an 
international aid initiative to intercede and provide life support where both a national 
government and an insurgent military leadership were failing. 
But even as the negotiations on the terms of the Comprehensive Peace agreement 
were far from completed, the now famous insurgency in Darfur began. Roughly three and 
a half years later, the Darfur conflict was termed a genocide by the US congress and by 
then-secretary-of-state Colin Powell. By 2008, the International Criminal Court had 
passed down indictments against 56 actors in the conflict for charges of genocide and 
crimes against humanity. These included an indictment on several counts for President 
Omar Hassan al Bashir, who thereby became the first sitting head of state ever to be 
indicted on genocide charged. The force of humanitarian attention was to be felt in 
virtually every facet of Sudan’s millennial history. 
And so, for that matter, were the troubles and shortcomings of humanitarian 
politics. As genocide accusations prompted Bashir to order the expulsion of 13 NGOs 
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from the Darfur region, and Darfur rebels (with support from Idris Deby in Chad) 
brought the fight in Darfur virtually to the doorstep of the Sudanese parliament, the CPA 
began to falter and it became increasingly clear that the unity of Sudan was, long before it 
would come to a referendum vote, irredeemably unattractive in the eyes of many 
Southern Sudanese. 
The 2010 elections, which were the first serious elections in a decade and a half, 
took place despite an election crisis that saw the SPLM withdrawing Yassir Arman, their 
only candidate, from the presidential race (he still received roughly  22 percent of the 
votes, the second highest number after Bashir himself). Meanwhile, massive land 
transfers had been reported in the seven years between the Naivasha negotiations around 
the CPA and southern independence, land transfers that may have tendered up to 10% of 
the total land of the New Sudan to foreign speculators before independence. In the west, 
Darfur had been in an unprecedented frenzy of urbanization that was driven, in no small 
degree, by the aid economies that provided putatively temporary support for displaced 
Darfuris living around city centers. And while the broad grip of sanctions, an instrument 
of humanitarian coercion more readily wielded than the embargo, was formally 
unchanged until just before Southern independence, the actual force of that embargo had 
been circumnavigated by alternative economic affordances that themselves became, in 
the discourse of several vocal humanitarian advocates, a threat to humanitarian 
governmentality. 
At work in every one of these transformations of the political landscape in Sudan 
were particular conceptions of how a politics of humanity are intended to look. These 
conceptions include claims about the virtues of democracies in protecting human rights 
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(given a normally functioning state), of civil society as a terrain for social self-
expression, of the limits of acceptable political coercion and military practice, and of the 
kinds of rights and affordances people need in order to protect their human integrity 
sufficiently. They operate with a notion of the human that is internally divided into 
essential and non-essential characteristics. The essential core (the capacity to eat, to be 
free from arbitrary killing, and to access basic medical care) is severed from, and takes 
precedence over, supporting affordances such as the capacity to move, to make political 
decisions, to self-determine the management of one’s daily life, or to exercise flexibility 
in ones economic affairs.  
In large part, I chose Sudan as a location in which to conduct research because I 
had the distinct sense that it was only in the context of these unfolding shifts that the 
practices of humanitarian imaginaries, and attention to the kinds of life worlds that 
political humanitarianism produces, could be taken into account. Given the importance of 
a social imaginary with this figure of humanity at its center, I find it important to spell out 
the framework that organized much of this field material conceptually. 
In thinking through humanitarian imaginations, representations of the world 
produced by humanitarian responses to how that world is, ought to, or might be 
conceived, I rely heavily on Charles Taylor’s conception of Modern Social Imaginaries; 
“the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how 
things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and 
the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectation” (Taylor, 2004: 
23). However, I am, first, not entirely convinced that these expectations and norms are so 
often consciously articulated (nor in the last analysis is Taylor to be fair). Second, I am 
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not convinced, at least not after my field work, that they are primarily embedded in the 
mental labor of seeing the world, and making that way of seeing collectively plausible.  
While this conceptual labor is an important part of the work of humanitarian 
practice. My interest was in the material bases of how humanitarian norms are 
promulgated, consumed, and circulated across unexpected boundaries. In other words, I 
was interested in embodied elements of how a humanitarian imagination of the world 
remakes the world in its own image, what Taylor calls the “ontic dimension” of any 
moral order, which is more than a set of norms, and instead goes about “identifying 
features of the world that make the norms realizable (Taylor, 2004: 10). 
Didier Fassin has also taken Taylors concept of the social imaginary to make 
sense of what he calls “Humanitarian Reason” (Fassin, 2012). Particularly in its attention 
to the governmentality of humanitarian reason, and its analysis of its regimes of 
representation, the book makes an indispensible contribution to understanding 
humanitarian reason. In particular, it identifies how the discourses of humanitarian reason 
function as a dispositive of what the human in self-possession requires in order to anchor 
a universal politics. However, the kind of constructivism that Fassin inherits from 
Foucault did not quite describe the tension between a recalcitrant world that was not 
easily reshaped by the protocols of governmentality, and material events that transform 
under slight changes in how they were apprehended. In the jargon of these debates, I felt 
Fassin’s approach was most useful if supplemented in order to tease out the relationships 
between representation and the way that material conditions also have a “life of their 
own.” Without redrawing the distinction between the symbolic and the material worlds 
that situate the human of humanitarian discursive practices, I felt these spheres should be 
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treated as functioning under different dynamics, even as the effect of one on the other is 
thick. To deal with this dilemma, I found it useful to turn to Ian Hacking’s ‘constructivist 
realism’ in Representing and Intervening. Hacking argues that the ontological status of 
scientific objects is ultimately guaranteed in the capacity to intervene and do things in the 
world with them. Though this is elaborated most explicitly in chapter 1, the traffic 
between representation and intervention, in which each borrows its contours from the 
other, is a sustaining theme of these explorations. 
Humanitarian imaginations, I want to argue, are just as much about mobilizing an 
attitude in the observer as they are about representing the other. As becomes clear in the 
following chapters, humanitarian responses, affectively speaking, invite a public 
identification through commitment to empathy (for the victim), shame (on ones own 
behalf as bystander, or on behalf of the guilty perpetrator), and moral outrage (on behalf 
of all future victims). This mobilization of a political identification animates, ideally, 
three political identities forged in the event of crisis or emergency. The political identity 
of damaged victim supersedes the identity of national citizen; that of the reformed 
perpetrator and bystander, compelled to reconcile, supplants sovereignty; and a collective 
identification (through moral outrage) with human values offers all a new beginning 
“after evil” (Meister 2011). The mobilizations of these political identities, and the way 
that they fundamentally change the political ontologies, and the subjectivities, of people 
living in crisis, are treated at the core of chapter 3. 
This kind of mobilization comes with significant dangers. Moral outrage can turn 
too easily into the hatred of the presumed enemies of liberalism, and into a disdain for 
any political position that will not be tamed by moral responses to present catastrophes. 
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Motivated by a fear that never-again humanism has already (as a burgeoning body of 
scholars have been pointing out over the last fifteen years) begun to break under the 
strain of its own weight, this book approaches how humanitarian world making works 
practically despite these fissures. 
The world humanitarian imaginaries posit is organized around a series of 
conceptual anchors.  Chapter one traces a case in which an attack on critical 
infrastructure does not give rise to significant humanitarian responses. The logic by 
which violence is apprehended in humanitarian imaginaries follows strict rules of 
evidence by which death is recognized as a consequence of illegitimate violence. These 
taxonomies, in which certain forms of targeting and myriad forms of structural injustice 
are rendered of little concern to humanitarian attention is one of the remarkable 
characteristics of this politics. As opposed to political commitments that move from 
intolerable effects to their causes, the humanitarian imaginary organizes itself around 
intolerable acts. These acts can, as the strike on El Shifa shows, be isolated both from 
significant pre-histories, and are not (for the most part) established as perpetrations by its 
consequences. As a result, a humanitarian apprehension of crisis can readily condemn 
particular and acute acts of violence as an entire life-world of depredations proliferates 
under its dominion unremarked. 
Conversely, when a crisis is recognized as such, as it is, for instance, in Darfur 
during the unfolding of the events that comprise Chapter 2, it is figured as total. The 
effects of this conception of crisis are treated at length in the chapter itself, but suffice it 
to say by way of general frame that it presents the socialities of those living in crisis as 
stripped down to routines and habits of survival and subsistence. In their simplicity, so 
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the world-representation of humanitarian intervention, these socialities are quickly 
assessed, and the work of humanitarian intervention subsequently turns to supporting 
these acts of survival. What goes missing in the process is the kinds of habits and 
practices that are forged in and through crisis. 
After a chapter that lays out the political identities genocide accusation assumes 
and invokes, the manuscript turns to a final chapter on a place in which the 
representational schemes of humanitarian imaginaries are in thorough disarray. In a city 
in which the social world being forged meets a generation that has lived only war and 
humanitarian crisis management, the concepts that mark the boundary between 
humanitarian emergency and the state of the norm show all signs of breaking under the 
strain of real conditions. The key distinction between civil society and conflict, the 
distinction that underwrites attendant distinctions between civilians and combatants, 
don’t obtain in this frontier border-town suspended between a (temporary) cessation of 
hostilities and their inevitable resumption. 
Perhaps most importantly, the notion that self-determination will lead to majority 
rule or, even if it does, that majority rule will establish the kinds of political relationships 
that are imagined under democracy, is dubious. It is questionable in part because 
established relationships between political elites and the rest a country that are forged 
under armed struggle do not translate with any ease into political relationships based in 
negotiation. It also assumes that democracy is a set of political relationships and 
procedures, ignoring the critical ways in which it requires a culture of material 
arrangements. These include agreements about instruments of value and their 
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distribution, and limitations on what kinds of value can be declared and manipulated by 
political power, and how.  
Given the troubles that humanitarian reason has run up against when it goes about 
the task of world making, this analysis is faced with a double task. On the one hand, it 
works to demonstrate how the concrete events that make up its ethnographic core are 
made possible because of the representational force of humanitarian imaginaries spelled 
out above. On the other, taking stock of what emerges when we stop thinking of these 
events as failures gives rise to a conceptual framework of what is at stake in these world-
making exercises. 
The notions of value and accumulation that underpin the imagined stakes of 
democracy are only one term of value that is intervened into by humanitarian practices. 
At a fundamental level, the core value of political engagement shifts, during humanitarian 
crisis, from institutions of state and procedure to more abstract notions. These provide a 
supporting infrastructure for the human as a political category. Furthermore, the worlds 
emerging out of humanitarian crisis management are marked by an ethical order quite 
distinct from non-interventionary ethics. Thus, there are three facets of trans-valuation 
involved in humanitarian imaginaries, three facets that cannot be collapsed entirely, but 
are nevertheless interlock. 
Transformations of economic value involve changes in what kinds of things 
matter, which can be considered valuable, which can be exchanged, which are not fit for 
circulation, who is entitled to have things, and how they are distributed. Closely related, 
transvaluations of political entitlement involve changes in how certain characteristics 
authorize or foreclose people from acting on the political terrain. It has to do with the 
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structures of entitlement to speak for a group of people who did not previously exist – the 
capacity to call a group into being. There is considerable power in being able to name a 
group and demand a place at a negotiating table on its behalf. Finally, the ontological 
status of events is at stake. The capacity to name and classify an event as having an 
ethical value is, perhaps, the most obvious part of a humanitarian intervention. What is at 
stake when we call an act of violence – and I mean here an event that all of us agree is a 
violent event – by a different name. What happens when we frame an action as genocide, 
as opposed to an ethnic cleansing, as opposed to an act of war, a civil war, a riot, etc... 
These forms of value emerge as central to humanitarian intervention on two 
different levels. The one is their relationship and interaction on the dynamical level – the 
social world in which modifications in one sphere have ramifications for the others. The 
second is that they collapse significantly in moments of rapid social change – the kinds 
we often refer to as crisis. Complex interactions in the sociality of crisis are rather more 
familiar. The way we ethically evaluate certain kinds of violence leads to certain kinds of 
economic entitlements; if we agree that a past violence is fundamentally illegitimate, this 
can lead quite often to entitlements to reparation.  
By the same toke, accruing or being endowed with political value (what some call 
political capital) – particularly if it lead to investitures of institutional authority – can 
often consist largely in being given entitlement to make determinations about the two 
other facets of value. To be endowed as the International Criminal Court to be able to 
pronounce acts of violence genocide, and have that designation carry legal force, is a 
good example of this form of political entitlement. It puts the institution in question into a 
position to exert an enormous amount of force with its evaluations. This manuscript sets 
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out to demonstrate that crisis intervention gathers its world-making force when the 
institutions of intervention (whether UN, NGO, or in some cases governmental) situate 
themselves at points of overlap – toggle points from which these scales of value can be 
rearranged. The rapid social transformations involved in humanitarian crises are moments 
during which different regimes of value collapse, and become especially proximate. 
While the issues around political, ontological, and economic value are at the heart 
of how humanitarian practice intervenes into events, there is a more direct intervention 
taking place at the level of the people who are the wards, the targets, or, in the privileged 
parlance, the “stakeholders” of aid. This is a profound change in the kinds of economic 
subjectivity that they can imagine. While intervention into political evaluations, not to 
mention the estimations of extremities of violence, are life-and-death issues, 
transformations in the economic subjectivities of those living through aid are more 
difficult to apprehend, and unfurl only in one direction. To occupy discourses of 
responsibility and authority, and to inhabit notions of appropriate political entitlements, 
the constellations of social commitments in which a person is embedded must be 
sufficiently deteriorated to motivate that change in commitments.  
Furthermore, for those commitments to be transformed in any meaningful way, 
they require a commitment by significant numbers of people to these new regimes of 
value. Encouraging an attachment to new forms of economic subjectivity, a central 
subject of Chapter 2, is a profoundly powerful way of doing so. By economic 
subjectivity, I mean the ways in which people see themselves as situated within the 
economic processes and infrastructures that sustain (or fail to sustain) them. This includes 
normative ideas about how wealth should be accumulated and distributed; about what 
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kinds of value-producing activities are legitimate; about what object can and what objects 
cannot be monetized; and about where the boundary between economic rationality and 
other ethical and political grounds should lie. One of the remarkable characteristics of the 
economic affordances that humanitarianism in Sudan offers is the raw magnitude, in 
comparison to other economic activities, of the aid endeavor. 
The economies built up around the human, whether directly in the form of aid or 
indirectly in the form of medical disbursements, employment, or ancillary economies like 
construction and service, are of such a scale that scarcely any economic activity (or way 
of being an economic actor), are left unaffected. For instance, while the residents of a 
certain WFP compound in El Fasher in 2009 had no real sense of the prices of staple 
vegetables for sale in the market a half kilometer from their front door, that market’s 
stalls were stocked with USAID and WFP grains selling at around 1 Sudanese Pound a 
Kilo (roughly 30 us cents at the time). Meantime, whole alleys of the Souq were 
dedicated to salvage. Those working these salvage shops cultivated a suspicious attitude 
towards Khawaja visitors, not certain whether or not we were UN workers. The market, 
in part because of the vehicle traffic, in part for the usual reasons that dense places of 
human interaction are taboo for outsiders, had a reputation for being a dangerous area. 
Humanitarian economies lead to such changes all too easily, and they are often 
not the outcome of any policy that humanitarian workers promulgate. Be that as it may, 
the ways in which humanitarian logics distribute the wealth they comprise are necessarily 
otherwise than logics of entitlement and distribution that predates them. As these new 
rubrics of economic values burgeon, a generation that grows up with aid as the most 
robust industry in its social world adjusts accordingly. This is not a crisis-based version 
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of the rational actors argument. The regulating hand of crisis economies is anything but 
invisible, and often, the activities of people in crisis are beyond rationality or irrationality. 
They are at best educated speculations about how and when this wealth from nowhere 
will be redirected, and at what cost. While humanitarian apprehensions of people living 
in scarcity see need-based reception as a pared-down form of economic subjectivity, a 
practical assessment of aid receptions implies that a rather elaborate form or economic 
subjectivity is inculcated in the process.  
Perhaps a less obvious way of conceiving of the practical re-structuring of life-
worlds and expectations of the humanitarian dispensation is the production (and undoing) 
of what can be seen as a unit of responsibility in an ethical analysis. At the earliest 
moments of intervention, even the most “depoliticized” aid intervention must decide on 
who and what is, and who and what constitutes a unit of responsibility in its social 
imaginary. This entails, most obviously, making decisions about appropriate negotiating 
partners – deciding on who can be hired, which political representatives can be trusted in 
negotiating aid access, and who should be considered responsible for crisis and thus an 
untrustworthy partner in aid. 
It also entails assumptions about how people move in displacement. Re-enforcing 
the movement as a family, with a designated household, under a particular village 
leadership, along ethnicized lines, is one of the consequences of any effective refugee 
registration. It will remain so, at least, until the order of refugee treatment changes. The 
trouble with these expedients is that to determine a unit of responsibility (in the form of 
Camp Sheikh’s, or of refugee councils, or negotiators in agreements) during crisis is to 
change not only the structure of authority, but to change the ways in which it can be 
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invested, transferred, or commuted to others. In short, it is to change the ways in which 
authority can move through social worlds. These are changes to fundamental 
determinations of social value that cannot be undone easily once the temporary 
intervention ends. 
A similar issue emerges around thinking through chains of causality. By these, I 
mean considered ideas about connections between acts and their outcomes that identify 
unacceptable consequences, that are invoked to ascribe liability and responsibility for 
acts, and that link perpetrators (deliberate or otherwise) to their victims. Such notions can 
take different genre forms. As concerns humanitarian activity, the most obvious gesture 
towards these chains is deciding whether acts are criminal perpetrations or legitimate acts 
of war. But the entire question of causality, and the way it segments and reshapes the 
contours of social hierarchies, is much deeper.  
Local causal ontologies are thick and varied, and partake in both legal 
elaborations and often also in a certain metaphysics metaphysics. Legal elaborations are 
more or less clear, even where the complexities of the Sudanese legal codes are not 
altogether similar to any other. By metaphysics of causality, I do not intend to partake in 
the old trope of magical ‘pre-modern’ thinking. Rather, I am thinking of responses to 
consummately modern phenomena, such as wide-spread surveillance or state secrecy, 
that do not present any more-or-less transparent narrative of their function. To explain 
why, for instance, one or the other of my informants had suddenly landed under the 
scrutiny of the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services, my informants 
would often construct elaborate explanations of why another member in their circles 
might have been ‘turned’ to giving information to NISS. On the other hand, humanitarian 
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intervention partake, in their own right, in a considerable amount of metaphysics of 
causality. They are themselves concerned with surveillance in Sudan, of course. But at a 
more subtle level, humanitarian activities apprehend the conditions of survival, and the 
mechanisms of violence unfolding in a place at such a considerable distance that they 
often fall into similar zones of indistinction. How, for instance, they describe and respond 
to phenomenologies of famine, what kinds of income strategy and depredation is 
involved, is its own form of guess work, requiring metaphysics of sorts. It should be clear 
that by metaphysics I do not mean irrational belief. On the contrary, I mean a kind of 
reasoning that supplements the gaps in available understanding with approximate 
constructions of what might fill those gaps. 
What becomes increasingly clear in the first chapter, however, is that these 
causalities can also be made to expand and contract according to motivated 
interpretations. Take as an example an issue that has troubled laws of war, and 
humanitarian apprehensions, at least since the beginning of aerial bombing: the issue of 
infrastructure as a life unit. There are several rubrics – considerations of proportionality, 
of infrastructural redundancy, and of centrality to life support – that inform different 
decisions about the degree to which infrastructure can be considered a unit of life support 
and thus protected from the destructive force of wars. For instance, an electrical grid can 
often be a critical unit of life, maintaining hospital infrastructures and literal life-support 
mechanisms. On the other hand, it can itself be absolutely negligible, while hospital 
buildings and the thoroughfares that connect them to populations might be absolutely 
indispensible for life support. Even checkpoints that choke a critical channel between life 
support and people without destroying it can be a cause of unacceptable depredation. 
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In cases where the status of infrastructure is contingent on how it is situated in a 
larger economy of care, the decision about whether its destruction constitutes a cause of 
greater attrition is often a question of following the traces of injury back to the collapsed 
conditions of that prevented injury. This requires a notion of the kinds of legitimate 
evidence that is involved in establishing such connections. But under different standards, 
not all forms of evidence are equal. They are, as so much in how a social world is 
construed, artifacts of fact gathering and interpretation, and the product of decisions 
about which genre of evidence will prevail in a particular situated field of inquiry. To 
change, fundamentally, how we can understand the causes of our own injury is so 
profound an intervention into the capacity of people to make sovereign evaluations of 
their social worlds that it may, in the final analysis, strike at the very heart of what it 
means to be a member of a particular social world. And so that we make no mistake, such 
changes are an indispensible part of the work of humanitarian imaginaries intervening 
into worlds. 
This leads us to one of the conceptual cornerstones so central to humanitarian 
imaginaries that it is easily overlooked – the human as a central figure of an ethical 
imaginary. Implicitly, a humanitarian politics of has too often been assumed to organize 
itself around a more general, and thus less elaborately defined, political figure at its 
center. As opposed to decolonizing nationalism, which concerns itself with a native or 
national subject defined by allegiances or legal status, the humanitarian subject is taken 
into the political fold of humanitarian activities without concern for national belonging, 
and its legal status is considered in principle non-derogable. As opposed to constitutional 
libertarianism, in which the political subject is seen to exist within frame that guarantees 
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his or her status, and in which he or she has a stake in either maintaining or reforming, 
the humanitarian political subject is protected by a legal frame that is only invoked when 
all guarantees have failed, and in which that subject is a stakeholder only in name. 
However, contrary to these notions, the universal human as a central figure of an 
ethical imagination (as the locus of a project of) is the product of intensive political labor. 
As such it is a subject form that enables more robust politics than is imagined, and that 
works to mark lines of inclusion and exclusion as robustly as any other. It does so in part 
through the elevation of certain characteristics, entitlements, and protections as 
universals, while reserving second-tier status to others. While a protection against injury 
or acute malnutrition are without doubt pre-conditions for a political life, they may be 
more readily solved by recourse to another political rubric than the universal human 
(such as claims to citizen-based entitlements). Conversely, it seems almost commonplace 
by now to point out the contradictions by which the human at the center of the 
humanitarian imaginary can be saved from state violence only to succumb to the effects 
of structural poverty. But the question remains why precisely those on whose behalf 
immense effort is expended to guarantee that they will not be killed by their governments 
are also those that are most likely to suffer from structural neglect. 
Out of these conceptual frames, the thesis that follows takes humanitarian 
practices as a case in understanding some more general social problems in what Elizabeth 
Povinelli has called late liberalism. One of the central concerns is to trace what the 
itinerary of universal ethical commitments is when they circulate outside of the arena out 
of which they arose (often post-war Europe) into other terrains. As the material of the 
thesis will certainly make clear, the assumption of this thesis is not that the politics of 
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rights and aid as they circulate in Sudan are simply a derivative discourse. They are 
strategic appropriations, sometimes ‘failed’ and sometimes ‘felicitous’ (if this framework 
is still helpful), out of which (and with which) people attempt to forge futures. But 
despite this structure of appropriation, it is clear that there is an intensive power 
differential at work in humanitarian practices. 
While there are limits to the way in which contemporary re-constructions of a 
politics of recognition can account for the political encounters that take place on the 
frontlines of humanitarian intervention, these encounters may be one of the loci of 
contemporary politics in which that dynamic is most readily observed. There has, since 
the colonial period, been no political endeavor of comparable scale that elaborates so 
many normative assumptions about how other people should live while doing so on their 
behalf and at a distance. Contentions over what the content of these ideal life worlds 
should be, and how they should unfold, are a high-stakes contest of recognition. 
In sum it seems that increasingly, we are entering an era in which the tenuous life-
worlds that lie at the peripheries of late liberal states are becoming the arenas in which 
the grounding assumptions of these liberal political projects are being tested. While these 
“peripheries” have been critical to the operation, materially and conceptually, of political 
powers for hundreds of years, the way in which these fragile worlds are given intensive 
attention, the way in which they are framed as the limits that test the grounds of 
liberalism, are resurgent. In giving an account of projects of humanitarian practice at 
work, it is as much to understand this self-construction as to give account of its objects 
***




The Ruins of the El Shifa Factory lie about three kilometers north of the Blue Nile, not 
far from a mosque in which Omar Hassan al Bashir is said to pray. Departing from, say, the 
Acropol Hotel in Downtown Khartoum, a mainstay of European and North American visitors to 
the country since the Seventies, one would head due east along Shariat Al Nil and, leaving 
behind the Ministry of Health and the United Nations Development Program headquarters, turn 
left onto the Armed Forces Bridge that crosses the Nile 500 meters from the imposing façade of 
the Petronas Petroleum Complex. 
Moving north into an industrial area of Bahri, wedged between Al Thawra (‘the 
revolution’) and Kafoori, one would arrive, taking one or the other unmarked turn, at what 
remains of the factory. Behind a gate presumably rebuilt to leave the factory grounds less 
conspicuous from the outside, a meter-wide swath from which the rubble has been cleared opens 
southward, flanked to the east by the ruin sloping upward around a dozen or so remaining 
concrete pillars. A pool of brown glass medical vials, sealed with aluminum caps, some still 
bearing the sun-bleached labels and long-past expiration, fills out the hollow at the foot of the 
walkway, as if gathered for display. The more well preserved of the labels read “Shifaquine.”1  
The quality of contamination that these several hundred bottles of quinine-based anti-
malarial syrups lend to the place is hard to convey. On the one hand there is a sense of toxic 
residues. On the other these are the traces of the catastrophe of missed treatments, indexing the 
return of the febrile migraines of malaria, of terminal fevers, or of the slow consumption of 
                                                
1 Shifaquine was The El Shifa brand of Cloroquine, one of the cheapest available anti-malarials, 
effective against most strains excluding drug-resistant varieties. 
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tuberculosis: all the differentials of slow ailments.2 Medicines that would have been so urgent 
once are now strewn in suspension for over a decade. Such a dense accumulation of medicines 
has a haunting quality, seeming to call a past of uncured illness into the present, registering so 
many traces of invisible sickness. But that assumes that the infirmities entailed in these bottles 
will one day come out of suspension, be gathered from the rubble, and take a proper place in the 
epic narrative of scarcity and crisis that is the privileged story about Sudan. 
In many ways, what follows is an exercise in speculation about the bodies and worlds that 
are caused by the ramifications of the United States bombing of Sudan’s largest pharmaceutical 
plant to date, speculation that is inevitable because the injured bodies that are the gruesome 
emblem of bombing are, in this case, missing. They are absent from the scene of the factory’s 
destruction not because the bombing was “surgical” or free of injuries but rather because the 
bombing’s consequences were carried to bodies by indirect means. As I will argue, this is 
because the most consequential force of the destruction of El Shifa was not the initial explosion, 
but the sudden absence of the medicines the factory produced. 
                                                
2 Reliable malarial impacts are difficult metrological endeavors, and the evidentiary archive 
available is far from the positivist measure of recorded incidence one might imagine. They share 
the quality with many other forms of quantitative mapping of social phenomena (to which 
epidemics most certainly belong) of being produced by methodologies of speculations and 
prediction as much as empirical observation. It is important to stress this artifactual character not 
because this renders the statistical an unreliable source of social knowledge, but rather because it 
reminds us that public health must partake in speculative knowledge practices. A recent 2007 
study has combined methodologies of Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys used to adjust annual 
reported cases for under-reporting, and then adjusted downward again for “positive predictive 
values indicators.” In a separate article, the authors substantiate such evidentiary adjustments 
because of variable sensitivities of lab reports. See: Safa I Abdalla, Elfatih M Malik, and Kamil 
M Ali, “The Burden of Malaria in Sudan: Incidence, Mortality and Disability – Adjusted Life – 
Years,” Malaria Journal 6, no. 1 (2007): 97. See also: Ibrahim SM: “Decisive assessment of 
diagnostic staining methods of malaria in eight public and private laboratories, Khartoum 
area.” In Operational Research on Tropical Diseases: Final Report Summaries 1992 – 2000. 




This chapter is also meant to frame a series of questions about the semantics and 
ontological presumptions that various actors rely on to respond to humanitarian crises of 
different sorts; it seeks to understand how certain axioms about a crisis give shape to 
humanitarian practice. In other words, it is about how crises are made to count, and acts of 
violence are evaluated and given status. I have chosen El Shifa to open a book on humanitarian 
apprehensions of crisis because the bombing of the factory and the narratives that accompany it 
demonstrate the contingency of these universal responses. They also demonstrate the profound 
force possessed by agencies that are authorized to represent crises with practical (and at times 
legal) consequence. While the factory’s remains still lie at the heart of the political and economic 
power concentrated around the confluence of the Nilein (The Two Niles), the ramifications of its 
destruction were not localized there. Rather, as an essential part of an economy of medical care, 
the factory’s destruction constitutes a strike on critical infrastructure, the damage of which 
circulates widely through a population. But unlike some other deliberate strikes on critical 
infrastructure, like the destruction of water-points or the targeting of hospitals and other locations 
of care, this strike is not treated as a strike against a unit of life-support within the discourses of 
humanitarian actors in the country at the time. Why this elision; what accounts for this difference 
of representation? 
I want to argue in the following pages that the answer lies in regimes of evaluation that 
prevail in humanitarian apprehensions of violence. Rather than constituting a hierarchy of 
aggressions based on the malicious intent or the magnitude of attritions of an act, these regimes 
take the form of a complex genre of evidence and representation, one in which violence stand out 
against a backdrop of the day to day not because of its magnitude but because it presents 
apprehensible elements of the kinds of crisis around which humanitarian attention evokes its 
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historical role. For example, famines (around which so much humanitarian work took form) are 
accounted for, whereas the structural depredations of systemic poverty and economic embargo 
do not register as such. El Shifa’s destruction presents an interesting double bind, because it is, 
on the one hand, an act of war, but on the other, presents no determinate rubric for apprehending 
the consequences of its destruction as an economy of care. 
 Starting with a historical account of the strike on El Shifa, the chapter moves into a 
consideration of the status of indirect causality within different frameworks of evaluating 
violence (e.g. national or ethnic senses of collective injury, humanitarian notions of protection, 
just war theories on proportionality). It argues that similar acts and outcomes are assigned 
different political value within these different frames of evaluation (a strike on terrorist 
infrastructure is not comparable to the destruction of a medical factory). As an international 
evaluative frame, this way of assigning political value to events is an important aspect of the 
world-making power of humanitarian logics, which strive for what I am calling a sovereignty of 
representation. I argue that prevailing standards of evidence within this framework relegate 
structural violence to a second position by focusing on direct and deliberate violations of bodily 
integrity. Following an account of the ambivalent status of the strike on El Shifa within 
humanitarian agencies working in Sudan at the time of the bombing, the second half of the 
chapter turns to the traces left by consequences rendered invisible by these optics. It 
demonstrates that the disappearance of certain injuries and bodies is a problem endemic to 
various rubrics of evaluation, and that a lack of recognition within a humanitarian logic has 
effects on how death and injury can be accounted for within other frames of evaluation. This 
point is elaborated by turning to forms of structural violence that coexist with humanitarian 
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activities, particularly sanctions and embargo – arguing that it is possible to actively produce 
violent effects while not falling astray with humanitarian logics.  
 At its conclusion, the chapter proposes that there are ways of rendering attrition “legible” 
even in the absence of classic genres of evidence. This requires recognizing the degree of 
inductive risk that speculating on indirect consequences entails, but not dismissing those 
consequences as a result of said risk. Determining the political value of events, particularly 
violent ones, is a central activity of asserting agency and gaining recognition. It is precisely this 
determination of political value that is increasingly falling under the purview of international 
humanitarian actors, who produce a representation of the human in a state of crisis extruded of 
critical facets of social and semiotic agency. I propose that it is possible to recognize genres of 
evidence that are developed out of the conditions of each particular case. In other words, a 
politics of recognition vis-à-vis violent events needs to depart from the generic notion of crisis, 
and focus on forms of evidence given by the contingencies of the event of violence itself.  
 Thus, this chapter makes two fundamental moves. First, it is meant to give an account of 
how people (and their injuries) are given value within accounts of violence, or how they are 
rendered available as objects of an ethical evaluation. Second, it proposes that a different regime 
of evaluation or accounting is possible, indeed necessary to understand violence outside of 
prevailing humanitarian optics. 
 Operation Infinite Reach: Revenge in Advance, Pre-emption in Retrospect 
On August 20th, 1998, at about 7:30 in the evening, upwards of 70 Tomahawk Cruise 
Missiles fired from US Navy Vessels off the Red Sea coast hit Sudan and Afghanistan 
simultaneously. Two dozen of the missiles struck the El Shifa Pharmaceutical Complex, by then 
under cover of night, each carrying about 1,000 pounds of explosive. Within hours, word had 
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gone around the capital about the strike, and shortly, the only emblematic images of Operation 
Infinite Reach circulating internationally were broadcast: a burning husk of a building, with 
demonstrators haranguing news cameras, illuminated by fire from behind and media floodlights 
from head on. In the US, Bill Clinton informed the nation of an attempted strike on Al Qaeda. 
Within days, the first reports that perhaps the Sudanese target had not been chosen based on the 
most careful evidence began to circulate. The operation is considered the only pre-9-11 attempt 
to execute Osama Bin Laden. It was a first salvo in the war on terror that did not yet exist, at 
least not in name (Diamond, 2008; US Government Printing Office, 2004). 
At the time it was destroyed, El Shifa was the largest pharmaceutical producer in the 
region, one of three factories in Sudan producing anti-malarial treatments, tuberculosis 
medication, meningitis vaccinations, and a panoply of veterinary medications. On the importance 
of veterinary medications, one should consider the importance of livestock in both regional and 
national economies of scale in Sudan, and more importantly the livelihood of many living 
outside of the capital. The factory produced at a volume to be providing, by various accounts of 
engineers and technicians I spoke to, medical treatments to Yemen’s armed forces, and as much 
as 60-80% of the anti-malarials and tuberculosis medicines on the market in Sudan. Several 
informants with ties to the factory claimed that it produced nearly all of the Meningitis 
vaccinations available in Sudan. According to Journalist James Astill, El Shifa was the largest of 
the three functioning factories in the sanctioned country; “over 100,000 patients received 
Tuberculosis treatments per month…” on account of the factory. It also produces roughly 90% of 
the verterinary drugs available in 1998, drugs essential not only for maintaining pastoralist 
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livelihoods, but for preventing the leaps of certain livestock parasites from herd to herder, “one 
of the primary causes of infant mortality in the country.”3  
Werner Daum, German Ambassador to Sudan from 1996-2000, wrote in the wake of the 
the strike; “the factory produced some of the basic medicines on the World Health Organization 
list, covering 20 to 60 percent of Sudan’s market and 100 percent of the market for intravenous 
liquids.” By his estimation; “it is difficult to guess how many people in this poor African country 
died as a consequence of the destruction of the Al-Shifa (sic) factory, but several tens of 
thousands seems a reasonable guess.”4 Jonathan Belke, at the time of the bombing a member of 
the Near East Foundation, concurs with the estimate, writing that El Shifa “Produced 90% of 
Sudan’s major pharmaceutical products. Sanctions against Sudan make it impossible to import 
adequate amounts of medicines required to cover the serious gap left by the plant’s destruction. 
Thus, tens of thousands of people – many of them children – have suffered and died from 
malaria, tuberculosis, and other treatable diseases.”5 Other estimates, like those that fuel the 
interminable dispute between Noam Chomsky and Christopher Hitchens, who both condemned 
the attacks range wildly.6 One reason for the large range is that the humanitarian techniques of 
measurement necessary for reliable estimates were not, despite ample practitioners in Sudan, 
directed at the factory bombing’s medical fallout.  
                                                
3 Astill, James. 2001. “Strike One” The Guarian, October 1. 
4 Daum, Werner. 2001. “Universalism and the West: An Agenda for Understanding.” Harvard 
International Review 23, No 2: 19-23. Emphasis my own. 
5 Belke, Jonathan. 1999. “Year Later, US Attack on Factory Still Hurts Sudan.” The Boston 
Globe, August 22. 
6 Their point of contention is over Chomsky’s comparison of El Shifa to the strikes on the World 
Trade Center on 9/11. See Chomsky, Noam. 2001. 9-11 (New York: Seven Stories Press). See 
also Hitchens, Christopher. 2011.“Chosmky’s Follys” Slate Magazine, May 9. 
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What is certain is that within hours, the intelligence on El Shifa was found wanting. That 
intelligence consisted of a single soil sample, gathered months before the attack, in a vial of no 
more than several grams, that was said to contain EMPTA, a chemical precursor to VX gas (and 
most industrial grade fertilizers). It was provided by a single anonymous informant, who 
acknowledged to gathering it “within a few miles” of the plant.7 Within days, public admissions 
that El Shifa had likely been producing pharmaceuticals were aired. United States Secretary of 
Defense at the time, William Cohen, claimed that the US was not aware that the company was 
producing medications, despite the fact that eight months before the bombing, the plant had been 
contracted by the UN Oil-For-Food Program to deliver 100,000 cartons of veterinary medicine to 
Iraq, a contract approved by the US.8 What is also clear is that 1998 was the most withering year 
in a sequence of recurring famines overdetermined by civil war, drought, sanction, and 
government neglect. To these attritions, humanitarian groups paid ample attention. But the 
factory was subject to a series of rather understated speculations, by a relatively small pool of 
journalists and diplomats, given its size and the strike’s status as the first attempted strike on Bin 
Laden. Perhaps the kinds of evidence that this factory left behind could not hold a candle to the 
kind of exposure that was reserved for the other acts of political violence unfolding in the 
country.  
Whatever the reason, this is the raw material available from which to reconstruct the life 
worlds impacted by the destruction of the factory. These are not ruins that are available to be 
picked up, put back together, the incident of their destruction somehow set right. That moment 
has passed, and it is as though the medicines signal something about the political fate of the 
                                                
7 The details of single-informant soil sample cases for military aggression foreshadow, of course, 
the infamous performance of Secretary of State Colin Powell before the UN Security Council. 
8 Peterson, Scott. 2012. “Sudanese Factory Destroyed by US now a Shrine.” The Christian 
Science Monitor, August 7. 
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bombing: to expire before its time. These ruins stand out, different from other monuments which 
mark a world forged under the pressures of embargo and war, the former imposed in 1997, the 
latter running since just before independence in 1956 until 2005, with roughly a decade-long 
cease fire. The ramifications of structural violence that El Shifa’s remains are an index for extend 
well beyond the factory. They extend into a whole geography onto which histories of violence 
have etched their legible (and less legible) marks for several generations. 
It is not rubble itself that contrasts so sharply to the rest of Khartoum. The boulevard of 
steel and glass high-rises aspiring to become a “Dubai on the Nile” notwithstanding, Khartoum is 
replete with ruins. Some are never-to-be completed construction plots. Others are dilapidated 
colonial-era villas. Still others are homes lived through until nothing is left to do but to move 
next door through the fallen-in walls. What makes El Shifa stand out is that these ruins are not 
the typical ruins of this sanctioned boomtown,9 in which poverty and wealth unfold along 
adjacent and proximate tracks. The history of this rubble is different. Deliberate. Targeted. That 
much is clear. The outcomes of that targeting are not.  
Causality, Responsibility, and Impunity: how damage and perpetration are related 
What are the requirements for a causal chain to become recognized, so that the act of, 
say, pulling a trigger is directly tied to killing? How do we delimit causal chains so that the 
shooter who pulls a trigger is rendered a responsible agent, no matter how many intermediary 
                                                
9 Punitive economic measures against Sudan have taken sinuous turns and myriad forms in the 
last three decade. Brief watershed moments include 1) An international embargo on development 
aid, led by the US, imposed after Omar Bashir’s Coup in 1989. 2) The imposition of UN sanction 
in 1995 3) The US imposition of comprehensive economic, trade, and military sanctions in 
October of 1997 (effectively an embargo), eight months before the El Shifa Bombing, which had 
a chilling effect on medical supplies until exceptions were made explicit. 4) A renewal of US 
sanctions, extending them to particular individuals implicated in Darfur violence in 2007, but 
carving out certain “exempt populations.” The boom, beginning with the resumption of oil trade 
after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, has only made more rapid the double-tier economy 
of dispossession and accumulation that is so visible in greater Khartoum. 
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steps and preceding conditions of preparations the act entails? Under what conditions can 
negotiations about the unit of responsibility – a person, a collective, a mental state (such as 
temporary insanity or possession) – be expanded or delimited? Pulling a trigger as an act of war 
or in self-defense mitigates legal culpability, but does it mitigate the social consequences of 
killing? Can an entire arms trading network, and the industry that produces munitions (two 
economies of violence), each be seen as a unit of responsibility within that act, as arms control 
advocates argue? The bombing of El Shifa demands we pose such questions. They are the core 
questions entailed by structural violence: how do we infer chains of causality, who is authorized 
to do so, and how, from informed perspective on these chains, can we protect critical units of 
life, whether these are life supporting infrastructures, or persons? Is the sine qua non of 
protection to identify people or institutions responsible for the wellbeing (or injury) of vulnerable 
others?  
Eyal Weizmann has argued, in regards to the documentation of the ruined homes, 
hospitals, schools, sewage treatment plants, and industrial center in Gaza, that forensic accounts 
of ruins can serve as a kind of “hermeneutics of rubble.” Writing about the “book of destruction” 
being compiled by the Gaza-based Ministry of Public Works and Housing, he argues that; 
“Charges of ‘fetishism’ seem to haunt the practice of forensics. This is perhaps because forensics 
is tunes to the ‘object quality’ of history and its different modes of reification, and because it 
deals with the protocols and technologies by which objects speak.” He goes on to argue that; “It 
seems as though the universal notion of the ‘human’ – as much as the question of political rights 




I am sympathetic to Weizman’s project for a forensics of destruction, and indeed much of 
this chapter amounts to a call for seeing political and bodily damage in the traces of non-human 
things left behind in that damage. However, I think there are two caveats to be made regarding 
the structure of the fetish and the relationship between the object world and the universal notion 
of the human. First, it seems clear that Weizman is closest to the Marxian notion of the fetish – 
one that sees the fetish (in the commodity form) simultaneously comprising and obscuring the 
human relationships of which it is a product. Thus, I argue that Weizman’s hope for the 
representational capacity of ruins takes into account only one dimension of the operations of the 
fetish. Indeed, they can ideally represent rights and injuries, but they can (as he acknowledges) 
also work to obscure these human relations. Insofar as no accounting agency does the work of 
forensic translation, the object-world is in danger of obscuring the violence it entails. 
Second, and perhaps at a level that runs more consistently through the critique of the 
prevailing humanitarian imaginary as it is presented in his book, the “abstract human” that 
Weizman hopes will be represented in the object world in which s/he dwells is, by my account, 
itself a fetish.10 That is to say that the abstract human of rights discourses, whether in the guise of 
the injured innocent (chapter 3), the civilian stripped of civil entitlements (chapter 2) or in the 
guise of the reform-worthy combatant (chapter 4) always obscures the sociality of and in crisis 
that people actually live. As such, it does as much to comprise a population as it does to obscure 
the lived conditions of their lives. Though this offers an expedient to seeing indirect, mass-scale 
injuries, it can obscure all kinds of indirect attritions and damages that do not find place in the 
abstract genre. 
                                                
10 Darryl Wilkinson is developing theories on this relationship between human agency and the 
object worlds such agency “leaves behind” from the archaeological perspective, based on his 
work in the Andes. 
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Indirect causalities, or those that are difficult to attribute, are among the most long-
standing problems for social theory. Aristotle distinguishes between 4 types of causality in his 
Book II, part 3 of his Physics: i) the material out of which the thing comes to be (material cause) 
ii) the form into which this material is composed to make the thing (formal cause) iii) the initial 
agency that changed the dynamics of matter to make the thing (the efficient cause) and iv) the 
end for which a thing is or is done (the final cause). His theory of the causes is the strongest 
hinge between Aristotle’s ontology in the physics, and the notion of proper human behavior in 
the Nicomachean Ethics. In the ethics, he argues that what distinguishes humanity is the highest 
aim of Eudaemonia (a habituation towards activities that tend to cause a balanced attitude 
towards social and biological things). Thus, correct evaluation of causal chains – those that lead 
to balanced dispositions towards the physical and social world, is necessary to fulfill the “final 
cause” that marks out humanity. As an individual subset of the political good, these ethics are a 
form of the political. Understanding chains of causality is the nexus between the non-human, the 
social, and the interiority of personhood. Aristotle hopes eventually to find the general principle 
of the good that will hold for the ethical, the aesthetic, and the political, but limits himself to a 
value based on situated judgments that are right “most of the time.” For lack of grounds, he 
foregoes a universal ethics for a situated one. Aristotle’s formulation of the causes is not a 
generic set, as much as it is a rubric of criteria for understanding causality. They provide tools 
for inducing causes from the objects and events under investigation. 
Such acts of interpreting causality are central to the conceptual frames through which 
people make sense of the contingencies they inhabit, and how people understand their social 
interdependency, even when these are contingent on convention and not universals. For a theory 
of culturally situated notions of causality, Evans-Pritchard's ethnographic work in Sudan is 
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particularly useful. He presents us with a theory of how both people and tribes are made into 
units of responsibility, and how flexible these formations are. They change under the pressure of 
relational conditions – as do notions of space and time central to having notions of cause (and 
thus responsibility to events and the representations that give them a particular political value). 
Furthermore, Evans-Pritchard’s most compelling insights into phenomena of witchcraft 
demonstrate how it makes sense of problems of causality. So too does his work on organized 
relations of violence. His postulate of segmentary opposition can be read as an ethnographic 
demonstration on how the unit of responsibility is labile, yet predictable, changing by certain acts 
of violence or theft, expanding and contracting from persons to tribes to ethnic collectives and 
beyond. What he gives us in effect is an empirical account of contingent notions of agency and 
units of responsibility within dynamics of violence. This entails a philosophy of relationships of 
causality that gives meaningful status to misfortune that befalls people to whom it happens 
indirectly (e.g. by the coincidence of time and space in the collapse of a granary). The event is 
evaluated as caused by witchcraft, and if we follow Peter Geschiere’s reading of the 
phenomenon, thereby given political meaning.11 
The political, legal and bureaucratic frames that have become markers of modern states 
have not settled these questions.12 The firing squad is engineered to obscure the causality 
                                                
11 (Evans-Pritchard, 1976; Evans-pritchard, 1944; Geschiere, 1997) I am grateful to Paul 
Kockelman for alerting me to this archive of theoretical elaborations of the problems of causality 
entailed by the case of El Shifa. 
12 While there is plenty of valuable work done on processes and conditions of “modernity,” there 
is a serious risk in the unspecified deployment of the concept. Theories of modernity are often 
internally coherent, but they do not all share a common referent. While it is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to present an exhaustive of different genealogies of the concept, a quick synoptic 
look at some of the cornerstone thinkers shows that understanding social processes may not best 
be served by the shorthand of naming the condition without describing its referent. For notions of 
the link between bureaucracy and the organization of violence, we can follow Elias, Weber, 
Arendt, and Tilly, for instance. These overlap with notions of citizenship, civil society and legal 
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between pulling a trigger and killing a condemned prisoner. Several legal attempts to contain the 
transmission of violence through indirect vectors have all remained only selectively efficacious.   
These laws were written to respond to the gravest of uncontrolled proliferations of violence, the 
wars and intentional exterminations of the 20th century that turned every social connection into a 
potential weapon. Among them, Article 56 of the fourth Geneva Convention, and Lemkin’s Axis 
Rule in Occupied Europe, strive to identify legal units of responsibility for crimes of omission. 
Moreover, they codify an expanded notion of how injury to persons can be seen in acts of legal 
and infrastructural violence, elevating both law and infrastructure to life units. Then, there are 
certain historical moments where the absence of the bodies and injuries is treated as its own 
grounds for inferring criminal violence (think the Desaparecidos of Chile, of Argentina). These 
attempts, however, have not taken hold as a habituated way of seeing injuries. Absence has not 
led to an elaboration of ways of inducing past injuries from missing evidence. 
In fact, in many ways, social theories detached from pragmatic concerns of intervention 
allow much more leeway when it comes to inhabiting the chains of causality inferred by others. 
They allow for flexibility regarding how acts and responsibilities are evaluated, and thus allow 
for some degree of deference to the notions of causality through which those affected make sense 
of their worlds than current humanitarian representations. 
Humanitarian Genres of Evidence – How Attrition is Made to Count 
As an international evaluative frame for understanding crisis, the logic of humanitarian 
witnessing is to assign a political value to events. This sovereignty of representation is a critical 
                                                
entitlement that we see in Maine, Mill, Schmitt, Kelsen, and Habermass. For notions of 
economic modernity, Weber contributes again, as do Malinowski, Maus, Marx, Keynes, and 
Smith. It is thus best to specify what “modernity” means – even when speaking of the “modern 
state” or “economic modernity” specifically. 
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aspect of the world-making power of humanitarian logics. It is a way of representing and 
intervening into the life worlds of others. 
In the book by the same title, Ian Hacking describes debates of how to establish the 
existence of objects in the world that pose difficulties to observation. After elaborating debates 
between positivists (who treat nothing but what can be observed as real), pragmatists (who treat 
reality as conventions arrived at by a method for settling differences), and nominalists (who treat 
the relationship between the representational and its referent as mutually constitutive), he 
concludes that disputes about representation are undecidable without taking recourse to 
intervention. As he puts it “If reality were just an attribute of representation, and we had not 
evolved alternative styles of representation, then realism would be a problem neither for 
philosophers nor for aesthetes. The problem arises because we have alternative systems of 
representation” (Hacking 1983, 139). Hacking is careful to distinguish representation from 
“ordinary public sentences,” as well as from radically interior conceptions of the world. While 
“imaginaries” can refer to this kind of interiority, there are also public social imaginaries (Elias, 
2000; Habermas, 1989; Taylor, 2001, 2007; Fassin 2012).  
For Hacking claims such as “my typewriter is on the table” are not representations. This 
is a point on which he explicitly disagrees with Wittgenstein’s notion of the Denkbild or thought 
image (a disagreement which will become important in the second half of this chapter). Instead, 
what Hacking means by representation is always a public representation, and thus of social 
consequence (Hacking, 133). What I take as the relevant observation here is that public 
phenomena – whether natural objects to social acts – do not gain consensual political value 
unless they (i) are apprehended by a shared (which presupposes public) representational system 
or (ii) the competition between representational systems leads to active conflict, or a settlement 
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by force of intervention. Both of these latter scenarios are what the second half of his argument, 
on experimentation, is about. Intervention into a phenomenon is what gives it a status as real (in 
our case of acts of violence, it establishes a political value); “we shall count as real what we can 
use to intervene in the world to affect something else, or what the world can use to affect us” 
(Hacking 146). 
I take this conception of representations, in which events take on a status as “real” when 
they become the object of intervention, as a fitting model for contemporary humanitarian social 
imaginaries. Events of political violence are inherently contested and problematic, and thus 
demand representational surrogates to take public status. It is this need for witnessing to enable 
intervention that precipitated Kouchner’s break with the ICRC in Biafra, and opened a third 
position between neutrality and military intervention (Kennedy, 2001, 2004; Ignatieff, 2003: 54). 
It might seem that political violence is the ultimate act of intervening into the object world of 
people’s lives. It would then follow that interventions – doing something with the knowledge of 
crisis – would not be necessary for political events to be made to count.  
Representations of political violence are virtually always contested, however. While these 
representations may not require complex imaging strategies, they do require legal, visual, and 
political genres of representation (genres of evidence) to give certain the events they represent 
status as political events. To be able to decide when these strategies are deployed, which forms 
of representations are valid, and thus which social phenomena become significant events, are the 
conditions of a sovereignty of representation. 
To better illustrate genres of evidence, take the assessments made by the United Nations 
Handbook for Emergencies as an example. By virtue of its function, the Handbook’s assessment 
of emergency is primarily focused on the movement of refugees rather than the causes of 
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displacement. That focus is not easily generalized to all genres of humanitarian evidence. The 
politics of that genre are often the politics of witnessing the witness (see “Images and 
Imaginaries” below) – they have an ideal form of the perfect witnesses, and rarely focus directly 
on witnessing violence themselves, even when it is occurring at present. What the handbook for 
emergencies demonstrates is that displacement, one of the major indicators of political or natural 
catastrophe, is measured by a population-based calculation of the needs of “beneficiaries.” In 
other words, crisis is apprehended via those who demonstrate basic needs met by intervention. 
The baseline of that assessment does not seek evidence of wrongdoing, nor of 
responsibility and political conditions that lead to displacement. The events themselves are 
important as triggers – but reliable evidence of the emergency is displacement itself. The events 
that precipitate are contestable, like all historical accounts, but the presence of displaced people 
is not. Further, where these conditions of political violence become actionable and important is 
not based on the context of displacements, but for the future prevention of deepening emergency. 
In its chapter on the assessment of emergencies, the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies spells 
out how refugees are to be assessed for the future threat they pose. Both their proximity to 
international borders and the presence of armed groups among a refugee population are to be 
assessed. Whether or not these populations are displaced because they are perceived to be 
members of an insurgent group, or members of a militia, might be assessed in the checklist 
prescribed for registration, where the question “where did you come from, and why?” is first on 
the itinerary of questions (annex 1, chapter 5 UNDHR Handbook for Emergencies).  
But the political events that precipitate displacement are not of primary concern. It is of 
course reasonable to argue that these considerations are secondary to the UNHCR (and for that 
matter the International Organization of Migration, which focuses on internal displacement) 
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mandate for basic protections. However, the effect is clear. Only those factors (continued 
militancy, exposure because of a lack of integration into a household, and gender and ethnicity-
based exposures) become documented as facts with a relevant status that can contribute to 
present stabilization. As the preface to the Handbook succinctly states, gathered facts are only 
relevant when they constitute risks. Furthermore, in the interest of immediate protection, “it is 
better to get the whole picture half right” (UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, 78). 
To be clear, this is not meant as a whole cloth reproach of emergency assistance 
protocols. It is meant to identify that within the protocols of protection, and the genres of 
evidence they are after, precedence is given to facts that render the complexities of political 
violence as a secondary priority. This leads to a problematic flattening of complex political 
dynamics into the simplified figure (which I argue is a fetish) of the universal human subject. 
This problem is only compounded when acts of political violence (or, less frequently, natural 
events) are long past, and would require reconstruction, as the medical ramifications of the strike 
on El Shifa would. The conditions of political agency and violence are important within this 
powerful rubric only, like entities represented in Hacking’s description of experimental realism, 
if they allow effective action.13 
                                                
13 One of the critical resources the Handbook, and other genres of Humanitarian information rely 
on, are weekly Situation Reports or SITREPS – classified documents circulated to UN staff and 
their partners regarding the security situation of relevant areas. For several years, these have 
included a classification of the veracity of the witness providing the information. The 
categorization is alpha-numeric. Source reliability is ranked: “A-Source is knowledgeable and 
has direct access to information; B-Source is knowledgeable but has no direct access to 
information; C-Source is usually reliable; D-Source is not very reliable but can provide good 
information; E-Source is not reliable; F-Source cannot be assessed/We do not know. Information 
validity is ranked: 1-Confirmed by several independent sources; 2-Not confirmed but very likely; 
3-Likely; 4-Not likely; 5-Probably wrong information; 6-Unconfirmed/We do not know” (UN 
SITREP, leaked confidential document). 
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But that begs the question of why the strike on El Shifa demands reconstruction. Why 
was the medical attrition attributable to the collapse of this economy of care not registered 
immediately, in 1998, in the wake of the bombing? Samera Esmeir has argued that in a legal 
context, reconstructing a historical event leads to differential standards of witnessing. “Positivist 
historiography;” she writes; “assumes the existence of the state, the records of which constitute a 
reference for recovering the past and generating knowledge about it.”14 She is dealing with a 
massacre that “allegedly” took place in Tantoura during the Nakbah, a temporal gap of 50, rather 
than 16 years.  
Nevertheless, her observations are relevant here, with one important caveat. While 
Palestine is not recognized as a state, and Israeli national archives have traced (and secreted) the 
conditions of the emergence of the Israeli state in its present form, the Sudanese state worked 
under two very different conditions in 1998. First, though recognition of Sudanese independence 
was negotiated, and formalized on January 1, 1956, the state’s own politics of measurement were 
intermittent and selective. They have not been selective only in the way that Esmeir argues, i.e. 
obscuring foundational acts of violence (although these, insofar as they have been recorded, are 
more or less entirely sequestered). Rather, the metrological work of the Sudanese state has 
always been plagues by the states own ‘partial decolonization;’ that decolonization has been 
formal, in the sense that the country came under national rule, but not substantive. In other 
words, many of the institutions of state that the Aboud Regime (the first independent regime to 
take power after a transitional sovereignty council) and its followers have inherited have 
remained forged in the colonial mold they were formed in.15 More proximately, the archival 
                                                
14 Esmeir, Samera, “1948; Law, History, Memory,” Social Text 75, (2003): 25-48.  
15 This is perhaps most visible in the Sudanese Judiciary, both before and after the passage of the 
1983 September Laws which ushered in a sharpening of Sharia based legislation. For a 
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practices of the Sudanese state failed, refused, or was unable to gather reliable data in the South 
throughout the duration of the Sudanese civil wars. In fact, international agencies were probably 
more capable of doing so, and even those accounts were woefully incomplete (Karim et al, 
1996).  
As regards the effects of the strike on El Shifa, in distinction to the massacre at Tantoura, 
we are not dealing with an event disavowed by a state. Quite the opposite, this is an act of 
political violence by one state (the US) against another (Sudan) that is announced, proudly, by 
the president who order the strike. Nevertheless, despite the recognized sovereignty of Sudan 
(foreclosed to the Palestinians), the Sudanese diplomats are denied the sovereignty to represent 
that event in a way that can make it count in the humanitarian imaginary. Recognizing their 
status as a pariah state, several different factions in a divided Sudanese government apparatus 
were compelled to ask for outside inspectors to intercede and take account of the status of the 
strike on El Shifa on their behalf.  
The salience of Esmeir’s point is that in the absence of agencies entitled to exercise 
recognized representational agency acts fail to count, and attrition (even atrocity) can easily 
disappear. Her point is, in fact, doubly significant to El Shifa. We are not only dealing with 
disavowed deaths, but on a second order with a community of victims who were never afforded 
the capacity to recognize their injuries as caused by common causal chains in the first place. 
Their deaths are not only disavowed, they are never afforded a collective status to begin with. 
                                                
discussion of the present day consequences of the impartial “decolonization of the judiciary,” see 
Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim, Manichean Delerium: Decolonizing the Judiciary and Islamic Renewal 
in the Sudan, 1898-1985 (New York: Brill). Intermittent census collection has, in important 
respects followed suit, particularly in the south. Geographical subdivisions have been “reformed” 
out of colonial districts with a series of revisions re-dividing federal state boundaries in response 
to new governmental needs, or in the wake of conflicts. See Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk and 




Where Esmeir is right to decry the “death of human relationships, the death of societal bonds, the 
death of meaning, the death of commonalities – in short the death of humanity in concrete terms” 
(Esmeir, 44), the situation of the victims of El Shifa’s attrition is not that their commonality has 
been destroyed, but that it was never available as a collective identification to begin with. 
Except, perhaps by induction. 
The Ambivalence of Operation Infinite Reach 
Under present humanitarian apprehensions of crisis, counterinsurgency, rebel activities, 
displacement, and myriad other outcomes of armed conflict are “real” in the sense that they are 
made to count by representations that allow these consequences to be acted upon. But by 
contrast, the same strategies of representation that let the strike on El Shifa fall below evaluation 
render an event like the famine in Bagher Al Ghazal (South Sudan) that same year visible. The 
forms of representation that could reconstitute the attrition of El Shifa would require a forensics 
like the one Weizman suggests: actively inducing the events entailed by the bombing from the 
traces (like the vials of medicine mentioned above) that remain a decade and a half later. In the 
case of the famine in Bahr al Ghazal, the immediate images of starvation and displacement 
(particularly around WFP food distribution centers) fill this requirement. Forensics begin where 
these leave off, reconstruction what the positivist images of famine leave irrefutable.  
This is somewhat of a limit case. As aid compounds continue to become more fortified 
and security becomes the sine qua non humanitarian activity, it becomes ever more infrequent 
for humanitarians to apprehend the emergencies they are working directly, even when these take 
place in their immediate proximity and at the same time they work to intervene (Duffield 2001, 
2010,). To compensate for this remove, forensics are deployed to establish public accounts of the 
violence of states, or the violence of insurgencies combating them (and each other). They are 
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often contested, but nevertheless available: statistical indices that give deaths and injuries a 
status. The difference between these forensics, deployed in the case of humanitarian monitoring 
in Unity State, South Sudan or in rural Darfur, and the ones missing in El Shifa is that either the 
evidenciary signature or the political import of the crisis has rendered the fact that the crisis is 
real a foregone conclusion.  
The response of Human Rights Watch, one of the few humanitarian agencies to directly 
address El Shifa in its immediate aftermath, to both El Shifa and the famine illustrate the 
differential economies of attention and evidence well. The organization wrote about their 
concern regarding the El Shifa bombing (in an open letter to the White House) in the same year 
that they published an extensive report complete with assignation of responsibility, causality, and 
elaborate condemnation on the Bahr El Ghazal famine, bordering Unity State to the east and 
Darfur to the north. On the one hand, In the case of El Shifa, the Sudanese government extended 
repeated offers to various groups to inspect the factory. By contrast, in the case of the 
investigation into the Bahr El Ghazal, MSF reports that “repeated requests in 1998 for a visa 
from the government of Sudan were ignored.” It is curious, then, that the famine should receive 
copious documentation and the attrition of the factory so little. The opening of the MSF report on 
the famine could not be more stark; “Nobody knows how many people have died in Sudan’s 
most recent famine… but the United Nations estimated that, as of July 1998, there were 2.6 
million people at risk of starvation, out of a total population of about 27 million. This famine 
was caused and is being perpetuated by human rights abuses by all parties to the civil war, now 
in its fifteenth year.” (Human Rights Watch Report, “Famine in Sudan, 1998,”) 
Assailing the SPLA, the Baggara Murahileen or militia forces (fighting on behalf of the 
North), and the South Sudan Popular Defense Forces (also loyal to the Northern Government), 
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the report gets to the heart of the matter of responsibility: “The famine thus was not caused by 
incomprehensible forces. There is a very straightforward story line to the famine, set forth in the 
detail in this report describing the integral role of war-related human rights abuses in causing this 
famine.” The report gives intricate details of aid diversion, refusal of access to Operation Lifeline 
Sudan staff (the primary Aid Operation operating under UN mandate), looting by irregular 
militias and insurgent groups, attacks on “civilian objects.” The famine is, furthermore, an object 
available for assessment: Human Rights Watch reporting underscores the need for UN 
assessments teams to be allowed into areas closed by government inquiry. Furthermore, they 
particularly focus on the diversion and looting of aid materials, and ask explicitly that all parties 
involved in the conflict “punish looters and those who buy and sell looted goods; [and to] punish 
all those who engage in diversion or theft of food and nonfood relief items and those who buy 
and sell such items.” 
The report names individual commanders, lists causal conditions, and gives a lengthy 
analysis of the enthnicized violence that render Bahr El Ghazal Particularly vulnerable to 
violence. As admirable as it is for its detail, it stands in stark contrast to the kind of attention 
given to El Shifa. The report foregrounds not only the sustaining role of economies of care (both 
medical and food aid traveled along the vector of OLS distribution), but the problem of 
maintening control over said economy of aid. It aims at ensuring that the circulation of aid does 
not intersect and entangle with the economies of war. Such distinctions, as we shall see more 
distinctly in Chapter 4, are all but futile in conditions of aid during war. Moreover, the degree of 
attention paid to the famine is contradictory, in a moment where less direct (but large scale) 
disruptions of economies of aid are taking place throughout the county (e.g. in the form of 
embargo and medical availability) with no comparable form of attention. 
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For poverty, sanction, or many other forms of structural violence, the same forensic 
strategies are not deployed. One explanation, offered above, is that these don’t take appropriate 
status within the ambit of interventions which guarantee the real-world status of the objects of 
humanitarian attention. The depredations of structural violence of the distributed sort do not 
produce objects with which humanitarian actorc interact, for which they have contractual and 
practical frames of reference, as they do in the famine, which take place despite (and within the 
frame of) one of their more robust interventions. The causal ontologies by which poverty is 
apprehended have not been legally elaborated, and perhaps this is in large part because they are 
not considered vectors of crime on a global stage. Thus, while the consequences of poverty or 
sanction may well produce plenty of potential subjects of humanitarian intervention, the causes 
of the depredation are, unlike conflict and famine, out of reach. 
Given these observations, the case of the El Shifa Factory presents something of a double 
bind. The attack on the critical infrastructures on which people depend does not count. At most, 
those killed in the direct strike are lamented, and all other structural fallout is ignored. This 
despite the fact that critical infrastructure has long been a part of what is thought of as a life unit 
within theories of humanitarianism and of war. More than the immediate contrast with the case 
of the famine, the case starkly contrasts with accusations, made by the Head Prosecutor of the 
ICC, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Susan Rice (in 1998 Assistant Secretary of 
State for African affairs, by 2009 US ambassador to the United nations) a mere decade later, that 
the expulsion of NGOs from Darfur by the Omar Bashir might well be treated as a war crime. It 
is as though the combination of direct, avowed aggression and attritions not to be apprehended 
within the frame of humanitarian attentions lead the a confusion of accounts – a recognition of 
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the comparative resonance between the two cases which nevertheless leaves the drawing of the 
most relevant connections foreclosed. 
In a letter to President William Clinton just date September 15th, the organization that had 
so meticulously accounted for multiple variables having deleterious effects on economies of care 
in Bahr El Ghazal focuses on three areas of concern regarding El Shifa. The first is the 
opportunities for inspection of not only the factory remains, but other sites in Sudan, offered by 
the open invitation of the Sudanese government to UN weapons inspectors; it is, Keneth Roth 
writes, “with dismay that we learned that the U.S. Government is resisting a proposal to send 
U.N. chemical weapons investigators to Sudan… it suggests the U.S. has something to hide” 
(HRW, “Letter to President Clinton Urges Sudan Factory Inspection,” 1998). 
Echoing their organizations reproach of the Sudanese Armed Forces in Bahr El Ghazal, 
Roth continues “We have long denounced the Sudanese government’s bombing of civilians and 
civilian objects in its war in southern and eastern Sudan and in the Nuba Mountains;” and goes 
on to cite the US Navy Handbook and authorities in international law on the limits what 
constitutes “proper military targets.” Of primary concern is that; “it has yet to be established by 
the evidence in the public domain that the U.S. Military planners did everything ‘feasible’ to 
establish that the al shifa factory met the definition of a legitimate military target, or even that it 
was a legitimate military target at the time of the attack.” In addition, the director of the 
organization is eager to know if sufficient warning was given to civilians living in the area, and 
to see that compensation is made to any civilians that were injured or killed. Finally, the Famine 
of 1998 is mentioned, “… where the UN estimates, again, that 2.4 million people are at risk of 
starvation. Unfortunately for this devastated population, the US bombing has had the unintended 
effect of leading to a disruption of assistance.” 
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A scathing indictment, the letter is nevertheless stunning in two respects. The benefits of 
hindsight allow us to see how extreme the margin of error in risk estimates can be. After repeated 
estimates by UNOCHA and the WFP that 2.4 million were at risk to the famine, Luka Biong 
estimated, eight years later, that the toll of the famine hovered more around 70,000 dead. That is 
a radical metrological difference between risk and casualty, even if 70,000 is 70,000 too many. 
But would even the lower, brutal scale of attrition render the estimates of tens of thousands that 
have been offered as credible estimates of the attrition of El Shifa negligible? That absence is 
perhaps more shocking than metrological difference. Within a three-month span, the attrition of 
the famine looms large in HRW’s estimation, while the possibility medical fallout from El Shifa 
is not entertained. Little was clear about the outcome of the famine at the time of the letter’s 
composition. In contrast, by September 15th, it was established that the factory destroyed 
constituted a critical piece of the medical economy of Sudan. The total absence of any call for 
replacement medications is a baffling in the face of the suggestion of reparations, in the event of 
established culpability, suggested by MSF.  
Against these discrepancies, is it possible to develop active attentive relationships to 
material traces of injury like the ones found in El Shifa? This could mean nothing more than 
understanding the volume of production, and networks of distribution that were suddenly 
rendered absent. It could see the destruction itself as a strike against Sudanese medical 
sovereignty that leaves Sudanese at the disposal of foreign economies of aid. Or perhaps, in a 
country where the divide between those who are vulnerable to common infectious diseases of  
ailments versus those rendered immune is a given, that effect is not of primary concern. Can one 
think as broadly as suggested at the opening of this chapter that every bottle of medicine, and 
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every unused spool of labels, stands in for so many undelivered medicines, and induce from 
these indices the factors of attrition that occur until medical supplements can arrive? 
Any of these strategies would require a departure from humanitarian imaginations that 
seems attuned only to register testimonies and images of injury and exposure to vulnerability as 
viable genres of evidence. Symbolically or literally, it would require an exercise of sifting 
through the ruins of the factory and reading as clearly as possible the invisible injuries and absent 
bodies the material entails. But with the absence of reliable statistics on both production and 
distribution, even a retroactive forensics is likely to founder on the ambivalence of available 
evidence. 
Ethical ambivalence, which often entails questions of causality and responsibility, is 
inexorable when dealing with complex problems of humanitarianism. But the structure of this 
ambivalence in humanitarian crisis is somewhat unlike that of many other ethical deliberations. 
In a moment of crisis, at least by the accounts of appropriate procedure found in sources like the 
UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, ethical principles are given and it is the texture of the crisis 
that needs to be evaluated. In other words, ethical decisions are made a priori in forms such as 
the “responsibility to protect”, non-refoulement, civilian protection, or basic rights. These 
decisions are a given a priori, and in their face, the major aporia of intervention will be solved by 
“fact finding.” But of course, facts are never simply found, and the background assumptions of 
how the social world is arranged such that we can infer them are conventional, not universal. 
 The National Response: Ambivalent Identifications 
 “When we heard the news, everyone was devastated: even the opposition wept;” a 
former engineer explained, himself a member of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), one of 
the largest opposition parties of Sudan, that notably signed a peace deal with South Sudan at the 
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height of the second civil war. It is not entirely evident why weeping should be remarkable, save 
that in the political atmosphere of Khartoum, most events of any magnitude mark political 
difference. In an atmosphere where direct contradiction of the National Congress Party can be 
very risky (much more so for local Sudanese than foreign researchers), small differences in 
response to small events indicate larger fault lines. The encounter I observed between a young 
journalist and a parliamentarian in the Diplomat’s Club in Khartoum illustrates these small 
gestures. The journalist greeting the parliamentary member with the greeting of “ahlan ya ustaz” 
(a greeting without religious overtones) marks a position vis-à-vis social conduct (and an entitled 
position to do so). By the same token, the parliamentarian’s response in official chambers “wa 
aleikum wa salam”(the customary response to the more religiously marked “salam aleikum”) 
may mark either conviction, or a refusal to breach protocols in public. At the more absurd level, 
a friend in Khartoum once described to me that, during a series of demonstrations in the capital 
by students in February of 2011, his editor forbade him to write on any matters of government 
policy. A journalist, he chose instead to write a short piece on the number of times in preceding 
years that the temperature in Khartoum had risen to 45 degrees Celsius or higher. When I was 
puzzled, he explained that a standing law had given automatic leave to civil servants above that 
temperature, the response to which was that, officially, temperatures in the capital never rose 
above that mark.  
With political differences marked by small and sometime unlikely differences, perhaps 
the opposition missed an opportunity when it wept. Of course weeping is itself a complex act. 
People, and politicians, can just as well weep performatively as from an outpouring of feeling, 
and even the way we respond to grief is deeply habituated (though not therefore less immediate). 
But the strike on El Shifa marked a moment in which Khartoum had been made a target by 
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several critical missteps of the Bashir government. When the engineer I spoke to remarked that 
even the opposition wept, it seems that what was remarkable was the opposition’s willingness to 
forego voicing that accusation. 
On the other hand, what political gesture was really available to the opposition but 
weeping? At the moment of its destruction, El Shifa was made known to the world over as a 
chemical weapons factory for Osama Bin Laden, who had lived in Khartoum through the first 
half of the 1990s. The bombing was justified by those who defended it as a response to the near 
simultaneous car bombings of the US embassies in Dar Es Salam and Nairobi thirteen days 
earlier.16 What could become of politicizing this revenge from the air? Perhaps mourning was the 
only politically available act. To condemn the bombing outright could too easily resolve into 
rallying behind a military sovereign in the figure of the ruling party (and to be sure, it had that 
effect on many who spoke of the bombing casually in rikshaw or taxi rides). On the other hand, 
calling the bombing provoked would too easily amount to a kind of treason against a nation – a 
betrayal of patriotism that, in moments of attack, often contracts into a gesture of allegiance to 
the government. 
Perhaps weeping was more fitting. Mourning, after all, recognizes and marks a 
relationship to those injured, at least ideally. It can also index a collective loss – a relationship to 
others to whom one is bound by a common leader or enemy.17 Judith Butler has argued in 
                                                
16 It’s worth noting that in his justifications for those attacks, Bin Laden referenced what he 
described as the “US plan to partition Sudan” which he claimed was hatched in the Embassy in 
Nairobi. Lawrence Wright The Looming Tower, 2006. 
17 Thinking with Freud’s Group Psychology and the Ego Eric Santner has read German Post-war 
cinema as a corpus struggling to produce social texts addressing the profound sense of loss in the 
collapsed national socialist project. His psychoanalytic reading demonstrates how even the few 
Germans with political aversions to Hitler partook in this form of mourning – a loss of a center, 
even if it was one that they repudiated. For a comparative social history of national responses to 
defeat in wars, please see Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Culture of Defeat, 2004. 
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Precarious Life (Butler 2006) that the foreclosure of mourning for certain people, such as the 
Palestinian or Iraqi dead, is one of the enabling conditions for their continued killing. But then, 
even in mourning, so much depends upon who (or what) is mourned and how the injury is 
figured. Perhaps, it is possible to mourn for a nation, but at the level of nationalism, mourning all 
too quickly turns to one or another form of violence. And in the engineer’s account, tellingly, 
weeping gives way to indignation, to anger, without it being clear for whom anyone wept. 
“You see;” the engineer continues, “it was ours, it was the only thing we made that, if 
people had the choice for something from Europe or China, they still wanted Shifa, not Bayer or 
Amidol; people asked for Shifa even when other things were available. El Shifa was the most 
important pharmaceutical producer for the region, and it was also Sudanese.”18 
And then, as if sensing the emergence of a particular national pride he seems to fear will 
be distasteful to a Khawaja (term for white or non-African foreigner, derived from “sir”) when 
expressed by a Jalaba (term for northern Sudani Arab, derived from the common garment of a 
trader), He continues, 
“People used to say, ‘you and Shifa against the illness!’”  
He strains his eyes, wanting to impress that this identification with the factory was 
spontaneous, affective, life saving.  
                                                
18 I have searched the archives, and been given two firm promises by a Minister of Foreign 
Affairs who has access to a study done by the Sudanese ministry of Health, for figures on how 
much medicine was being produced by El Shifa and where it was being circulated. Thus far, 
none has been forthcoming. The US and United Nations were both invited by the Sudanese 
Government to inspect the factory, which had just landed a lucrative medical contract with the 
UN to supply Iraq with pharmaceuticals under the food-for-oil program. The estimates of critics 
as far afield as Christopher Hitchens, Ramsey Clark, and Noam Chomsky and the German 
Ambassador to Sudan at the time, which all run in the tens of thousands, don’t tell us much, as 
they are each bound by the same inferential aporia. Without expert measurements and these 
direct statistics, the only recourse is to to a cross reference of regional medical statistics, but the 
lacunae by these critics themselves tell volumes about the politics of measurement and 
recognition of consequence. 
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We are talking in the outdoor café of the Lisamin Safari hotel in Khartoum, a Lebanese 
restaurant favored by resident UN workers that lies six kilometers south of the city center, and 
my informant is gesticulating and talking passionately of the attack. If he is not moved by a sense 
of injury that he is quick to rekindle, then at least he is invested in conveying it. But the object 
towards which his story inclines, in the course of two interviews, never resolves into an injured 
person, not even, strictly speaking, himself. His anger is not driven by the loss of his work, and 
although he runs through the litany of meningitis vaccines, anti-malarials, and veterinary 
medications destroyed in the attack, his outrage draws momentum from elsewhere. The victim, 
for him, is ultimately national; “it was ours.” 
It is possible to bracket his affect as a displacement of concrete people injured in the 
attack, for whom the national frame functions as a stand-in. This could easily look like a 
metonymic replacement of the generic national for the singular. But it seems that there is more at 
stake here. When we turn momentarily away from the assault on national sovereignty that he 
expresses so strongly, the injury done by the strike on El Shifa seems still suspended somehow in 
those wasted medicines, and every missing treatment they stand for. Was this an attack on 
instruments, substances, and a sovereignty for which these objects stood in? Are human 
casualties indeed as absent from it as from my informant’s narratives?  
National Security 
El Shifa has, of course, taken a position within a nationalist narrative of a people under 
imperialist attack. Remarkably, however, even that narrative is marked by an absence of direct 
attrition. Unlike discourses of martyrdom by nationalists on both sides of the civil war, the sense 
of direct injury to bodies and people is indistinct. Even the status of this damage, somewhere 
between privileged government fact and popular national monument, remains indistinct. This is 
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to no small degree because its consequences have never taken full status – the violence it entails 
has itself been left, as I have argued, indistinct. 
After my first visit to the El Shifa, as my friend and I leave the factory grounds, two men 
pull up on a Senka 250: a ubiquitous, simple, Chinese-made four-stroke motorcycle. The man 
riding on the rear wears a crimson button-down shirt too clean to have been worn since morning. 
He dismounts. His patent leather dress shoes are dusted with a thin patina of dry road, and he 
politely asks us our business. 
“Are you American?” he wants to know, a distinction that matters, to be sure. 
He then suggests we should be on our way, thwarting us without the enjoyment that is the 
generic signature of petty authority. We should come back with one of the official tours of the 
site, he suggests. He is polite, a comportment that suggests he could do something more 
authoritative if pushed. Perhaps he simply isn't as petty as one would believe. He follows the ten 
steps to the door of our vehicle, telling us more about the factory, and somehow I get the sense 
we have agreed to leave too quickly.  
“Children come here with their schools from time to time,” he explains; “we want 
everyone to know our history, what happened here. But you should be careful ‘fi’l mintaqat – (in 
the area); it’s a ‘mintaqat sha'bi’ (popular area); you don’t want to have your things stolen.” 
He belongs, almost certainly, to the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), 
the Sudanese state’s largest public service investment, as the joke runs. Either that or he belongs 
to the neighborhood’s Lagna Shaabia, or ‘popular committees’.19 This industrial area has 
residents, but the care he has is more for our reason to be in the area than for our safety. 
                                                
19 The committees play an ambivalent role in the neighborhoods of Khartoum, acting by some 
accounts as intermediary between community and the relevant authorities, by other accounts to 
enforce discipline and police the prerogatives of the state. Known initially as Rahma (mercy) 
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By whatever protocols he may work he’s so far removed from the particular people who 
live the story he tells that he barely speaks of the neighborhood bombed, other than the 
dismissive mention of poverty – euphemized as sha’bi, or popular. I get the sense that for him, 
this mintaqat sha’bi is one in which the people living in it do not, strictly speaking, matter. Or 
they begin to matter, more precisely, when they begin to take place within the image of El Shifa 
that makes the story matter nationally. Is this the way of national subjectivity, that the collections 
of histories, commitments, material attachments, injuries, and relations to which a person says 
“I” only have a texture if and when they take place within the story of the nation, when the “I” 
resolves into a national “we”? 
In Sudan the question is laden with so many residents and citizens who cannot be 
accommodated within a single national subject. Throughout the North-South civil wars – wars 
that we would do well to remember were not fought under the single banner of Southern 
independence, wars fueled by political identities that can be traced back far into a colonial 
practice of closed district ordinances20 and indirect rule. Throughout these wars, Southerners, 
even those living in the capital, were never quite available as proper national subjects. The 
ethnicized insurgencies and counterinsurgencies in Darfur made famous more or less recently 
mark a similar disjuncture – in which certain Darfuri’s were strategically incorporated into first 
colonial and then post-colonial pacification of the region.  
                                                
committees, they were once seen as representatives of the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional 
neighborhoods of Sudan. They were to act as intermediaries to facilitate the difficult translation 
of customary laws into a national legal idiom (particularly one that since the passage of the 
September Laws in 1983 had been firmly rooted in a particular interpretation of Sharia). 
20 The closed district ordinances were a series of colonial restrictions on movement and language 
use passed, in successive waves between 1922 -1928. They included empowerment of local 
Sheikhs to enforce immigration restrictions, a restriction on language used in particular areas, 
and a permit requirement for travel of North and South Sudanese across the border as it was then 
understood. They can be read as the modern legal beginnings of a separated Sudan. 
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Both are part of a long history of a national subject always undercut by conflicts and 
border demarcations that follow people wherever they go. The Southerner, for instance, becomes 
a placeholder for resident enemy squatter as massive refugee settlements emerge around 
Khartoum during the civil war. The Zhaghawa, a Darfuri tribe intimately linked to the 
insurgencies there, and who for years controlled the traffic of electronics and other consumer 
goods from Chad into the capital, are marked as a threatening trader class from insurgent 
Darfur.21 Perhaps Kafoori’s industrial area lost its people, in the account of our security man, to 
one or another variation of this optic. Certainly, the divided sense of who can be included within 
the national frame leaves humanitarian understandings of Sudan struggling with the way these 
politicized fault lines divide and undercut the nation in moments of crisis. For Kafoori, the 
neighborhood in which El Shifa was situated, things would have been different had the Mosque 
of Omar Al Bashir been a bit closer, perhaps. 
Missing Bodies 
But suppose that there were, literally, not many people to speak of in Kafoori and Al 
Thawra on the night of the attack. Direct casualties were, by all accounts, minimal. Perhaps more 
died: the homeless, itinerant, unregistered, and otherwise unrecognized. As though to mark these 
possible deaths so conspicuously absent from the story of the strike, virtually every conversation 
tarries with the night watchman who was on site that night, and died of his injuries in the ensuing 
days. Talk of injury focuses on this one casualty, stretching his capacity to stand in for the 
                                                
21 Raphaëlle Guibert has been engaged for several years in political and ethnographic research on 
the domination of Zhaghawa traders in certain commodity baskets in Souq Lybia, one of the 
largest asuaq (plural) in greater Khartoum. I am indebted to her for conversations about her 
unfolding research, now available as “La guerre au Darfour au prisme des alliances du 
mouvement islamique: retour sur quelques trajectoires d’hommes d’affaires zaghawa.” Politique 




gravity of some other injury for which he is, given all the circumlocutions and hesitations, 
clearly not a capacious vessel. It is as though in search of an icon, they would stretch him until 
there is nothing left. 
“He was just an innocent employee;” one says;  “he was unarmed despite what the news 
says, not army” another assures me 
“He might have had his family with him, it is not uncommon for guards to live with their 
families around on the building grounds…” 
And then, echoed in interview after interview, emerging as the central artery at which the 
strike took aim, is the mention of the sudden and unexpected deficit of medicines that the 
destruction of the factory entailed. For many these medicines function like a screen onto which 
the sense of greater attrition can be projected, but which at the same time obscures those exposed 
by the ramifications of the attack22. But then on another register, the medicines are not really a 
screen. Rather, these medicines are the material traces of a missing injury, palpable marks that 
point to the existence of people whose bodies have been disappeared by the way this violence is 
apprehended. And that disappearance is determined as much by a humanitarian imaginary that 
sees only direct bodily injury it can prevent as it is by a national imaginary that can never quite 
accommodate the peripheral South, West, and East. Something was here that has passed, and the 
traces are the only thing everyone can agree unequivocally exists. In humanitarian optics, the 
cause and effect form of evidence must exist for injury to take full political status. Under 
national optics, southern attrition is not given a clear status during the civil wars. Are there any 
forensics that can allow these two frames to be circumvented, and thus make those who died 
                                                
22 As we shall see in chapter two, in moments of unstable political or social facts, events that 
offer themselves to projective interpretation become at once a dangerous and necessary stand-in 
for metrological and empirical certainties. 
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because the medical support provided by El Shifa collapsed matter again, in a country saturated 
with humanitarian ways of apprehending injury? 
Reference to the few who were killed immediately in the strike are indirect signs of 
missing bodies, and the question remains, what happens when we move entirely from direct 
signs of injury to indirect signs? Is this the hallmark of structural violence, to obscure chains of 
causality so profoundly that indirect violence becomes plausibly deniable? If behind these 
interrupted circuits of medicine are to be seen certain groups of Sudanese who died when this 
medical economy collapsed, they remain faceless, indistinct. The question is, who and where 
were they? Can material traces really somehow render them visible? They don’t appear to have 
been identified, their families do not appear to commemorate their deaths as extraordinary, they 
are not remembered as national martyrs, they are not even national subjects available as icons of 
injury in their death. So it appears. 
Sanctioned Injuries 
If one of the consequences of a humanitarian imaginary is the selective attention to injury 
it affords, another is that economic and structural violence can, like in the case of El Shifa, 
proliferate without running afoul of humanitarian attention. Indeed, while other deaths in other 
parts of Sudan mobilize the political identity of humanitarian cosmopolitans in unprecedented 
ways, only the most direct of attritions are available to the humanitarian accounting of El Shifa. 
From the nationalist perspective, it appears that with the dead of El Shifa, outrage focuses at all 
levels on the victimized nation, with no national citizen to underwrite, anchor, or personalize the 
injury. I spoke with one high-profile government advisor at length who could not exhaust the 
subject. He is a man with a medical degree. 
“El Shifa was one of the clearest examples of imperialism and hegemony, the clearest 
example we can get in international politics, not just being prone to aggression, but having the 
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audacity to deny it; that is the embodiment of evil in my opinion, pure evil, a sheer and pure 
evil…” 
With responsibilities that include long-range policy responses to the insurgency in 
Darfur, he is a man keenly aware of the economy of attention paid to injury. Certainly he 
understands that he could well be read as a government insider, whose sense of injury is likely to 
be held up against the denied and disavowed aggressions of the atrocity-laden counterinsurgency 
in Darfur (atrocities he does not deny, and the ontological status of which will be the central 
topic of Chapter 3). After all, to stake an ethical claim to the deaths resulting from the death of El 
Shifa does not square well with equivocating about the consequences of the brutal 
counterinsurgencies taking place in Darfur. 
But his arguments are not organized around the kind of chauvinist revisionism that we 
hear often and loudly from certain corners of the Sudanese government. He is speaking to a 
moment in 1998 and a very different kind of attack that, no matter how conveniently it may 
double as a relativizing comparison to counterinsurgency in Darfur, was not resurrected for that 
purpose. Whatever his politics regarding present state violence in the country, he is talking to a 
refusal to recognize the palpable injury of El Shifa; a moment that hovers disavowed in a history 
barely remembered outside Sudan. 
“At the time the government immediately invited the United Nations to bring weapons 
inspectors to test the claim of whether this was a chemical weapons Factory. In fact, the demand 
was taken to the Security Council, and they used the veto and never apologized;” 
 
Then, in an odd non sequitur, which I can only imagine signals resignation to the reality 
that such recognition was unlikely to come, he simply remarks  
“With the Sanctions, we have learned to live without you…” 
Following the ’89 US embargo on development aid, The UN first imposed sanctions on 
Sudan in 1995 in response to the material support the government was said to have provided for 
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the assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak that year. They were followed in 1997 by a US 
embargo; leading immediately to a time that I heard often shorthanded by Khartoum residents as 
the years of the breadlines. Not that the collapsing economies were not long over-determined by 
myriad other factors; a protracted war with the south, and the repeated famine cycles long 
predated the sanctions.23 But sanctions with embargo systematize collapse and scarcity of 
particular economies. They make certain that anything available from international circuits 
comes only by exemption, or from non-compliant allies. And thus, before exceptions are carved 
out, they lead to literal breadlines, lines for bread and nothing else, until further notice.24 In the 
worst of cases, it is clear that embargoes are the humanitarian alternative to war – the lesser of 
evils (in Weizmann’s terms) in a world of international relation where war is a favored 
instrument.  
The breadline times are a specter for both the government and the residents of the 
northern cities I spoke to. As spiraling inflation fuels a demand for austerity through a country 
whose residents are, even in the relative boomtown capitol, already unhappy with their 
                                                
23 According to Douglas Johnson, the initial embargo on development aid had dropped 
Khartoum’s annual reception of development from 1907 million USD in 1985 to 127 in 1993-94. 
Central government revenue remained below first billion mark until around 2000, and only 
began to rise dramatically around 2002, spiking at about 12 billion in 2008-9 (UNOCHA). Aid 
Flows followed a roughly similar trajectory, with one spike in 2005 following the completion of 
the CPA, and one in 2008 after the Darfur Crisis took national attention (UNDP). Oil revenues 
followed the signing of the CPA, but then experienced another bust. During the sanction period, 
inflated oil prices, combined with Foreign Exchange Crises that seem to run on tight 3-7 year 
cycles, hit the lower and middle classes of Sudan the hardest. Reports of how long certain 
medical supplies, notably Insulin, were difficult to obtain, differ, although the acute deficit was 
likely limited to the initial embargo period, after which medical exceptions were carved out. 
24 From 2009-11, while I worked in Sudan, all flour consumed in Khartoum came through a 
powerful import-export conglomerate known as the Daal group, who were protected during 
sanctions partially because of allegiances to the Sudanese Military Industrial Corporation, as the 
latter relied on the construction imports of Caterpillar and other goods for their production of 
small arms and munitions. 
 
58 
government, the breadlines hang like a sword of Damocles over the current regime. For less 
wealthy residents of Khartoum, they are a memory that can always return. They reappear as a 
threat in moments of inflation, or in foreign exchange crises that reemerge with relative 
regularity. Fuel subsidies, which have been cut repeatedly since 2011, see these specters re-
emerging as active threats to the stability of the capital. Many government critics, however, are 
also clear-spoken opponents of the analysis that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” 
recognizing themselves as the leverage point through which the pressure of sanctions is 
conveyed upward to their government.25  
It is that sense of being made victim by proxy that leads me into a tense discussion with a 
close friend while in Khartoum on account of interviews I was trying to conduct in a 
neighborhood just to the east of mine. It is primarily a barracks area, not frequented by 
Khawajat, in which a munitions stockpile exploded (accidentally it seems) a few years ago, 
killing some untold number of neighbors. Trouble was, the warehouse of munitions did not 
officially exist. Interviews on the explosion all ultimately failed, but my friend was critical of my 
motivations for trying; 
 “Criticize our government all you want, man, but in the end, if Sudan looks bad it’s us;” 
and at that moment he broke into Arabic turning to a Sudanese friend of his “nahnu fi’l balad, 
wa nahnu fi’l musharah, you understand?” (we’re in the country, and we’re in the lines). Under 
sanctions, everyone stands in the breadlines save the well connected, and even government 
critics discover, in negative form, a reluctant patriotism in the form of a shared injury. 
                                                
25 Though political scientists writing on sanctions (Cortright & Lopez, 2000; Crawford & Klotz, 
1999) have tended to emphasize Sudan as a case of relative success, few seem to have done close 
work on the differential effects these have had on the government and the national elite versus 
the middle and lower classes of the country, a serious problem in a country whose wealth 
disparities nearly rival those of the United States. 
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But at present the breadlines still remain just that, a specter, as the effects of sanctions 
and embargo have developed in a different direction with the oil boom and an interim peace. By 
2009, a decade on from the first exports of oil coming out of Port Sudan and six years after the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the traces of embargo are far more complex 
than the blanket scarcity that “the breadlines” evoke.26 
In Khartoum they mean that next to readily available flat screen televisions, and a 
booming restaurant and food delivery economy unimaginable ten years before, the import of 
medicines and medical instruments require special Office of Foreign Assets Control licensing.27 
Luxury goods are available, while in the early years of sanctions insulin’s availability was 
limited. Until explicit exemption was carved out, it was available only to people of means, or to 
those who could access charitable clinics. Embargo may allow for charity, but will block every 
economy of care, including medical economies, unless explicitly exempt. The upshot of this 
policy is that medicines from embargo-compliant countries can generally be donated into Sudan 
without a license, but not sold, limiting the spectrum of ailments for which instruments and 
treatments are available. Donation tends towards the statistically most prevalent conditions, or 
                                                
26 In a certain sense, the fear of future austerity shares the status of specter with the knowledge of 
El Shifa’s effects, which have the structure of a haunted and unacknowledged past. The 
difference between past grievance and future threat is critical to understanding the difference 
between the structures of these specters. 
27 It took nearly three months after I received my grant from the Wenner-Gren foundation to 
receive my own OFAC license to do non-commercial research in Sudan, and I was told by 
people familiar with the process that legal council of certain granting organizations in the US 
was discouraging grants to sanctioned countries on account of the difficulties involved with 
licensing. Three months, by all estimates, was nothing short of a fast track licensing. Under such 
conditions, the relation of academic exchange and research between countries is swept up in the 
politics of ‘assets control’, an economic dimension of the Department of Homeland Security. In 
the words of a researcher who was familiar with the process, “homeland security is not a division 
of the government, it is a strategy, in which every wing of the government polices the boundaries 
of security in its particular terrain.” 
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those that have gained political momentum. Expensive treatments, or those involving sensitive 
technologies (like radiation therapy) are generally impeded. 
The man with the medical degree speaks, of course, about the medicines. He promises to 
produce a study conducted at the time by the ministry of health that documents that El Shifa was 
producing half of the pediatric antibiotics on the market in the country. He never produced the 
study to me, but his estimate resonates with those of many others, from interviews to journalistic 
accounts. By all accounts, El Shifa was critical to how Sudan was able to have “learned to live 
without” the sustaining international connections choked off by sanctions. When these life 
support economies become the only game in town, sanctions are not a condition of raw scarcity; 
they deliberately manage all but the most basic instruments in a way that targets the objects of 
life-support and luxury under one and the same canopy as “businesses,” to be scrutinized and 
slowed, choked, and occasionally allowed to pass. In sanctions, “the law in its majesty makes no 
distinctions,”28 amounting to a guarantee that drugs will fail to arrive unless trafficked by 
charitable circuits. 
In one sense, embargo demonstrates that every economy of care has a choke point, and 
those choke points have been exploited by the NCP as pressure points in the run-up to the 
referendum on Southern secession. The worst case scenario presented is one in which 
Southerners pondering independence were afraid their vote to secede would cut them off from 
hospitals in the north they rely on for rather simple treatments they could not get in Juba.29 
                                                
28 Anatole France, The Red Lilly.  
29 Speaking, months later, to Southerners thinking through the logic of independence, the 
consistent refrain was that the political necessity of separation did not mean that the two 
countries would, or could, live in economic isolation. “The northerners need our oil, and still 
they are threatening to take our needles from us if we become independent,” one Payam 
Administrator complained. The economic troubles of separation will be treated in Chapter 4.   
 
61 
Sanctions had already produced a condition in which Sudan Airways are on a United Nations 
blacklist for abysmal public safety records as the result of missing replacement parts; parts 
stopped at the border by an embargo enforced by the same parties responsible for the blacklist. It 
is one in which the Gum Arabic trade gains early exemption (it is in Coca Cola, and every 
consumable mega-commodity we can think of), while the agricultural export of Hibiscus out of, 
among other places, Darfur and Kordofan, is blocked except under UN observation.30 The attack 
on El Shifa made clear that every economy of care protected by humanitarian exceptions is itself 
precarious, available only by the good graces of international regimes of regulation. It made clear 
to many (uncounted) Sudanese that their bodily integrity was intricately tied to political 
processes absolutely out of their control. 
The conditions of embargo should, at least, make unmistakable what the destruction of 
the factory producing most medicines available in Sudan in 1998 would mean for its less 
wealthy. It is the destruction of a life support infrastructure in a moment when all conditions 
hindered the quick substitution of available medicines, rendering them unavailable to whoever 
would have been receiving them, in a country ravaged by one of the more violent interludes in its 
decades-long civil war. It is a destruction that triggered no call, nor attempt, to mitigate the 
“collateral damage” it inflicted – damage that would easily have been mitigated by US or UN 
donations of replacement medicines to fill the gaps left in the pharmacological spectrum that the 
plant had filled. If this relatively privileged capital was speaking in 1997 of bread lines, one can 
only imagine life outside of the boomtown. 
Images and Imaginaries 
                                                
30 See accounts of UNDP value chain analysis in “we have never been neoclassical,” chapter 2. 
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But therein lies, again, one of the core troubles. The rest of the country can be imagined, 
but not seen from the vantage point of the putatively monolithic “international community” by 
their. During the height of these wars, even humanitarian agencies operating in conflict zones 
were not in the business of doing surveys, and by all accounts the architects of embargo knew 
too little of the micro-politics of aid and circulation to understand the gravity of these 
distinctions. In order to read El Shifa’s destruction and apprehend the scope of its violence, we 
need to read it against an optic that can only register violence in the image of threatened bodies 
that an intervention can visibly protect. We need to read it against an optic that structures what 
kind of violence is legible (read visible) to an intervening humanitarian operation, and what kind 
is not. And the texturing of what is visible and not, what can and cannot be imagined, is 
structured significantly in Sudan by a humanitarian imaginary, and has been for decades.  
And as much as this optic may be propagated most strongly by the representational 
bodies (myriad) of the ‘international community’ in question, it is quickly incorporated (even 
projected into historical accounts) into ways of apprehending violence. From colonial 
intervention through Operation Lifeline Sudan in the South into the present day, humanitarian 
endeavors, in the form of development initiatives as much as in the form of Human Rights 
Watch reports, have defined what counts as violence in Sudan. Or perhaps more precisely, the 
gap between violence that is seen, and violence that is allowed to count within a humanitarian 
imaginary, has thus far not been overcome. We can see that a factory is bombed, without 
counting the attrition that bombing entails. We have seen the repeated elision of people injured 
with the medicines they would have received. Those medicines function as the only conceivable 
stand-in for people exposed by their loss. Perhaps they are so haunting for precisely that reason. 
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They lie preserved, strewn and displayed on the grounds of the factory 11 years after the strike, 
for a nationalist imaginary, or for whatever indication of injury they might be necessary.  
As we have seen above, both Human Rights Watch and Oxfam condemned the El Shifa 
bombings on the grounds that the operations of NGOs and aid organizations were halted because 
Americans working in Sudan withdrew in the wake of the bombings. Their failure to make 
assessments of medical attrition may be accounted for by the enormous complexities of 
causality. But we still face a glaring inconsistency: humanitarian imaginations unable to 
comprehend medical attrition happening in its field of intervention. 
 70,000 excess deaths attributed to the ’98 famine by the counts of Human Rights Watch 
and the Institute of Development Studies in Brighton match nearly as many displaced moving 
within South Sudan and, inevitably, significant displacement into the “squatters areas” 
surrounding Khartoum, sprawling self-settled neighborhoods that surround the capital. There is 
as little reliable accounting of who specifically arrives in these neighborhoods, and when, as 
there is accounting for where the treatments coming out of El Shifa were ending up, a condition 
which renders attrition all but invisible, available properly only for speculation. The dead and 
displaced of El Shifa disappear within the causal explanations of civil wars that lie, ready at 
hand, to account for what is unfolding in Sudan. 
But this disappearance is obtained by a symbolic economy at work by which the 
complexity of crises is streamlined for efficiency before it is properly “worked on” by practical 
intervention. Put differently, one of the most profound forms of humanitarian labor is the work 
of representation that establishes the world for intervention. It is the work of representation that 
allows intervention, and thus guarantees that the crises and events posited by a humanitarian 
imaginary are real. 
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The attrition resulting from the strike on El Shifa becomes invisible precisely because it is 
injury by absence, one that does not submit to easy witnessing, one that may be illegibly 
entangled with the enabling conditions of a certain form of abandonment, less spectacular than 
Agamben’s, and anything but bare. Do we need to see the injured body offering a nearly 
pornographic history of its own destruction in order to be able to see an act of aggression for 
what it is? 
This opens up long-standing debates about visibility and the image in relationship to 
crisis. Kevin Carter’s famous photograph is perhaps the most emblematic image of this genre of 
rendering crisis visible. In it, an infant girl who has metabolized much of her muscle mass has 
collapsed three meters away from a vulture. She is photographed, we are told, on her way to a 
distribution point of humanitarian aid. The shot is an odd still life of crisis, a shot that won Carter 
the Pulitzer Prize and triggered a storm of outrage about the politics and ethics of the image. It 
was taken five years before the El Shifa strike in South Sudan. Carter was following the grain 
circuits of Operation Lifeline Sudan in the South. Following the protocols of visibility that 
require a combination of representation and intervention, these grain circuits become visible only 
when bodies begin to display symptoms of famine, as did, most famously, the body of this girl. 
She is overexposed, in virtually every way – exposed to the conditions of famine, and to the gaze 
that presents her damaged body as an international icon of the necessity of intervention. Under 
the logic of this gaze, it is that overexposure that makes her available for ethical response.  
Or does it? While her spectacular damage becomes an icon of a general and generic 
depredation of war and famine she does not achieve the status of a figure for the depredations of 
systemic violence in Sudan. She is speechless, and even her gesture of exhaustion is simply 
iconic. The image functions perfectly with no understanding of the world that led to her 
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collapsing, at that time, in that place, and before Carter’s camera. As an icon, she can mobilize 
expressions of sympathy, and she can signify emergency and crisis, extruded of all the social 
dynamics, causal chains, and political conditions that would give her person ethical value. This 
girl is a person in whom the trajectories of structural and direct violence converge, and to render 
the way in which her condition is caused by this convergence requires somehow rendering these 
visible. But this minimal exercise in ethical imagination fails the moment she becomes purely 
iconic. In some ways, she is less available to ethical evaluation, within the economies of 
attention that attend to crisis, than the vials of wasted medicine, which are far less spectacular, so 
much more thick with material traces of their ethical value.31 
Didier Fassin, citing a claim by a speaker at the Sixth Bayeaux International Festival of 
War Correspondents and Photographers, claims that in the wake of the Biafra war, the logics of 
the image in humanitarian representation have shifted from the crucifixion to the pieta. Rather 
than direct apprehension of violence thick with traces of causality, perpetratorship, and 
consequence, the humanitarian spectator is invited to identify instead with the image of a witness 
of suffering, giving us all the cues of response. “Thus;” writes Fassin; “the reader became a 
spectator of suffering rather than of violence, and the emotion to be felt was compassion rather 
than terror” (Fassin, 2012: 25). If this analysis proves right in the long run, perhaps this Pulitzer 
Prize winning image of a young girl almost certain to have died after she was ‘shot’ by Carter’s 
Lens stands exactly at the threshold between two humanitarian aesthetics. She is directly 
overexposed, with no mediating witness, the desperate state of her body a source of horror. But 
she is also isolated from all traces of what lead her to collapse here in this place, a generic 
                                                
31 This, I think, sums up the difference between Agamben’s notion of ‘bare life,’ and the 
treatment that Joao Biehl, writing against Agamben, makes of the life of Catarina, connecting the 
circuits of social, political, and economic transformation that meet in a particular person he 
meets and engages as such. 
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product of suffering that leads (as we see in the public outcry surrounding the photograph) 
spectators to turn their own attention back on the conditions of the photographer himself. The 
Sudanese girl is both victim and iconic witness, photographed at the threshold between survival 
(the precondition for witnessing) and death (the sin qua non of victimhood). The invisible 
witness (Carter) is, by representing without intervening compassionately, breaking the 
conventions that stabilize victimhood for international apprehension. 
Precisely this overexposure – the girl’s status as pure icon – leads to a storm of outrage, 
in which Carter, who commits suicide within a year of the shot (leaving behind a note that he is 
nothing but plagued by debt and images of war – as though the two occupied the same valence), 
is likened repeatedly to the vultures that approach in the background of his shot. As is clear from 
the events recounted here, the direct apprehension of the image did not suffice to motivate 
inferences of causality or responsibility. It evoked pity and rage as structural violence continued 
to unfurl in the background. What is so troubling about the image is not, as many commentators 
claimed, that Carter took the photograph before presumably helping the girl. What is so troubling 
is that the image elicited widespread rage as a pure icon of meaningless suffering, when in fact 
the conditions behind the photograph are not deciphered by any of this flurry of moral outrage. It 
is not the image, nor the intentions of the photographer that is the most troubling; it is the 
framing that suspends this dying girl in a political and ethical vacuum. 
While images like Carter’s photograph stand in for (and occlude) all the ambiguities of a 
slow unfolding and complex crisis, there are, of course, those persistent operations of violence 
that are not given, or perhaps simply do not manifest, in forms apprehensible to the humanitarian 
imaginary. Can we forge a relationship to catastrophes when these do not present us with their 
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own form of spectacle? Can we render legible the slow death of bodies that are irredeemably 
underexposed; that have been disappeared? 
The question is perhaps better answered by specifying what it means to imagine absence 
as an index of injury. The imaginaries that have succeeded in this regard have been popular 
movements that lay claim to the enduring injuring that the disappeared of Argentina and Chile 
entail. The force of these movements comes precisely from their opposition to the foreclosure of 
recognition by their own government. On the international terrain, where an international 
humanitarian response took heed of this movement’s claims in retrospect (in the 1990s), that 
recognition proved disinclined to focus on the individuated disappearances than on the possible 
proof of perpetration by the generals and their executioners. It is not, in other words, that 
absences cannot (or are not) imagined as indices of perpetration in myriad political imaginaries, 
it is that it has limited purchase.  
The prevailing humanitarian ethic has remained, even after Bernard Kouchner’s famous 
break with the neutrality if the International Red Cross in Biafra, an avowedly non-political (or 
super-political) ethic. Thus, the apprehension of violence that allows acts to be taken up by this 
powerful medium of circulation on an international terrain falls back on genres of recognition 
either embedded in or directly borrowed from international law. Even in moments where the 
failures of a legal system have been recognized as such, and with that recognition the need to 
step outside of criminal justice in order to reckon with the past, such as in the case of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the recognition of past perpetration is declared 
generally. Responsibility, and the apprehension of particular crimes, only takes place when they 
are matched by a direct confession. 
 
68 
The trouble of registering absence and indirect perpetration runs directly into the 
historical inception of our contemporary mode of understanding extremes of political violence – 
into the designation of genocide. Raphael Lemkin’s initial legal elaboration of the concept, 
which will be treated in Chapter 3, focuses at its greatest length precisely on the non-human 
vectors of aggression. With only one of the conceptual chapters in which he lays out his notion 
of genocide focuses on direct perpetration of violence, he spends considerable effort identifying 
the assaults on property, legal regimes, and habits by which people live as a form of genocide. 
The refusal of the United Nations to accept his designation whole cloth has, it seems, much to do 
with the way in which it would have indicted both colonialism and class struggle (an avowed 
regime commitment in 1948) as a form of genocide. And while designating all these attacks 
under the single rubric of genocide may indeed be an excessively expansive designation of the 
term, Lemkin’s exercise of forensics may still lead us some way to answer what it would be to 
apprehend absence as an index. 
Though her explorations of the concept are much deeper than I can do justice to here, I 
am taking Elizabeth Povinelli’s call for an anthropology of the quasi-event as a lodestone for this 
thesis. She asks, “What are the temporal and epistemological presuppositions that foreclose an 
anthropology of ordinary suffering and thus an anthropological understanding of the dynamics 
by which extraordinary events of violence are folded into everyday routines – and vice versa.” 
(Povinelli, 2011: 14). I take her challenge in two ways – as a challenge to see the structural 
violence in pedestrian transactions, and as a call to see in spectacular violence the slow unfolding 
of social and political phenomena that converge to make them an event. The Carter photograph 
is, I think, a case that calls for the latter approach. On a larger level, I think this is a perspective 
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from which it becomes clear that the figure of the human they operate with is a profoundly 
unsatisfying category of ethical value. 
Unsatisfying in part because at every tightening of embargo, every infrastructural strike, 
and even in the internalized logics of civil war, the figure of the human that is ideally intended to 
anchor an ethical response to crisis emerges as the authorizing figure for depredations. Embargos 
are the humanitarian alternative to war. Development saves humans from bare life. In these 
forms the figure of the human operative in contemporary humanitarian imaginaries underwrites 
the strike on El Shifa itself, which is figured as an act of preventative violence, as it is calibrated 
to prevent repetitions of the violence witnessed in the bombings of the US Embassies in 
Tanzania and Kenya, on behalf of “America and other freedom-loving people in the world.”32  
In a logic that runs from Las Casas through Schmitt to Foucault, Derrida, Agamben, and 
on we have become familiar with a gesture that, in naming humanity, also names the grounds for 
exclusion of many from its pale. The way the figure of humanity at work here functions 
differently. In sanctioning the strike on defensive, preemptive grounds, an injured empire turns 
injury into an authorization of its own violence. In a gesture of projective identification, it 
mobilizes an imputed symmetry between its own injury and the injury of Sudanese targeted by 
their government, taking up the cause of redeeming and protecting the latter (in Darfur, the Nuba 
Mountains, and the South), an implicitly messianic gesture, underwritten by the intervention that 
is the proof of empathy. Implicitly messianic, it not only redeems those chosen by its optic, but 
also promises an eschatology, an end to the political violence that it abhors. The strike on El 
Shifa, by this logic, is surgical in the sense that it isolates precisely the potentials for crimes 
against humanity that states like Sudan pose.  
                                                
32 Clinton’s National Address on Operation Infinite Reach 
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The gesture, even (perhaps especially) in its belligerent form, is a familiar one, redeeming 
a vulnerable humanity by vanquishing its enemies. But it works also on a second register of 
redemptive logic: redeeming the debt that the world owes America for the gifts of democracy it 
has ostensibly bestowed at great cost. In exchange for that debt, a sovereign defensive violence is 
legitimated. Let us not forget that acting on behalf of the vulnerable has for centuries been the 
humble posture by which empires enter the scene and claim a right to attack the enemies of those 
they consider human, rendering imperial violence illegible, eliding force and care. The first 
presidential address Clinton made regarding the strike could not have made this universal 
justification more clear;  
For this is not just America's fight; it's a universal one, between those who want to 
build a world of peace and partnership and prosperity and those who would tear 
everything down through death and destruction; a fight that joins people from 
Northern Ireland and Africa and the Middle East; a fight not directed at any 
particular nation or any particular faith but at a callous criminal organization 
whose policies of violence violate the teachings of every religion.33 
 
The embargo, a humanitarian supplement for war in the decade of El Shifa, is 
underwritten also as a response to the Sudanese government’s “continued support for 
international terrorism, ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring Governments, and the 
prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious freedom.”34 
Throughout these justifications, the human always appears to have a double value. As potential 
victim the human is an existing vulnerable body to be defended (perfectly represented by 
Carter’s photograph). But in that gesture of defense, a slippage occurs by which the human is to 
be produced precisely by the force that was mobilized to defend it. In other words, people are 
inducted into the pale of the category of the abstract human precisely by being rendered in need 
                                                
33 President William Jefferson Clinton: Weekly Radio Address, August, 22, 1998. 
34 E.O. 13067. CF E.O.13412 
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of, and thus subject to, the defensive force. This double-value makes the attrition of El Shifa so 
difficult to trace for a humanitarian imagination. The rights of the human as the product of 
defensive force are obtained only after a raw human material presents itself as available, by a 
self-interpreting spectacle of injury, for humanitarian intervention. The human is made possible 
by that intervention, and the object of intervention – human suffering – is provided to the 
“international community” precisely by the evidence that intervention acts on bodies in ways that 
are exposed as failed in Carter’s photograph. Paradoxically, this failure proves the efficacy of 
intervention. This gesture, even (perhaps especially) in its belligerent form, is a familiar one, 
redeeming a vulnerable humanity by vanquishing its enemies.  
Return to War 
In a nod to the perverse adherence of the embargo to the moral geography by which 
Sudan is apprehended as a site for intervention, George Bush expands the embargo terms in 2003 
to specifically target government officials with plenary powers in the counter-insurgency 
campaigns in Darfur. In the same Executive Order, he carves out exceptional status within the 
embargo for large swaths of South Sudan, including therein (as though it went without saying) 
the so called “squatter’s neighborhoods” outside of Khartoum (ethnically southern, 
geographically as central to the north as the El Shifa). These neighborhoods, such as Soba, 
Mayo, Haj Youssif, Dar el Salam, are long-term displacement camps, densely populated by 
primarily southern Sudanese who have fled the war. They are under technical Sudanese 
government jurisdiction, but present a problem to said government as (presumed) domestic 
combatants. The camps, which have been the location of at least two insurgencies, are under a 
kind of double sovereignty. They are locked down by northern NISS checkpoints on the 
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connecting roads that lead to the capital, but under a semi-formal agreement, they are also 
policed by the SPLM (the party and armed movement of the South. 
These are neighborhoods within which sizable numbers of people are not using currency 
for their daily transactions because monetized transaction, would be too expensive vis-à-vis their 
access to currency. These are not places, in other words, that stand to benefit from an exemption 
from the US embargo under even remote circumstances, given that all goods reach them through 
the sieve of Northern government scrutiny. By 2012, the 1.5-2 million Southerners living in the 
capitol – a majority of them from these neighborhoods – had dwindled to about 500,000 in the 
run up to independence. All those that remained were stripped of their citizenship status on April 
9th as one of the terms of southern secession, provided they did not formally become citizens of 
the North (by application). 
Cutting these ethnically southern neighborhoods out of the blanket-logic of embargo a 
symbolic gesture of protection that by the same token acknowledges the violence that the 
embargo constitutes, entertains a fantasy as nonsensical as the fantasy of the surgical strike in 
which no civilian is killed. It is the fantasy of an embargo that minutely manages a perfectly 
predictable political economy. Recognizing the exigencies of the embargo as real and grave, this 
logic disavows the damage done by asserting control over who is and who is not struck by the 
effects of sanctions. But we always already know that materials circulate and people move, 
producing textured life worlds that cannot be disentangled without unweaving the fabric that 
make them livable. The fantasy of a surgically managed embargo that protects friends and 
punishes enemies in an integrated community misapprehends the logic of social worlds. There is 
a material sociality that generates relations between people who may, politically, have broken off 
relations some time ago, and it is as important as any community that shares in mutual 
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recognition. This material sociality is seen in the labor markets of the north, at least those largely 
fed by southern labor. It is palpable the moment one steps into any souq in the border areas of 
South Sudan, where the Jellaba and Felata traders provide most of the available goods from 
Uganda, the North, or Darfur. 
The impossibility of severing these relations, even when the desire for separation cannot 
not be felt, is visible now, as north and south fall on each other with a fury fueled in large part 
precisely by the impossibility of their economic and social separation. This impossibility was 
obscured, in the run-up to the separation, by the images of divergent political projects, by the 
images of thirty years of civil war, by the images of racialized difference, and the difficult fact is 
that each of these images, like the image of an injured body, tell an important part of a story 
about the world out of which they are torn. Only because they are allowed to stand alone, as 
images that comprise the social world we cannot see within them, do they distort that world in 
the very act of describing it. 
They remain, thus, images that occlude an underlying fabric of interdependent political 
projects, a fabric that demands attention not because it is more real by some primitive notion, but 
simply because it has been rendered all but nugatory in a prevailing ethical imagination. 
Persistently, throughout my own various attempts to give an account of the political economy of 
humanitarian aid in Sudan, what emerged was a material dimension of social relations that 
troubled the prevailing humanitarian imagination of crisis as the rupture of that material fabric. 
El Shifa is one of the concrete manifestations of this logic at work. It is a concentrated place, in 
the shadow of the humanitarian imaginary at work in Sudan, in which traces of violence threaten 
to stay, suspended, invisible. 
***
Chapter 2: Interrupting The Future. 
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Life Before the Future 
Turning from the strategies of how crises are apprehended and given political value this 
chapter will focus on how crisis and economic value become bound into a troubling knot. The 
chapter focuses on a massive pyramid scheme that took deep root in Darfur around 2009 and 
collapsed by 2010. I argue that there is a co-constitutive relationship between the economic 
subject positions that have emerged under the pressures of crisis and aid, and the forms of 
economic personhood that allowed the pyramid scheme, known initially as the rahma (mercy) 
market, and later as the mawasir (a local term for water tap or channel), to gather such a broad 
base of support. Both economies – of humanitarian aid and the mawasir lead to changes in how 
value accumulates, at certain times and places, and around particular objects. Alongside these 
changes, people develop modified notions of what kinds of activities legitimately amplify the 
value of objects and transactions. I argue that while these shifts in the economic disposition of 
actors can be understood as a way of finding footing on rapidly changing economic grounds, the 
ramifications of this re-evaluation for long-term relationships between people navigating the 
fluctuations of aid involve a higher degree of risk than either humanitarian actors or recipients 
recognize. 
This ethnographic material is illustrative of the second of the three terms that are re-
tooled in the world-making endeavors of humanitarian practice. The preceding chapter treated 
ethical and political values being reshaped through strategies of measurement, attributions of 
causality, and genres of evidence that govern recognitions of violence. More broadly, it explored 
how representational strategies work to make and unmake people and things as units of life and 
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objects of responsibility. In this chapter, I turn to economic value – transformed as relations of 
force and trust are changed, and as new notions of appropriate accumulation emerge.35 
The chapter begins with a description of the mawasir, the burgeoning aid economies of 
El Fasher, and some context of the place into which they emerge. It then moves into a discussion 
of the differences between physically grounded markets (sing. souq, pl. aswaq), and more 
abstract economies (like aid, or the mawasir). By abstract, I mean that value is determined and 
distributed in these economies by conditions that have little to do with the practices those who 
depend on its circulation. The processes by which wealth aggregates are opaque, and the result of 
activities are more or less “black-boxed” to most recipients. I argue that this relative distance 
between value-determining activities and the determinations and practices of people depending 
on that value is shared between aid and speculative economies (or pyramid schemes, as the 
mawasir has turned out to be). This commonality marks out the economic subject positions 
available for people navigating these fields. As such, it illustrates a (perhaps obvious) symbiosis 
between crisis and aid. Obvious as the nexus might be, it demands a critical look at the 
presuppositions entailed in aid regarding the kinds of economic actors its activities engage.  
These presuppositions have to do with conceptions of crisis that prevail in humanitarian 
imaginaries (a conceptual problem related to the discussion in Chapter 1). These conceptions 
make strict delineations between humanitarian aid and development, and a corollary distinction 
between humanitarian emergencies and structural depredations. However, humanitarian crises 
                                                
35 The third chapter will turn to the debates about the ontological status of violence in Darfur. It 
focuses in part on how that violence is seen and shaped by a humanitarian imaginary that draws 
sharp distinctions between genocide and counterinsurgency, between political violence and tribal 
conflict. The final chapter turns to the case of Bentiu, in which we see the world-making force of 
humanitarianism toggling with a all three terms of value. As will already be clear, these three 
terms are in complex and dynamical interaction, so that their distinction here into three chapters 
may be more of a descriptive expedient. Their relation becomes clear in the fourth chapter. 
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disrupt, and ultimately reform relationships between objects of value and those who depend on 
their circulation, precisely because they collapse value and survival. These changes demonstrate 
that there is a thick (if strained) sociality of emergency, a condition in conflict with the 
representations of humanitarian crises that see only a rupture or disappearance of the social 
fabric called “civil society” during times of war.36 The prevailing notion of people in 
humanitarian crisis, in a state of emergency, is that their economic subjectivity is collapsed into 
their bare biological survival. Much like homo sacer in Agamben’s locus classicus on people 
abandoned by the protections and affordances of their government, the subject of humanitarian 
crisis is considered stripped of all social and semiotic agency beyond survival. However, when 
we interrogate the life worlds that emerge in the interaction between aid economies and those 
inhabiting them, it seems more apt to describe the subject-in-crisis as subsumed under economic 
logics. 
The conditions of economic agency within humanitarian crisis, in which aid is an 
essential condition of collective survival but remains essentially unpredictable, motivates a 
speculative investment in crisis, and in the positions one takes vis-à-vis others within it. Taking 
the volatility of aid distribution as its point of departure, the chapter turns to a conclusion on the 
temporal dimensions of aid. It accounts for how the “failed” investments in the mawasir are, 
even when based on misapprehensions, a strategy of re-asserting agency in the face of 
overwhelming economic relations of force. Ultimately, the practical dimensions of emergency 
                                                
36 The everyday sociality of conflict is the topic of chapter 4. For accounts of the ways in which 
novel social bonds are forged and maintained within crisis, see Allen Feldman, Formations of 
Violence; The Narratives of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1991); Venna Da, Life and Words; Violence and the Descent into 
the Ordinary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Elizabeth Povinelli, Economies of 




aid are framed (often correctly, at least for a time) as the lesser evil. They are figured as rescuing 
the possibilities of a future from an irredeemable catastrophe, taking place here and now. But if 
futures are being salvaged from a catastrophic present by practices of aid, what is it to live in the 
time of aid, between crisis and the future? 
Pyramids, Camps, and The Anatomy of an Aid Intervention 
Aid is more than the delivery of goods for material subsistence. It entails presuppositions 
about economic behavior and rubrics of value in which both recipients and distributors invest 
actively, and around which they structure their actions. One of these presuppositions is the belief 
that the material affordances necessary for sustainable futures can be built suddenly, appearing 
fully formed with little visible hint of the conditions that provide for their emergence. Another is 
that there is a latent economic infrastructure that, unless totally destroyed, provides the 
infrastructural conditions for a return to normalcy (and a withdrawal of humanitarian aid), once 
the humanitarian emergency is considered over. 
Displacement is, of course, an effect of conflict as much as it is an effect of aid. But what 
keeps people in cities is that urban centers (often more secure than “deep field” distribution 
centers) quickly become the economic wellspring of the region. As both Michael Herz and Alex 
De Waal have pointed out, one of the remarkable differences between the present violence in 
Darfur (beginning with the insurgency of 2003, in particularly the April attack on the airport of 
El Fasher), and previous conflicts in the region, is the incredible scale of urbanization in its 
wake. In 2003, before the counterinsurgency began in earnest, roughly 18% of Darfur’s 
population was living around urban centers. Seven years later, that number had risen to well 
above 70%, if we aggregate both those integrated properly into urban residency (about 35 
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percent, which itself constitute a growth factor of two in five years), and an additional 30% 
living in the camps, which De Waal calls “urban in all but name.”37  
 The economy of scale that humanitarian aid constitutes, enabling this demographic shift, 
is staggering. Through a series of both official and classified assessments by various offices of 
the UN (the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the World Food Program, 
primarily), a relatively vivid picture begins to emerge.38 The 2011 UN and Partners Work Plan 
for Sudan shows food security as the largest investment of the aid economy by far, estimated at 
40.4% of a 1.8 Billion Dollar Budget for Sudan (about 727.2 million for food security). Some 4.6 
Million Sudanese are reliant on humanitarian aid by 2010 estimates (UN Workplan, 12). In 
North Darfur (the location of El Fasher), where some 69% of the population is estimated to be 
living below the poverty line (marked at around 114 Sudanese pounds or SDG a month), that 
figure is likely to be significantly higher. In fact, according to a WFP Food Security Monitoring 
Report in 2010, a staggering 81% of North Darfur’s population was living between a daily 
income of 1.9-3.8 Sudanese Pounds per day, just around one US dollar per day by the official 
exchange rate at the time. Only 6% of income gained came from crop production, while 43% 
came from wage labor. Needless to say, aid reception is not counted as income (though as we 
shall see it often functions precisely that way). The Sudan Census Bureau provided the UN with 
                                                
37 Alex De Waal, “Whose Emergency Is It Anyway? Dreams, Tragedies and Trauma in the 
Humanitarian Encounter.” Center for Research Architecture Roundtable: 
http://roundtable.kein.org/node/1078. 
38 Some of the information in the leaked documents, consisting of financial records and of 
security situation reports, as well as hiring and firing documents, has since entered the public 
domain. Some of the statistics may have been available through public channels. As I received, 
on separate occasions, sensitive documents on condition of anonymity, and these proved 
essential to making sense of a rather opaque economy of aid, I have included citations of 
classified documents so that their source is as closely identifiable as possible without 
compromising my informants. Where publicly available, I have pointed to the source, provided I 
was aware of its publication. 
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an estimated 7.8 million population for all of Darfur. In North Darfur, where El Fasher is located, 
approximately 50% of the population is age 16 or younger in 2009, meaning that over half of the 
population has come of age, economically speaking, under a robust aid intervention that 
burgeoned in 2004/2005. 
 Comparing the aid economies that are the primary economy that a majority of the 
population of Darfur has grown up with for the entirety of their adult lives, one begins to get a 
sense of the social magnitude of aid interventions. The Darfur State Ministry of Finance accounts 
a combined local and federal expenditure of 284 million dollars for all three states of Darfur in 
2008. By contrast, the aid budget for Darfur in the same year was an aggregate 840 million 
dollars – the aid economy (the bulk of which, at 65% in North Darfur, was spent on food 
security) was nearly threefold the total government expenditure (on infrastructure, salaries, 
security, etc…). 
 As one coordinator for overall aid summed up the statistical picture for me;  
Except for the initial stages of conflict, grain production was above the pre-
crisis average. But we are doubling the amount of grain on the market every 
year [by which he meant that aid grain distribution was nearly equal to 
annual local production]. Poverty and food security are of course very 
different things. But in many ways, some years ago, many of us began to 
think it was time to go public that ‘this thing’ is over. The trouble is, the 
moment we announce that, what happens to the cities, particularly to the 
IDP populations, who we don’t count as urbanized but are not leaving any 
time soon? Our fear is that once we say this is over, it will begin again.39 
 
Aid budgets have quintupled in Sudan since 2004, with each year seeing more than 50% 
of that aid as short-term humanitarian aid. Compared to a very slim percentage of under 5-7% 
short-term humanitarian aid in any other large-scale economic intervention, whether Iraq or 
Afghanistan, or the Democractic Republic of Congo. Even Rwanda, which saw about half of the 
                                                
39 Interview, North Darfur, March 2011. 
 
80 
aid budget earmarked as humanitarian (and thus short term) in the initial wake of the 1994 
genocide, saw aid budgets re-apportioned by 1997 to about 20% development aid. It is important 
to note that, ideally, development aid is less volatile, insofar as it is not cut the moment the 
“emergency” ends.  
Drawing out the social implications of a social world in which half the residents have 
lived under a humanitarian economy that represents 2/3 of their economic affordance, and in 
which that economy is, unlike in other interventions, intended to be short term, one begins to 
understand why economic subjects emerge around these economies of aid. An entirely new 
demographic lives at the peripheries of a massive economy, clustered around urban centers 
(many of their neighborhoods still considered camps and unincorporated). They could not exist 
as they do were humanitarian aid to be withdrawn, “when they forget about us and move on,” as 
one young woman explained, and are thus impelled to keep aid economies in place. This fact is 
difficult to square with the availability of ample food stocks; production has kept relative pace 
with population, and is doubled by aid grain influx. Living in poverty in these conditions implies 
something very different than the subsistence economy – and the widely distributed scarcity – 
that is imputed to these cities. While that scarcity is certainly felt in rural areas, where poverty 
indicators often outstrip those of the urban center two fold, a very different kind of accumulation 
is happening here, at least as long as humanitarian aid remains. This is the economic 
environment that most Darfuris have been navigating for roughly a decade now. 
The Mawasir – Another Kind of Wealth From Elsewhere 
Sometime around the summer of 2009, a market, initially known as the rahma or ‘mercy’ 
market, offered a novel and high-yield form of investment and return. The market began as a 
rumor about investment in Darfur, and soon, a number of warehouses cropped up around the 
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central souq of the city. The fact that word of the rahma was disseminated in these asuaq and 
that warehouses were placed there is emblematic of the way in which the market relied, both 
semiotically and materially, on these pre-existing channels of exchange and communication. 
This is in part because they afford a social constellation no newly emergent economy can 
imitate: they are embedded in their social worlds. As questions arose regarding the mawasir’s 
viability, it was in this central souq that people gathered to hear of its developments. Musa, a 
local UN staffer who lived in El Fasher during the market’s shaky initial collapse, said that the 
souq “had a gloomy mood about it in those days,” as though it personified a social anxiety.  
In its initial stages, the rahma market promised high-yields in exchange for delayed 
returns – inviting investors to buy in to a process to amplify the value of goods by unclear 
processes of magnification. Much like the short-term aid that comprises such a disproportionate 
part of darfur’s aid economy, The rahma market was not built on promises of permanence, but 
rather on the rush of urgency and finitude. The methods by which value was amplified were not 
clear to those investing. Ideas of how profits were actually made emerged slowly. All that 
anyone knew is that the market was supported as a sound investment by prominent businessmen 
in both El Fasher and El Geneina (many of whom, tellingly, did not invest). I was told by many 
who spoke about the mawasir that neighbors were encouraging each other, in that classic trope of 
pyramid schemes, to invest. “Relatively soon after it began,” one of my informants told me, “if 
you were not in the mawasir, you were an idiot.” 
Practically speaking, the scheme seems to have been structured around a select number of 
hubs. These were warehouses which bought goods from investors at one price at a given time, 
and sold the same good at a different price after a given delay, sometimes selling the same good 
five or six times. The temporal gap between transaction and the receipt of either the goods 
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purchased or payment for those sold spanned 3-6 month cycles. The delays were, interestingly, 
taken as a justification of how the mawasir made sales and purchases more valuable. Something 
was happening, by the logic of investors (many of whom spoke with little shame about having 
lost money on the scheme) that changed the economic value of these goods over time. 
 For those selling goods, profits for delayed payments ranged, by all accounts, from 20%-
50%. Investors could be anyone, from the owner of the most successful luxury cafeteria at the 
outskirts of the city to the water salesman who sold a donkey or his lorry. The goods could be 
anything from land titles to, by one report, chickens. People who chose to delay payment and 
accept the promissory note carried the slips of paper as evidence of their investment, showing 
them to neighbors, and encouraging them to get involved in the scheme. They called in money 
from relatives living overseas, encouraging them to invest remittances into the scheme. 
Three principle agents on the institutional side were central to the function of the 
mawasir. The samsar, or broker, solicited participation in the scheme and connected people to 
the wakil. Most of those I spoke to explained the wakil as a ‘check writer’. But the wakil is, at 
least outside the scope of the mawasir, anyone entitled to deal with business affairs on behalf of 
another party. The wakil would connect the customer to the major transactional players of the 
mawasir: making links between investor and larger brokers – the shadow figure that owned the 
warehouse and kept the scheme in motion. 
There were two main forms of payment that enabled the scheme (not to be confused with 
the two modes of profiting from delay). One was writing two checks for the full cost of the 
object sold – the first redeemable immediately and the second redeemable after several months. 
A second form of payment was to offer the seller (or buyer) an option. If selling, for example, a 
car, the owner was offered the option to either accept immediate payment amounting to, say, 
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40,000 SDG. As an alternative, they were given the option to accept a share, or promissory note, 
worth 60,000 SDG. The catch was that said note was redeemable only three to six months after it 
was issued, on condition that after the initial transfer, the car stayed with the warehouse 
managers. In turn, a hypothetical buyer of the car would be offered the car immediately for 
50,000 SDG, but be given the option to pay just 30,000 SDG to own the car within 3-6 months. 
While one or two successful rounds of payment on deferred sales had expanded a base of trust 
that drew in a vast majority of Fasherites, neither those early moments of success nor the 
scheme’s40 precipitous collapse had settled into a congealed narrative by the time I was forced to 
leave the field. A full year after the collapse of the scheme, a special prosecutor had just been 
appointed to re-construct who was involved in the scheme and in what direction the economic 
networks ran. 
Many investors were under the impression that brokers appreciated the value of objects 
by selling them on the Khartoum market, where they commanded a higher price. In actual fact, it 
seems that during that interval of months during which goods allegedly accrued value, the same 
car (or chicken, hypothetically) was sold six or seven times to different buyers without any 
having knowledge of the other. One of these buyers might be lucky enough to get the object in 
the end. By conflicting reports, the mawasir had functioned for about nine months to a year, 
when rather quickly checks stopped being honored and two of its prime movers fled El Fasher. 
Running from some time in the second half of 2009 to May 2010, the only reliable 
estimates regarding the mawasir’s magnitude that I heard were from the minister of finance for 
                                                
40 I use scheme here, and throughout this paper, because it felicitously doubles as investment 
scheme and pyramid scheme. For the purposes of ethnographic analysis, it is important to note 
that I avoid answering the question that I pose and that remains unstable throughout the field 
material: the question of what, from the limited perspective of an investor, could serve as criteria 
distinguishes the structure of legitimate and illegitimate schemes of accumulation. 
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South Darfur, based in Nyala, who had taken public position against the scheme. Most Fasherites 
explained his position as the reason Nyala was not more drastically effected, and one UN official 
offered her guess that this was to protect the government aligned Rizeighat who have a strong 
base in El Dein and have virtual control of the significant trade routes moving out of Nyala. That 
minister estimated losses of around 175 million US dollars (equivalent to about 62% of the total 
annual federal budget of Darfur). It was hard to find anyone in El Fasher who had not either lost 
money in the scheme, or lost significant objects, even land titles (dahabshil). The scope was so 
broad that, at the time of my research a full year after collapse, checkpoints were still checking 
registration papers for private cars. If these were lacking, cars were impounded to (ostensibly) 
establish a fund to pay back those who lost money in the scheme. Within three days, I met two 
local UN workers who were actively looking to regain lost investments, and that was before I 
had begun doing any serious research. 
When I first encountered investors more systematically, the talk was no longer of the 
rahma (mercy) market, but of the mawasir, or water tap. Many (but not all) felt that the scheme 
had the structure of a pyramid scheme – often, my interlocutors simply called it a scam. But even 
in collapse, the mawasir had an uncertain status as economic phenomenon, and there was heated 
disagreement about whether that interpretation was correct. The radically different ways in 
which value was imagined to obtain and issue forth to investors from the scheme not only left it 
as an unstable economic object. As we will see in the next section, while some believed they had 
been swindled for raw economic gain, others thought the region had been the victim of an 
instrument of economic sabotage targeting Darfur’s rebel’s base of support. Still others insisted, 
though more rarely, that this had indeed been a legitimate development scheme, undermined by 
anti-government forces. These heated and persisting disagreements in the face of a massively 
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collapsed economy evince the very instability of the status of economic value (and its 
relationship to conflict and aid) in El Fasher at the moment. That the same scheme of investment 
can still hold plausible status, alternately, as instrument of expropriation, or of political 
expediency, or of economic development speaks volumes to the uncertainty regarding 
relationship between value and accumulation. 
This uncertain status is also one of the mawasir’s most abiding relationships to the aid 
economies of the region – aid economies also marked by unpredictable and unstable fluctuations, 
but themselves an institution that determines what matters as economic value and how it is 
distributed. One remarkable difference is, where the scheme collapsed at the magnitude of 60% 
of the annual budget for the region, the aid economy was still in full motion, and still amounted 
to three times the total government’s budget. 
Economic Figures, Economic Grounds 
 
 In his critique of national elites in The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon takes a rather radical 
position on infrastructural facets of developmentalist nationalism; 
If the building of a bridge does not enrich the awareness of those who work 
on it, then that bridge ought not to be built and the citizens can go on 
swimming across the river or going by boat. The bridge should not be 
“parachuted down” from above; it should not be imposed by a deus ex 
machina upon the social scene; on the contrary it should come from the 
muscles and the brains of the citizens. –Franz Fanon “The Pitfalls of 
National Consciousness” 
 
The passage interweaves primitivism and humanist nationalism in a way that crops up 
with some consistency in Fanon’s writings (particularly in his gendered read of the psychological 
dispositions of inferiority in Black Skin, White Masks). Development driven by broad nationalist 
interest (rather than intervention in the name of civilization) may fit to said nationalism; a 
commitment to it makes sense within the context of his critique of a decolonizing national elite 
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that mimics old colonial postures vis-à-vis its citizens and thereby carries forward legacies of 
colonial disenfranchisement. But Fanon also partakes in an odd valorization – which I read as a 
primitivist perspective – on the non-elite, much like his ambivalence towards the rural/urban 
divide.  
In his demand that the bridge be built in the presence of as many “local authorities” as 
possible, “…so that the new techniques can make their way into the cerebral desert of the 
citizen;” (Fanon 1963, 201) he conveys a certain metropolitan disdain that echoes Marx’s famous 
comments about the “idiocy of rural life.” Fanon insists that the newly emergent popular citizen 
is the core of the national recovery from colonialism. But that citizen, while ultimately heroized, 
is encumbered by a “cerebral desert,” that demands the enlightening influence of national 
development (can we read the enlightening influence of labor?) under the tutelage of indistinct 
local authorities. In this notion, he echoes both Nyrere’s Arusha Declaration, and the rhetoric of 
capacity building within UN Development Program discourses.  
This proximity between decolonizing nationalism and current logics of international aid 
is worth reflection. The citizen whose conscience is addressed by Fanon’s nationalist utopia 
seems to recede in discourses of international developmentalism. Under current idioms of 
intervention, international aid steps in where the nation is seen as lacking, and the “stakeholder” 
displaces the citizen. In the process, calls for consciousness-raising that were the hallmarks of the 
high era of radical anti-colonial nationalism are displaced by a rhetoric of capacity building. As a 
former Frelimo fighter now working for the United Nations as a Rule of Law officer said over 
evening drinks in 2007; “people don’t fight for justice anymore man, they fight for good 
governance.”  
People in Economic Infrastructures 
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Perhaps. But often, before they begin to speak the language of good governance, they 
fight for more concrete things: potable water, functioning health facilities, and inclusion into the 
electrical grid. In 2011, El Fasher’s electricity oscillates across halves of the city, the grid going 
dark on one side and diverting to the other around four in the afternoon on alternating days. On 
nights when the electrical grid attends to the Southern side of the city, the Main Souq changes 
texture and shape, illuminated by a vast expanse of petroleum lamps fitted with rag or rope wick 
and shaped out of various malleable metals. Traders at the western foot of the market pile 
tomatoes, onions, or Jebel Mara oranges (when these are available; war has little mercy for 
growing seasons) into pyramids of exquisite geometric precision. 
From this delta of fruit sellers, the souq rises in all directions, cut off sharply to the north 
by a residential neighborhood lined with repair shops, one or the other cafeteria restaurant, and 
clusters of machinists. Rising only slightly higher up the southern foot, with tributary roads 
dedicated to carpentry and general goods, the souq dissipates into a residential area of classic 
Sudanese houses – several rooms and a kitchen surrounding a Hosh, an open-air courtyard inside 
the enclosing walls.  
When people walk the avenues, the souq has a hydraulic quality. Streams that ebb and 
flow depending on the time of day are diverted and gather again at particular places. To the west, 
the souq cuts abruptly, contained by a row of stalls under indefinite construction and a reservoir 
that swells and contracts with the seasons. The souq’s depth is to be found eastward, comprised 
of arterial pathways marked out by the rakooba of sticks and tarps for shade. There, butchers 
work with sweating cuts of meat that secrete the smell of fleeting freshness. A few streets over, 
knock-off denim and sunglasses texture the tables, followed by leather wares on tarpaulin’s 
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under the only large building in the souq – the seven stories house a pharmacy, an emergency 
room, several general stores, and luxurious spreads of halawiyat (sweets) on the ground floor.  
While the butchers, grain-mongers, men and women plying legumes and spices on the 
east face of a slope rising along what looks to be the long-dried bed of a once-seasonal watershed 
sell the most important wares, the place where people meet, linger, and discuss is the open-air 
delta where merchants adjust to the not-so-natural circadian flux of electrical and firelight. Long 
after other avenues thin out, people gather here, often buying nothing. They talk about the days 
events, spread political rumors or talk about the latest antics of their slightly off-kilter neighbors. 
They tell of shipments they have heard coming in, of rising or sinking prices, and simply spend 
time, being there, awash in the streams of talk about the city and it’s environs. This is a locus of 
both fruit sales and what Julia Elyachar calls phatic labor41 – the work it takes to stay abreast of 
the information that traffics on social circuits, especially in times of volatility. Perhaps, given the 
material qualities of the landscape, qualities that become metaphors for economic circulation, it 
is appropriate that this now-dried watershed at the end of a reservoir remains saturated with 
people, light, and rumor regardless of the hour or the electrical grid.  
A Souq has a shape, a textured geography, smells that make an olfactory signature for the 
landscape. The rhythms of surfeit and scarcity are uniquely psychoactive in all the ways the 
circulation of objects is uniquely psychoactive – meaning that they produce connections beyond 
rationality and irrationality, mix desires and needs, render social relations dynamic and 
                                                
41 Julia Elyachar combines Malinowski’s concept of phatic communion with Marx’s conception 
of labor to coin this term about the semiotic infrastructures and communicative work that forge 
social worlds. I understand her use of the term in conjunction with the work on semiotic channels 
and infrastructure of one of her interlocutors, Paul Kockelman. See Elyachar, Julia 2010. “Phatic 
Labor, Infrastructure, and the Question of Empowerment in Cairo.” American Ethnologist 37 (3) 
252-264. Also Kockelman 2010. “Enemies Parasite and Noise: How to Take Up Residence in a 
System Without Becoming a Term in It.” Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 20 (2) 406-421.  
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unpredictable, and forge deep attachments and aversions in ways few other pedestrian activities 
do. The abrasive hard sell, the leather with a hint of un-cleansed tannery stink, the smell of Jebel 
Mara honey, inconspicuous dealers of USAID grain and oil; this repertoire is repeated, with 
iterations and omissions, across souq and city. Even if offering exactly the same array of goods, 
the aswaq (plural of souq) elicit a sense of recognition, invite feelings of intimacy, and give a 
sense that you can make a relationship to the place. From this vantage it is easier to understand 
why the negotiations of value with gestures and brief verbal exchanges had so enthralled a 
certain generation of ethnographers whom I envy for their unreconstructed wonder, treating this 
“bazaar” like a dream, or a fleeting natural wonder (Geertz, 1978; Rabinow, 1977). 
It is in part this quality of signature that explains why ‘Souq’ and ‘market’ do not 
translate with proper equivalency. Some circuits of value carry strong traces of the social worlds 
they comprise as they forge relationships in their transaction between persons. Others, such as 
credit, currency, or derivative contracts are considered opaque – producing a social world they 
simultaneously obscure.42 One of the biggest misconceptions behind the persistent refrain to let 
the banks crumble, a refrain heard often from critics of the government bailout of US financial 
institutions in 2008, was the notion that the concrete worlds these financial instruments had built 
were limited to the banks themselves. Missing from the analysis were structures of dependency 
and flows of capital that facilitate the kind of overpowering “wealth from elsewhere” that can 
suddenly supplant a local economy. An uncontrolled collapse would have been marked by 
collapsing food and health infrastructures in places the world over who had never taken credit by 
choice. 
                                                
42 Lee and Lipuma draw out the social consequences of the opacity of these instruments in 
Financial Derivatives and the Circulation of Risk. Even classic commodities share, as we have 
seen since Marx, this quality of obscured social relations.  
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 However, the temporal and spatial intervals that insulate certain transactions against 
interference from those whose worlds they produce do not necessarily depend on high-
technology financial abstraction, nor do they require complex contractual apparatuses. In places 
that are effected by sudden economic emergence, places precipitously suffused with the 
chronotopes of aid43 as El Fasher, such a disconnect may require little more than investment in 
these objects, charged as they are with prescriptive social force. Once habituated to living in a 
world remade by these powerful objects of modernity, it would take enormous work to undo the 
subject positions they have afforded. The ideal actors with whom aid does its business – those 
whose futures are being salvaged, are being imagined prima faci as neoclassical actors in 
waiting. It is to this point that I now turn. 
We Have Never Been Neoclassical 
Ideal neoclassical actors make self-interested rational decisions based on as accurate a 
sense of the world as possible, trading on gains across margins (trafficking into places where the 
                                                
43 I am referring here to Bakhtin’s concept from his Theory of the Novel, in which the 
chronotope takes the spatial and temporal indicators of how space and time are connected in 
particular constellations, and renders them concrete. Where Bakhtin deals with literature, I want 
to suggest that aid, like civilization and modernity, is a discourse that deploys chronotopes to 
invite a particular re-constitution of how space and time ought to be constituted. The chronotope 
is, if you will, an object lesson in what development will bring; “spatial and temporal indicators 
are fused into one carefully thought out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on 
flesh, becomes artistically visible;” writes Bakhtin on chronotopes in the novel; “likewise, space 
becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot, and history.” Clearly the 
concept does not map perfectly onto terms of economic subjectivity. However, it does convey a 
condensation, into particular objects of value (cooking oils, aid grains, fire-free brick presses, or 
solar powered bor holes to mine the water table) that convey a different way in which space and 
time is to be inhabited productively.  
Chronotope is also a felicitous concept for translations because it presents us with a 
model of why aid is so effective at transmitting core values associated with neoliberal subjects, 
despite the policy makers and practitioners of aid projects working, by and large, with no such 
grand conspiratorial intentions. Rather, the neoliberal subject formations that traffic with 
economies of aid are often transmitted by the basic infrastructures and objects that, in good faith, 
are quite effective at preventing poverty-determined epidemics such as cholera or malaria. The 
trouble with their traffic is, of course, that preventing the symptoms of uneven development does 
little to effect the social relations that condition them to begin with. 
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value of a thing is different relative to its point of origin) or on direct utility, depending on what 
moment you take stock of the theory. This is not the condition of living in the time of aid, in the 
time between the crisis and the future – in which desire is displaced by need and the future 
occluded by urgency. In fact, it has never been the condition of an economic world marked by 
perpetual crisis. And these days, perhaps the question must come full circle. Is crisis not a 
pervasive feature of our economic world? 
El Fasher, as the capital of North Darfur, and one of the loci of the regional displacement 
that has taken on a scale which Alex De Waal has referred to as “urbanization in anything but 
name,”44 is figured under a series of inter-connected notions of what it means to have status as 
the capital of a war torn, impoverished African region. All the excess mortality and slow atrocity 
that is implicitly disavowed in the strategies of apprehending the bombing of El Shifa45 are 
explicitly ascribed to El Fasher as a given. El Fasher has never been neoclassical.  
Rather, El Fasher is defined by the logic of humanitarian crisis, a notion distinct from 
economic crisis. The logic of humanitarian crisis shapes a long, gradual, and brutal process into a 
discreet and well-defined event. Histories of unfolding are not forgotten; they are put on hold in 
the interest of the present. Within this logic, scarcity and subsistence are the economic signatures 
of this place, in which aid flows are problematic but indispensable. They come as relief. They are 
immediately necessary, because during crisis nothing unfolds along slow sequential plans – there 
is only the constant, immediacy of threat. As such, a distinction must be made. While 
humanitarian aid is indisputably an economic intervention, it is an economic intervention into a 
                                                
44De Waal, “Whose Emergency Is It Anyway? Dreams, Tragedies and Traumas in the 
Humanitarian Encounter” http://roundtable.kein.org/node/1078 accessed May, 2013 
45 See chapter 1 
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humanitarian emergency. As such the determination of emergency invokes broad power, and 
renders the recipients of aid, by definition, passive, placing the authority of the emergency 
responder over that of the self-interest of the recipient (De Waal, 2013). 
The logic of humanitarian crisis is carnal, complex only in the sense that everything is 
failing all at once.46 This is not the location of those modern economic circuits of speculative 
abstraction (and extraction) that have manifested in the North Atlantic as “the economic crisis.” 
In El Fasher, the effects of that crisis may be felt on the vectors of oil prices, fluctuations in 
available grain, and foreign exchange shortages. While these fluctuations have ripple effects that 
run from elite centers of accumulation to the price of staples, and other critical parts of the 
economic lives of Darfuris, these effects are mediated and ancillary, not considered to be parts of 
humanitarian crisis. This is one of the troubles with representations of humanitarian crisis, and 
how they are figured in distinction from notions of fully developed, and complex economies of 
modern accumulation. 
One of the exceptions to this logic is Dr. Laura James, who traces the fluctuations in 
different eras of natural resource extraction in her contribution To Ryle, Willis, Baldo and Jok’s 
The Sudan Handbook (2011). She illustrates how long-processes of shifts from reliance on one 
concrete commodity base to another (from Slaves to Oil, as her chapter is called) is as complex a 
collection of effects as any modern financial transaction (Ryle et al 130-148-76). Tracing 
extractive economies exploited by the Sudanese state from gold, to ivory, slaves, and irrigation 
                                                
46 Identifying thinking about crisis as a set of logics that do work to represent their object in a 
particular way is not to say that crisis is less real. For a lucid account of the cataclysmic moments 
that are apprehended in Humanitarian reason, see David Keen, Complex Emergencies 11/17/14 
10:19 PM. For one of many biting critiques of what is missing from the optic, see David 
Kennedy The Dark Side of Virtue, and especially Gayatri Spivak Righting Wrongs in the 
collected volume Human Rights, Human Wrongs. 
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based agricultural, arguing that oil has fundamentally changed the game but is only the last in a 
series of complex extractive measures. 
She shares with Jay Spaulding a keen sense for the supporting institutions that each of 
these economies relies on, and a close analysis of the kinds of contractual relations, re-
configurations of governmental relations, and trading networks each requires. Gold trade, for 
instance, has by both her and Spaulding’s analysis been one of the driving factor in early drifts 
toward Islamic legal influence in the urban center (particularly of the north), as Shari’a tended to 
be more conducive to merchant’s contractual arrangements in the 16th and 17th century.47 She 
sees clearly that, even today, while petroleum extraction may be the single most profitable 
extractive industry of the Sudanese National Economy (all caveats about how national 
economies are measured notwithstanding), agriculture remains its most important sector because 
of the livelihood it provides to a large swath of citizens… a distinction often overlooked between 
profit and social value. She also understands the precarious quality of any economy entangled 
with international fluctuations of economic relations, tracing the collapse of the agricultural 
boom (reliant largely on the still-existing Gezira agricultural scheme) with the downturn of 
cotton prices during the Great Depression (James 134). She goes on to illustrate the deep social 
similarities between 20th century labor migration and the raw commercial traffic in human 
commodities that was the slave trade.48 
Juxtaposed to her analysis of that complexity once can see the distorting power of a 
restricted humanitarian vision. Her account makes what should be a relatively uncontroversial 
                                                
47 Jay Spaulding, The Heroic Age of Sinnar (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
1985).  
48 For a history of the integration of former slaves into the emerging labor market of Sudan, see 
Ahmad Sikaing, Slaves into Workers; Emancipation and Labor in Colonial Sudan (Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 1996 
 
94 
point. Not all changes in the grounds of fiscal value have a positive social consequence. All of 
them involve deep legal, social, and spatial restructuring. They re-configure international forms 
of dependency and different configurations of government.  
By contrast, in accounts of the UNDP, economies of aid are all-too-often figured as blunt, 
simple, object-oriented schemes of state planning. Aid initiative based on these conceptions often 
overlook the lesson to be taken from the fact that both the Gezira scheme and the schemes to turn 
Sudan into the breadbasket of the region in the mid 70s failed miserably, in part because of 
unforeseeable contingencies (the collapse in global cotton, or increasing crop failures). In short, 
it is not simply high-technological financial economies that work with risk (and its distributions). 
Development planning is a largely object-oriented activity, and long predates instruments such as 
the derivative, or the options contract. Nevertheless, it involves considerable speculation and 
risk. 
Dominant humanitarian optics, as we have seen above, draw a sharp distinction between 
basic humanitarian aid and more long-term development interventions – between complexity and 
spare materiality. The troubles of speculation in financial spheres can be criticized by those 
fortunate enough to engage it. But in countries plagued by a bare problem of material surfeit, 
there is little time for planning. It is for this reason that interventionist agencies situate 
themselves at sites of potential “value development” or “capacity building” with relative 
certainty they will manage to do no harm. This is the logic of triage. After all, how can an 
already broken economy be ruined? The trouble is that these schemes overlook the distinction 
between financial value and social value.49 
                                                
49 Certain models of livelihoods analysis being developed by scholars like Suzanne Jaspers and 
Margie Buchanan-Smith at the Feinstein Center at Tufts University are trying to develop models 
around these differences. 
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This representation amplifies an economic representation of Africa prevalent in both 
academic and popular accounts. The framing of Africa as an exceptional economy on account of 
its lacking infrastructure has proven recalcitrant, as it can serve both the narrative of the 
impoverished continent and recent notions of Africa as the frontier of economic opportunity. 
Registering this stubbornness, Peter Geschiere gives a brief commentary on Jane Guyer’s 
Marginal Gains, observing that her regionalist approach tackles differences in African economic 
practices without “…ending up with the binary oppositions (‘African’ forms of organizing the 
economy that seem to be the opposite of western ways), [and] without falling into the old 
anthropological form of attributing each ‘tribe’ (or region) its own specificity in economics” 
(Geschiere 2007). Geschiere reads this “west vs. the rest” narrative as an unintended side effect 
of the substantivist attack on the economic universalism of the formalists.  
That narrative, however, remains in popular journalism on the ‘frontier economies’ of 
Africa. The robust, high technology financial speculations that have devastated the financial 
sectors of North America, East Asia, and the North Atlantic may be precarious, but they are not a 
crisis that strikes at essential elements of human existence (so at least we are given to 
understand). The speculative interests that drive the crises in the developed world are systemic 
and distributed (much like the circuits of medical aid that disappear from the register of El 
Shifa’s depredations) but still more or less law-abiding and civilized within their legal and 
ethical frame.50 By contrast, in El Fasher, the precarity of people’s lives is determined by the 
breakdown of their social worlds, not by fallout resulting from the economic complexity of these 
worlds. Violence is the primary locomotive of the development of lives here, and it is against the 
                                                
50 For a more nuanced version of this narrative of lack – both sympathetic and not rooted in the 
same racialization – see Ferguson, Global Shadows. 
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impacts of that violence that an economy of care is established that should see people through to 
that moment where they can become survivors, known in UN jargon as “early recovery.” 
These neoclassical accounts, which inform basic tenets of the value chain analyses 
prevalent in the UN (and to a degree, even to the more nuanced livelihoods models developed by 
Tufts University and moving forward into the UNDP’s development programs), rest on two core 
normative notions that obscure the economic stakes of humanitarian aid. First, they are based on 
notions of how economic activities make things happen – they have a particular image of causal 
chains. The limitations of their inherited perspectives on causality makes it difficult for units of 
responsibility to be linked to economic acts and decisions. Conversely, they miss the complexity 
in economies of volatility and relative poverty – seeing little of the social detail that inhabited 
economies actually entail.51  
Value chain analysis, which will be discussed in more detail in the final section of this 
chapter, was emerging as one of the models for early development (competing with livelihood 
models that take a more well-thought-out perspective on the local matrices of institutions, 
resource controls, and political contexts in which people work to make their living). One of the 
major differences between Value Chain Analysis and other approaches to development aid, the 
latter of which do not explicitly espouse entrepreneurial business models, is that Value Chain 
Analysis explicitly focuses on “the application of business opportunities to the bottom of the 
pyramid.” The three projects I observed at work, targeting hibiscus flowers (from northern and 
central Darfur), un-tanned leather skins (from South Darfur) and groundnuts (primarily from 
                                                
51 The stand-in for complexity is, often, environmental impacts, and these have come a long way 
to bring complexity back into the argument. While the Complex Emergency concept (Keen, 
2008) places economies in context. It is really only in some reports that the human economic 
activity, and political engagement with, environmental change is brought to the fore of analysis. 
A brilliant example is Adaptation and Devastation (Buchannan-Smith and Fadul, 2009). 
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fields in the triangle between the three capitals) all aimed explicitly to link local farmers with 
regional traders and then international firms; ensuring livelihoods and “any possible added 
value” to local farmers, and “socially responsible high value products to international 
investors.”52 The manual that lays out these objectives explicitly valorizes low labor costs 
(which, under other rubrics of accounting, would be called poverty), as a competitive edge. The 
main difference between Value Chain Interventions and straightforward neoliberal 
entrepreneurism is that, given the volatility of the “investment environment,” an international 
organization (in this case the UNDP) provides the international investor with guarantees. The 
organization offers “value chain governance” (meaning that they enforce vertical relationships of 
responsibility), and explicitly carves out room in their Terms of Agreement for “Value 
Interventions,” which are brief interventions intended to “trigger an internal change of the 
system, in this case the behavior of the VC actors” (GTZ Value Links Manual, 9). 
As one of the leaders of the project put it to me “At the moment, we are selling the 
vulnerability of the growers as well as the crop. I mean, men aren’t allowed to harvest Hibiscus, 
so we can emphasize gender-empowerment in conflict zones under early recovery.”  
She thinks for a moment and elaborates; “I mean, it’s obvious it will take us a while to 
make this really profitable. In principle the German companies we have involved can still import 
cheaper from Mexico, but this is better hibiscus, and here they are building civil-society 
entrepreneurs, it’s a perfect way to incentivize investment, even if this isn’t a competitive field 
until we make it happen.” 
                                                
52 These projects were run under models inspired by the German Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zussamenarbeit (the Society for Technical Cooperation), which has since changed its name to 
the GIZ The replacing ‘Technical’ with ‘international.’ For a thorough programmatic 
introduction, see their Value Links Manuel (internal GTZ document, available also to UNDP 
cooperating partners).  
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Perhaps, to be more precise, it is not so much that these interventions assume the 
neoclassical economic subject to pre-exist the intervention. Rather, they are some of the few 
development interventions that explicitly aim to inculcate the norms of neoliberal subject 
positions in their recipients, and assume it to be in the long-term interest of local “stakeholders.” 
What these assumptions obscure is that belief in the distributive logics of aid changes, at least 
temporarily (and I will argue more permanently), the political status of political violence. This is 
clear from the program director’s notion of “selling vulnerability.” Victimhood and 
disenfranchisement becomes, under this and several other conditions, a valuable commodity. In 
the context of these value chain interventions, if the harvesting Darfuri woman has trouble 
selling her labor, marginalization enters the scene as “value added.”  While we have seen how 
humanitarian aid produces an economy around conditions of crisis, what we see here is that 
while Darfur has never been neoclassical, there are at least certain projects actively working to 
change that.  
Crisis and Projection – Making Sense of Emergent Economies 
This analysis of economies of aid suggests that deeper changes in the economic subject 
positions and regimes of value are entailed in crisis management that claims no intention of 
inculcating these kinds of changes, or even, for that matter, remaining permanent. These changes 
are effects of crises and relations forged to them. In other words, the transformations in 
economic subjectivities I am describing are prefigured in the models of crisis (and of people in 
crisis) by which various NGOs and UN agencies operate. With these models, normative notions 
of value, of contract, and of appropriate modes of transaction and accumulation are carried 
forward. By the same token, these notions are actively engaged by and incorporated into the 
economic practices of recipients known, tellingly, as stakeholders, and in that reception, their 
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status as agents is changed. The critical point I want to illustrate is that, in extra-contractual 
ways, crisis invites a re-negotiated of regimes of evaluation precisely through the intensive 
attention that valued objects receive in those moments. They are volatile sites around which all 
kinds of value-making activity is motivated by the urgency at the root of crisis logics. 
One of the remarkable characteristics of both the mawasir and the aid economy is the 
radically different interpretations my informants formed to make sense of what made each of the 
respective economies work. For some, development aid in the form of microcredit was “theft” 
because others received humanitarian aid with no conditions of repayment. For some, the 
mawasir was absolutely indistinguishable from development interventions that made of local 
workers entrepreneurs. 
The consistent string that held the accounts of the mawasir together was that they each 
offered explanations of the structure of boom economies during crisis – crisis being the name 
given to a variety of events by a cluster of professionals working on emergencies and 
experienced differently by victims and perpetrators, by bystanders and beneficiaries (Roitman, 
2013; Meister, 2011; Schivelbusch, 2001; Koselleck & Richter, 2006). Mbembe and Roitman’s 
work in their seminal “Figures of the Subject in Times of Crisis” (Mbembe & Roitman, 1995), 
but also to Roitman’s recent rethinking of the concept take us some way to understanding its 
dynamics. 
Commenting on subjectivities of the crisis and the crisis of subjectivity they argue that; 
“The first term refers to the crisis as a constitutive site of particular forms of subjectivity. The 
second term invokes the crisis of the very act of signifying that moment. These two instances, 
constitution and signification, are decisive elements in the generalized production of violence in 
the world today” (Roitman 2013a, b). I would only insist, and I think this is precisely what 
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Roitman is working to address in her more recent work on crisis, that the sequence of events 
named and constituted as an object of intervention are no less brutal because they are slow and 
unfolding.53 
Speculating on Subsistence 
In the way “victims” of the pyramid scheme respond to its collapse, the contingent 
realities of aid and crisis emerge as a conceptual template of how people make (and make sense 
of) value. We see that beside a speculative relationship that develops towards the processes of 
humanitarian intervention, intervention inculcates the norm of speculation. It does so by 
normalizing the notion of wealth that comes from no identifiable location. The economies of 
cities burgeon as aid flows swell with donor interest, and thus it makes sense, as a Darfuri, to 
practice the kinds of dual income strategies that many WFP administrators have observed. To 
take advantage of wealth distributed to anyone registered as an IDP, displaced families will keep 
some family members in camps in order to gather this income, but continue to cultivate their 
fields illicitly (as the fact of cultivation would render their status as IDP questionable). This is 
one of the explanations for both a high level of poverty and a level of grain production that 
surpasses levels prior to the crisis. It is also invites a speculation on where and when aid 
disbursements will be re-allocated, as these fluctuations within the region can cut off critical 
income strategies for displaced Darfuri residents not staying abreast of cuts in WFP budgets. 
Aid goods, thought of as subsistence or relief, in fact begin quickly to function as objects 
for the accumulation and distribution of wealth (can we call them a hyper localized form of 
general equivalent?) Aid grains are sold for about 1 Sudanese pound per Kilo, and cooking oils 
(vitamin fortified) are often sold for much lower quantities of the preferred sesame, peanut, or 
                                                
53 See also discussion of the quasi-event as conceptualized by Povinelli in Chapter 1. 
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olive oil. UNHCR tarpaulins were selling, by several accounts, for about 15 Sudanese pounds in 
camps that were threatened by rain (often not those around the relatively arid climate of North 
Darfur). Mosquito netting sold at a premium, with variations between 20-50 pound for a single 
piece of netting depending on the quality of the weave. All these objects would traffic in the 
souq, while WFP officers had little idea of what the price for staples, like a kilo of tomatoes or 
200 grams of sugar might cost.  
“Spooning” was the term that the WFP developed for a practice that they monitored quite 
closely, by which Camp Sheikhs (local authorities who had authority only during displacements) 
taxed their constituents by skimming from a collective delivery. These collective deliveries 
happened because Sheikhs would often collect the ration cards (single entitlement identifications 
for an entire family, made out to the male head of household) as a way to “keep the secure” 
(which often meant as a strategy of taxation). In an extreme case, the Tukul (Thatch-roofed 
domicile) of a Sheikh burnt down in a “cooking fire” during one of the registration exercises, 
leaving the Sheikh in question pleading for temporary ration cards to feed his constituency (of 
some 40-50 families) until the next registration. Registrations did register new displacements, but 
multiple registration was so common that the World Food Program officer, a Nigerian man with 
years of field experience, walked through a registrations exercise I observed telling registration 
officers “remember, we should be cutting about one of every three recipients.” Later that day, as 
refugees became restless during the registration process (which often processed 4-7000 refugees 
per day in a given location), a young soldier began shooting at the ground to keep them from 
rushing a cordoned area. No injuries. 
That all to make clear that the dynamics of crisis become an object of speculation, and its 
material items take on a currency of sorts in economies of aid. It is speculation on the economic, 
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political, and ontological dimension. Where and how being displaced will be compensated, what 
groups will be most likely to benefit from hiring practices of NGOs, or practices of spooning, 
and who will be counted as a refugee and not – these all become critical for their economic 
implications. The building blocks of an emergency become, in other words, the ground on which 
speculations on value take place. 
Being an object of belief, aid itself is an unsteady object that participates in the volatility 
of facts that involve human actors. These are in extreme vacillation in Darfur, where aid finds its 
unlikely double in the Mawasir. Between mawasir and aid economy, the economies that sustain 
the new El Fasher thrive on a perpetual state of precarity, and rapid cycle of booms based on 
speculations about an expected but uncertain future to come. This is in part because of the 
particular techniques of measurement, prediction, planning and testing that render speculative 
responses to crisis actionable (see Chapter 1). They are, to borrow Donald MacKenzie’s phrase, 
a complex structure based on belief in future states that partakes in the “material production of 
the virtual” in the form of future norm (MacKenzie, 2007). Out of such speculations, the basic 
building blocks of an ideal social world with which a different future is to be forged take their 
shape and find root in social circuits. Abstract concepts units, like ‘civil society’, ‘rights-based 
lives’, and a care for the ‘abstract human’54 – are translated into material correlates. They come 
to be articulated with entitlements and supporting institutions, and before too long, take the form 
of rubrics of evaluation and of distributing value. Thus, attending to the world-making force of 
this circulation requires attending to what it forecloses.55 Among those foreclosures is an 
                                                
54 I am using the abstract human here in the genre of Marx’s notion of abstract labor. 
55 Ian Hacking, in a recent LRB article, paraphrases Andrew Lakoff’s description of how a 
classification of a particular disorder (in this case, bipolar disorder) by the American DSM is 
carried, by the interactions of wealth disparity and uneven epistemic power, to the halls of an 
underfunded Argentinean hospital, that agrees to change its practices and treatments to gain 
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unencumbered relationship to how value is made and remade, a “dispossession,” to use Julia 
Elyachar’s terms, of the capacity to determine value for oneself in contexts of aid. Perversely, the 
mawasir promises (if falsely) such representational agency. 
Non-Violent Robbery 
“You know, one of the good things about the mawasir is that there used to be a lot of 
hijacking before, but after the mawasir, none, because non-violent robbery worked;” Explained 
Hassan. He wove together accounts of how the mawasir worked with these observations about 
connections between legalized robbery and hijackings. He was the first of a string of people I 
met in El Fasher, from UN specialists to women who walked hosh to hosh (inner courtyard to 
inner courtyard) to do laundry and lived in the displacement camps around the capital, who had 
“invested” in the mawasir. For many of the Fasherites I spoke to, the mawasir, was a social 
phenomenon of such undecided status that it served as a kind of projection screen – revealing 
optics and impressions precisely because its internal workings remained so fundamentally 
indeterminate.  
Furthermore, it stood in for a political discourse that was dangerous to utter directly and 
publicly – and the mawasir became the surface (if not blank, at least fungible) on which 
representations of the political present of Darfur could be rendered. Assertions that the Mawasir 
was legitimate were often presented as an opening salvo in an argument that “the crisis” had 
been caused by the rebels, and the government was doing what it could on the side of the people. 
                                                
access to the financial and infrastructural resources of clinical entrepreneurship that depends on 
the Manual. In the process, “… doctors rethought and patients experienced the symptoms in new 
ways.” It is re rethinking and re-experiencing of processes of building livelihoods, infrastructure, 
and accumulating value that I am describing in this chapter. Presumably, the re-constitution of 
symptoms is not a process, in Lakoff’s example, of the passive reception of reclassification by 
doctors and patients. Nor is the reception of aid and it’s notions of value passive – and as such 
the world making is more emergent than architectural. Still, the power of differentials and 
reciprocating monopolies on sovereignty cannot be overlooked. 
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More nuanced assertions recognized a shifting logic of the sociality of crisis. Initial insurgency 
and counterinsurgency had never totally abated, but annual deaths from armed conflict had 
dropped to 2,321 annually by 2010 (according to UNAMID statistics I received in 2011). Of 
these, most of fatalities attributed to armed conflict were in south Darfur, the region least 
impacted by the mawasir. Hassan, as well as several other informants, nevertheless marked that 
the troubles they faced had taken a more economic turn. One informant, blaming the government 
for the collapse of the scheme, called this “the economic front of the war.”  
Still others claimed that it had been an economy so robust it had brought the private car 
to El Fasher, and drained out the guns. For others it had drained money, yet again, from the 
poorest regions of the north into the capital. By some accounts the government had planned 
every last detail, intending to impoverish El Fasher and its rebels. By others “the rebels” had 
intentionally undermined a booming economy. In the play of such variations, one could tell more 
about attitudes towards responsibility, entitlement, and legitimate accumulation (economic 
values) and about evaluations of the legitimacy of insurgents and government functionaries 
(political values) than one could about the scheme itself. Many off hand remarks regarding the 
mawasir simply found it shameful, though it was only when explicitly asked that any of my 
informants mentioned considerations of riba or usury. The shame was, rather, that people had 
been cheated.  
Another common response, often hurled by sitata shai, the tea ladies who are the most 
important hub of rumor (often the best information available) as they listened to my 
conversations, was to ridicule those who had invested. On one such occasion, a man employed as 
a driver for the United Nations who had lost a car and several thousand pounds in the scheme, 
took the ribbing rather well. As we left, he told me the tea lady herself had encouraged many to 
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invest while the scheme was in full swing. Had the Wali acted as a political actor when he 
supported the scheme, or was he simply giving prudent personal advice? One of the questions 
that always remained unsettled regarding the mawasir was where the initial liquidity with which 
the fund was run had come from. At a deeper level, this opened a set of questions about whose 
wealth this really was, both during the mawasir and after its collapse.56 
“No, no;” one of my informants insisted while working her vegetable stand in the main 
souq; “they didn’t have much money. The did it by taking money directly from the population… 
and they started with simple people, business people could not afford the risk.” The answer was 
so self-evident to her she wasn’t much interested in talking through it more. Still, if indeed a 
primary base of investment for the mawasir had come from a broad base, then it must be 
assumed that some actionable belief drove the scheme, and gave drivers of the scheme access to 
resources (to the investment of others) that would have compensated for the relative lack of 
initial liquidity. 
While the vegetable dealer went back to selling potatoes and onion bundles, Hassan and I 
wove on slowly through the Souq. Time and again, in accounts of the mawasir, the refrain was 
that, whatever the scheme turned out to be, there was good reason to invest initially. Even those 
informants who found the collapse unsurprising were understanding of those who had been 
compelled to investment. As one NGO worker told me, “if I had lived in Zam Zam (one of the 
                                                
56 Katherine Verdery invests, quite literally, in a Caritas scheme in the shock-therapy transition 
to privatization and capitalism in Romania, and thus manages to provide us with a robust account 
of conceptions of accumulation and ownership that led many who lost money they had (re) 
invested into the Caritas scheme as not having ever been their own to begin with, as they had not 
worked for it. (Verdery 1996). A larger lesson to be gleaned from her ethnographic intervention 
there is that every notion of accumulation and legitimate ownership demands a “metaphysics of 
accumulation;” a way in which it must make social sense that wealth accumulates in one place 
and not another. This is a sense of fiscal legitimacy, and Roitman’s Fiscal Disobedience 
(Roitman 2005) shows us the subversive side of people either appropriating or re-interpreting 
these notions of accumulation. 
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largest IDP camps in Darfur) at the time, what reason would I have had not to put money into the 
mawasir?” 
Hassan was convinced that it was solicited trust in the government that inspired people to 
invest in the scheme, and trust solicited with explicit purpose; 
“The government planned this entirely with the purpose to drain the refugee camps and 
destroy the zaghawa tribe. The main rebel groups went to the mawasir also; it was the economic 
side of the war. Then, in April, the demonstrations, and 18 people were killed.” 
The explicit purpose of the scheme, as far as Hassan was concerned, was to draw 
investment from Darfuri’s who would otherwise have invested in (one of) the insurgent groups, 
which Hassan refers to as Rizeighat (as though the tribal affiliation and political belonging were 
synonymous). Whether or not that interpretation had any truth to it, the magnitude of 
demonstrations had been widely reported. Hassan saw them as a clear sign that the entire chain 
of events was orchestrated, and he believed the conspiracy went to the highest echelons, that this 
was war carried out by other means. 
Still, the 2000 odd demonstrating Fasherites moved directly against the Wali’s house, not 
least because they blamed him for reneging on a promise to recuperate the money they had lost 
in the scheme – a promise he made immediately after its collapse. By way of encouraging 
investment in the scheme, his office had taken the public position, in May of 2010, that these 
interest payments were not Riba – forbidden under anti-usury regulations. He actively 
encouraged investment. But the mawasir’s collapse, coming just one week before the national 
elections (the demonstrations following a month after), led to an about face. The scheme was not 
repudiated, but the losses that stoked the rage of demonstrators were refigured by the Wali as 
nothing but accident – a glitch in a mode of entitlement, an aberration of the market that was the 
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mawasir. More specifically, the accident he referred to happened as the development initiative 
(as he called it) was unfolding, and corrupt officials undermined its function. 
When I asked Hassan about whether the crossing of riba regulations – regulations against 
making profit by interest – had not occurred to any of the investors he dismissed the notion, 
“No, I give you money to buy sugar, and a bicycle. That’s not profit that is forbidden.” 
It was as though it was a foregone conclusion that, as long as mediated through the traffic 
of objects, there was no issue of riba or usury, which seems to agree with the basic outlines of 
riba regulations, which are not anti-profit per se, but work by different ethical schemes of how to 
increase value than interest-based banking and investment (Maurer). It wasn’t to say that Hassan 
wasn’t convinced the mawasir was illegal; 
“They [the agents of the mawasir] gave people you cannot trust in real life credit to open 
a store. They give these people the power to sign checkbooks so these people can give checks out 
to buy cars… what do you think will happen? 
“But you have to understand,” he reflected on afterthought “there has been a layer of 
people who get rich fast, and everyone believed they can be like them. That was another trigger 
for the Mawasir. Khartoum and Juba got rich from the CPA. The Camps got money from the 
UN. People asked ‘why not me’?” 
With that, he opened up a perspective on the mawasir that multiple boom economies had 
made plausible, a perspective that rested on the notion that wealth ought to be distributed to all 
those involved in its creation, and that this had not yet happened. Or more precisely that now, 
with the multiple booms, this prospective local boom was bound to become reality. The 
comprehensive peace agreement had re-invigorated the economy of the North, and the boom 
economy there was real enough to make the notion of massive gains on Khartoum markets 
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plausible. While oil was not new, investment in its potential in peacetime was booming, though it 
would be a mistake to believe that it was being distributed in a way that would have ripple 
effects for other parts of the country.57 
These background assumptions, from the perspective of those watching the material 
effects of wealth developments, are difficult to fault. The economic effects of the CPA were 
relatively opaque to most Sudanese citizens. The structure of entitlements, decision-making, and 
funding sources of the UN were a constant source of debate (transparency means much more 
than making figures available). The distribution of Federal revenues was probably about as well 
described in JEM’s black book as anywhere else (even if the Black Book was excessively brief 
and polemical). In short, a sense of how the scheme differed from other modes of accumulation 
was unclear. 
Again, a full year after the collapse, differences of opinion between those who had 
speculated on the scheme were still active. This despite the admission by the Minister of Justice 
in Khartoum, less than a month after the collapse, that two regional councilmen closely attached 
to the NCP – and both former police officers – had been arrested for, among other things, 
fraudulent check writing. Wealth from nowhere, be it in the form of aid or the result of 
speculation, is by definition opaque, and that opacity is an enabling condition for how it 
functions, whether as pyramid scheme, government investment, or aid disbursement. It is so 
opaque that even the arrest of these two officials was passed off as an aberration. The market 
                                                
57 It should not escape a reader familiar with the history of the Darfur conflict that this is the 
political core of the claims of the “black book” published by the Justice and Equality Movement, 
which is seen as a sort of manifesto for the initial stages of the insurgency. The Black Book:  
http://www.sudanjem.com/sudan-alt/english/books/blackbook_part1/book_part1.asp.htm last 




itself was still framed as a legitimate scheme of development, but plagued, like all large scale 
economic schemes, by the inevitable aberration of corruption. 
“This was our development scheme,” a lifelong local who worked in an office just south 
of the main Souq told me, angrily, a day or two after I had been introduced to him by Hassan. 
“The government was trying to bring money into Darfur. What is wrong with it? They were 
taking things we sold here and taking them to get money in the Capital.” How the local 
government was implicated, as either perpetrator of fraud or benefactor, is rather clear from the 
actions of the wali. Unconfirmed reports (which circulated in reports of non-government aligned 
newspapers like the South Sudan Monitor before these were either shut down or the reports 
redacted) cited a speech by Omar Al Bashir saying that ‘those that want to make money for the 
country, don’t leave Sudan, go to Fasher.’ 
“When the mawasir collapsed, they said to us ‘you must water the tree;’ and many people 
voted for them again because they thought it was the only way to get their money back.” Selma 
explained. 
During the elections, which were in full swing (in fact, in a crisis of sorts when the 
scheme began to collapse), each party was assigned a symbol with which they would be known 
in election material, to deal with the poly-lingual citizenry of Sudan (and relatively high rates of 
illiteracy). Smaller parties, like those with no more than several dozen posters in a local election 
like Bentiu, had symbols for instance, of an angreb (a classic Sudanese bed) or a bicycle. The 
NCP’s symbol was a tree. The hydraulic notions of distribution of both power and wealth took 
form even in electoral symbolism. The nexus between the electoral iconography and the 
hydraulic quality of the mawasir’s processes of expropriation was not so much a choreographed 
dramaturgy as it was felicitous. 
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Still, what effectively took place with this call to “water the tree” was a keen act of 
articulating economic and political value precisely where and when this relation had been (and 
would later, in prosecutorial phases continue to be) disavowed. What the ruling party in Darfur 
intimated, with characteristic lack of subtlety, is that investments in the scheme, now in 
irrefutable collapse, would “return,” or again become “real,” as long as they were re-enforced by 
political investment in the party. In other words, re-elect the party, and the monetary value 
returns; invest political capital, and economic capital returns. 
Selma’s friend, Omer, who works close to where she works, in the telecommunications 
office, interjects “but look now, now there is not even any sugar in the juice any longer;” 
As he pauses for a moment, Selma clicks a south-Sudanese style agreement… 
“…and when they killed people it was only the Zaghawa killed, none of the other tribes,” 
he continues. There, Selma doesn’t seem to agree, silently moving on to talk of the war in 
general. “Since this war;” she says “it has all fallen to the women, men cannot do the work any 
longer.” And then she tapered off. I was eager for more on the gendering of labor in the shadow 
of war economies, but the context (in the office of her local NGO) was not conducive to it. I 
made an arrangement to meet her a few days later. But circumstances intervened. Still the 
conversation had brought in both a gendering of the depredations of war and a racialization that I 
recognized from narratives of the conflict, but that appeared here projected directly into 
economic positions, imagined or otherwise, vis-à-vis emergent modes of accumulation.58 
                                                
58 This is a theme that re-appears in more robust form in the southern on southern violence 
described in chapter 4. This violence takes place within peri-urban neighborhoods, the largest 
single encampment between 90-100,000 inhabitants, and contiguous camp areas to the north of 
Khartoum alone (counted as several camps) hovering around 900,000. We see a similar theme in 
the racilization of the Khartoum Arab as “white” compared to both the western and southern 
peripheries that is treated in Chapter 3. 
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Omer had lost his car in the mawasir, and echoed Selma’s sense of the government’s 
culpability. That the Zaghawa, considered predominantly insurgent, had been the only ones 
killed in demonstrations only seemed to confirmed the scheme’s careful choreography to the 
end; “Two weeks before the elections Mahmood Ismail and Adam Ismail came out and said the 
problem was with the central bank… then they won the elections because they were the ones 
who could bring it back.” In both their accounts, even as they sat next to each other in 
conversation, an irreducible ambivalence about the mawasir was clear. As though as an 
afterthought, Selma threw in another non sequitur; 
“The one thing is, during the Mawasir there was no fighting. The fighting ended during 
the mawasir because it collected all the guns from people. They used to keep guns, but during the 
Mawasir they needed money.” She was telling me in no uncertain terms that by placing a 
premium on arms, the Mawasir had purchased them out of circulation (albeit likely on the wager 
of getting a price of three to one – a Kalashnikov was reported to cost somewhere around 40 
USD on the markets of Al Geneina, to the west, where they were cheapest). This odd insistence, 
by two informants who met me frequently, and who both had intricate knowledge of the wars in 
Darfur, that there was some zero-sum between economic violence and political violence 
mirrored the same statement by Hassan, a claim that I could make no sense of until I began to 
accept the instability of the mawasir as a social fact as part of its political and economic force. It 
had been intricately construed to me as a rebel’s continued insurgency against a developmentalist 
national government finally ready to share the spoils of peace with Darfur. It was, for some of 
my friends, the economic frontline of a war on said insurgents, while still others were simply 
dumbstruck by the goods and money they had lost. Some hoped the government, local or 
national, would still intervene. Others laughed at the blunders of their neighbors and brothers for 
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deciding to invest. To try to expose “what really happened,” while conceivable, would have been 
to miss the event in the mawasir, namely that a shift in the very grounds of economic life was 
visible in its fissures. What was believed, or could be considered credible, drove people to invest 
in an economic field so new that its emergence was dependent on precisely that speculation. 
Speculative Investment in Crisis 
In a short essay What We Do When We Believe, De Certeau builds an elegant argument 
not only for the etymological arc that binds credit and belief, but for their link through a 
temporality within which belief must exist to enable transactions within (economic) power (de 
Certeau, 1985). “Belief thus occurs between the recognition of an alterity and the establishment 
of a contract.” Belief is no longer necessary when a contract is honored and both parties are 
again at equal advantage (no longer having given up an advantage in the hopes the other will 
become something they are not at present – namely capable of paying). Belief also breaks at the 
moment a promise is broken to the overpowering advantage of one party. 
De Certeau’s theoretical observations illustrate how fundamental to the function of the 
Mawasir the belief in the legitimacy of accumulation and distribution from nowhere is. This 
belief is, in part, prefigured in the forms of transaction entailed in aid economies. There are, 
strictly speaking, no contracts, only promises, between distributors of aid and its recipients. Only 
promises, hence the persistent memoranda of understanding and insistence on best practices that 
pervade the paper-communiqués of that world. Memoranda of understanding, sealing economic 
relations that for nearly a decade doubled the amount of available grain circulating in (and out 
of) Darfur. Contingent understandings, underwriting annual budgets of aid and protection of 
Darfur that every year amount to about 3 times the budgets of the region’s three states.59 
                                                
59 See appendix A. Statistics, and visual representations courtesy of a UN Official working in 
Darfur, corroborated against budgetary disclosures. 
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Promises might be a fitting form of commitment between parties that share a social world, 
promises provide a thin reed on which to rest transformations of evaluation at the scale at which 
aid economies do. 
These economies are based on belief (reciprocated between ‘stakeholder’ and aid donor) 
and function only over the unpredictable intervals and power differential that obtains between 
participants relating to each other just short of contract. The logics of distribution of the WFP, 
for instance, often change precipitously in the face of donor attentions, something recipients 
must adjust to, often with a belief that the underlying causal conditions will change in the future 
(Buchanan-Smith 2009). The head count registrations by which the WFP calibrates its 
distributions are part of a complicated negotiation between government census and field 
registrations, guaranteed by tokens (and, as trust begins to dwindle, by biometric registration). 
The structure of belief, for De Certeau, is always (unlike faith) social: “the process of 
belief only works starting not from the believer himself (sic) but from an indefinite plural 
(other/others), presumed to be the debtor and the guarantor of the believing relationship. It is 
because others (or many) believe it that an individual can take his debtor to be faithful and trust 
him” (De Certeau, 201). Despite many differences between debt and aid, the conditions for 
making sense of accumulation that is not based on an articulated contract or legible dynamics of 
value creation is sharing with others a belief in continued results. Belief in aid as an enduring fix 
begins to transfer onto other, very different economic objects. When anchored in objects, belief 
is supported by things construed as evidence and is thus no longer pure belief. The mawasir is 
one of those moments during which belief seems to function without evidence because of the 
opaque nature of its promises of wealth and its volatility. 
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Another example is a brick-building boom that took place in Nyala, the capital of South 
Darfur, around 2008. Rumors spread quickly through the town that the African Union was 
planning to move its headquarters to that capital from El Fasher. To prepare for the attendant 
boom in construction that comes with any influx of aid infrastructure (Duffield, 2010), the brick 
builder went into a frenzy of firing brick. To feed the Kilns, a premium was put on firewood, 
much of it gathered from the neighboring Thun forest, which was strained far past its capacity, 
and was being stripped for fresh saplings. The compound never arrived. But the social after- 
effects of overproduction and deforestation remain. By several accounts, about 80% of the Thun 
forest had been destroyed, as brick production had spiked from 1-2 million bricks per annum 
before 2003 to 2-10 million in 2008.60 
As we think through some of the neoclassical assumptions of invisible hands and rational 
actors (see especially Elyachar, 2012), it is worth remembering (following Callon, Barry and 
MacKenzie’s work on the performative dimensions of economics) that in economic phenomena, 
it is perhaps not so fruitful to sharply distinguish between social fact and empirical fact, nor for 
that matter between belief and certainty. Rather, in economic phenomena, the traffic between 
these terrains is rapid and powerful, blurring beyond recognition the lines on which we 
analytically rely. In many ways we may recognize in this re-evaluations taking place in the 
moment of crisis that people as economic actors have never managed to be or remain 
neoclassical for very long. And perhaps in contemporary distributions of risk (Beck, 1992; 
LiPuma & Lee, 2004), De Certeau’s invitation to place belief back at the center of how we think 
about what we do when we perform economic acts is worth taking seriously. 
                                                
60 UNEP: Deforestation, Devestation, and Destitution (2008). 
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Taking seriously the material effects of belief also means understanding how tenuous the 
effects of belief can be, and attending to the sociality of its collapse. I had heard the news of the 
demonstrations of about 2000 people converging on the wali’s house in El Fasher (mentioned 
above) a year before this research, while I was stuck in Bentiu waiting for the only plane 
servicing the town to return and take me and several others who were temporarily stuck in the 
border town back to the capital. The rumors about the demonstration were slightly different than 
the reports of major news outlets, like the Sudan Tribune or the northern Southern Sudan 
Monitor (not to mention the Northern Monitor, aligned more or less with the Ansar or Muslim 
Brotherhood) at least in tone. The prevailing view among residents of El Fasher was that the 
collapse of the mawasir constituted a blow to the government, with the two prime movers of the 
scheme both closely affiliated with the National Congress Party of Omar Al Bashir. These two 
councilmen, and 56 others, were eventually arrested in conjunction with the mawasir.  
However, the Wali of El Fasher was not held responsible, claiming that the government 
had no role in; “The so-called ‘mawasir market,’ as it is a market that citizens make the profit 
and loss (sic) without interference from the government.” There is no small amount of irony in 
the governor of El Fasher deploying a classic Caveat Emptor argument in his defense, after 
having, by all accounts, encouraged investment in the scheme. But on the level of public 
imaginations of the mawasir, he was not wrong that markets in which profit and loss could 
obtain quickly had become an ideal model in El Fasher, an ideal of speed and scale that had not 
been prior to the influx of aid. He offered an image of the mawasir in which citizens traded in the 
absence of the government for personal gain, while at the same time, repudiating his own active 
participations. On the other hand, it is clear that he recognizes that “investors” do not, like good 
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neo-classical economic subjects, feel personal responsibility for their losses. Behind this strange 
mixture, I argue, lie the assumptions of an aid economy. 
A logic of accumulation had emerged under the influence of aid economies that not only 
normalized volatility and risk, but actually valorized risk as a potential for robust profit. This is 
in part because aid, as crisis management, follows and responds precisely to volatility. When aid 
becomes a primary economy, risking, in the sense of giving up a relatively transparent economic 
activity (selling or working lands), becomes a premium, as aid changes economic landscapes and 
possible strategies of survival even for those who would not choose to be its recipients. 
Value Chains and the Physiocrats 
As touched on above, at least one division of the UN – The United Nations Development 
Program – has also had its eye on several commodities in Darfur – groundnuts, sheep, oranges, 
and cattle that could benefit from so-called Value Chain analysis, described above. The basic 
idea was to compound the value of local crops by “relinking” them to international markets. 
Value Chain analysis had a moment in the mid 1980s where it worked as a privileged model of 
calibrating profit in the corporate boardrooms of the US. It matched the moment where everyone 
was going global at an unprecedented pace, and the modeling of costs of global commodity 
chains helped make sense that new stage in global speculation. Like speculation and belief, so 
here, the separate details of a burgeoning economic network were not new. It was their re-
constellation, and the way in which they subsumed so much previous economic activity. In the 
corporate context, Value Chain analysis was seen as one of the models that demonstrated that 
there were strong incentives for aggressive outsourcing of production both nationally and 
overseas. Their origins also trace roots to Francois Quesnay’s founding formulation of the 
physiocrat notion of agricultural value. 
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Important for my thesis is the overlap in the imagined efficacy of intervention. A simple 
tenet of the Value Chain analysis, applied to Groundnuts and Hibiscus in Darfur, is to vitalize the 
value available to Darfur’s marginalized economic actors by connecting them to international 
circuits of exchange. This, of course, mirrors one of the most common claims made about the 
mawasir – that the traffic of goods through the richer markets of Khartoum would facilitate 
objects to accrue more value than they would on the markets of El Fasher. It is remarkable that 
one of the competing models of “early recovery” development in Darfur, the Value Chain 
projects of the UNDP, would fall back on the physiocratic notion that ultimately grounds a 
regional economy in agricultural. After all, UNOCHA figures (provided above) showed 
agricultural production to be one of the sectors of the Darfurian economy most “distorted” by 
aid, and the UN Environmental Program’s Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment identifies 
precisely that distortion as one of the drivers of continuing conflict. 
The latent physiocratic roots of this “early-recovery” development (development in the 
immediate wake of crisis) are interesting on a second level. When taken in light of Johannes 
Fabian’s claim that the time of the other is also figured as another time, often in the past of the 
modern economic subject, this application of physiocracy ignores the ways in which this round 
of conflict has re-ordered the social world of Darfur. In that lacuna, the imputation of crisis to a 
people and old projections of primitivism begin to overlap structurally. The shifting grounds of 
value that mark present volatility are figured here as though they were nothing but a world 
disordered by violence that displaces rule and rationality. That rationality is presumed to return 
without serious friction at the end of hostilities, which amounts to a deep misunderstanding of 
how the socio-economic impacts of aid had made themselves felt. To elaborate the nexus 
between Value Chain analysis and the physiocratic approach to value somewhat schematically, 
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the Physiocrats share with Value Chain analyses performed of late in Darfur the central objective 
of assessing how commodities can be made maximally productive in the interlocking networks 
of so-called “value systems.” For the UN, this chain leads through the import-export markets of 
Khartoum to the world market.61  
It is here that the flaws in Value Chain analysis when applied to an economy of conflict, 
and the rubrics of value that conflict and aid inculcate, are most apparent. The notion that wealth 
is being invested from outside Darfur by connecting basic commodities from Darfur with the 
market of the capital is the notion that anchors the imagination of the mawasir’s potential 
viability. It also mirrors precisely the long-range attempts at remedying Darfur’s lack within 
development projects through “community-based capacity building” by linking their work to 
global markets. 
Taking a very provisional look at notions of short and long-range market behaviors, and 
the temporal order of circulation necessary to see tendencies towards equilibrium and profit 
maximization in an economy brought out of the direct ravages of crisis, it becomes clear how ill- 
suited the neoclassical world-view is to the conditions of humanitarian crisis. Or perhaps it is 
better to invert the criticism. Crisis-as-optic makes of the habits, desires, and rationalities that are 
extant among recipients of aid an object to-be-formed. It forcloses different ways of inhabiting 
economic subjectivity in the strict sense of the term, which would include reckoning with desire, 
unlike the concept of the economic subject which sees mechanical, rational response to need. 
This is the economic lesson to be gleaned from a critical perspective on crisis and humanitarian 
management. If crisis is seen not as an unfolding of events but rather collapses past and future 
grievances and intentions into a short-range condition of emergency, it also collapses different 
                                                
61 UNDP value chain analysis Hibiscus Grower’s Project. 
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elements of self-definition into raw indicators of population-level crisis and recovery. In short, it 
makes out of emergent subjects objects of intervention. Seeing crisis as a condition that totally 
subsumes the agency of non-combatant economic subject, humanitarian imaginaries treat 
decisions of ethical or political value, economic value, and ontological values as proximate, 
opening up thick interaction between the one and the other. They fail to see the complexity of 
socio-economic agency shaped within crisis as an economic subject position to be engaged 
carefully, with attention to the details of these different activities of determining value.  
It is these details in which the sociality of crisis comes to life. One of the cooks of the UN 
cafeteria, which had until recently been run by Pacific Architects and Engineers – an 
infrastructure and security firm owned by Lockheed-Martin, and charged with a rather sinister 
portfolio of  “tasks” – admitted that he had a backdoor business in cooking oils. Many Darfuri’s, 
it seemed, disliked the Vitamin-A fortified vegetable oils, and sold them on the market (or, to 
this cafeteria cook) for quantities of sesame oil or peanut oil without the fortifications. Rather 
amused, he explained to me that the World Food Program was consuming a lot of their own oil, 
which had been re-circulated back to them. From their perspective, perhaps, the ideal recipient of 
aid also tends not to have tastes. Similar stories of grain recirculation, which was hitting levels 
where it was at a relative surplus,62 demonstrate that the subsistence utility of grain has moved 
closer to the utility of grain as general equivalent. It was not, in fact, uncommon to find USAID 
grain in some of the larger markets of Khartoum, and particularly in South Sudan (where it was 
decidedly NOT being distributed), at prices of around 1 SDG to the Kilo (50-60 Sudanese 
Pounds for a 50 Kilo sack of Sorghum); a low price, but still better than the value it might get in 
an aid-grain saturated region. 
                                                
62 See Chapter 3, and Appendix A, for discussions of how accusations, denials, and specters of 
genocide have frenzied the subsistence-parts of aid economies. 
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In other words, one of the channels by which the mawasir was imagined to legitimately 
bring in wealth from no identifiable center was a very real dynamic in the secondary sales (the 
“black market” as the WFP would have it) of aid grains. Selling objects that were distributed on 
conditions of crisis in places where people not-in-crisis might be willing to pay for them was, 
indeed, a way of generating value from aid. Still trying to understand the investments of belief 
involved in the scheme, I explained the notion that the traffic of goods into the capital could 
potentially bring some of the money being made there back into Khartoum, to one of my other 
informants, Noha, who ran a modest sized local NGO. She nodded; 
“They put the picture of the president up on the walls of the buildings, and the Wali said 
he trusted them shortly after it began. After that, when people received their first checks, a rumor 
went around that the government wanted to reward El Fasher, and that was the base of trust. The 
rumor was they have a lot of money for the peace agreement that they could not spend, and that 
they wanted to give it to Fasher. Within a few months, everyone was involved.” 
I asked what she precisely understood by ‘everyone’ to be, but she slipped from people to 
the goods they sold rather seamlessly; 
“Everything you can imagine. People brought the Caro [donkeys], they bought chickens, 
there are people I know who lost their dabashil [land title script] to their house. Most of the 
people who the collapse affected were the IDPs in the Camps, who invested and went broke.” 
There is, in other words, a counterintuitive ‘surplus’ in many of the refugee camps around 
El Fasher. Margie Buchannan-Smith and Abduljabbar Fadul present one way to describe these 
dynamics in their writing of economies within the camps: 
The case of livestock is particularly interesting… livestock traders are bringing their 
animals for slaughter in the camps rather than to the towns to avoid taxation…. As a 
result in both Abu Shouk and Kalma camps the price of meat is markedly lower than in Al 
Fashir and Nyala towns. Many of the town people thus travel to the camps for cheap 
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supplies. There are also reports that some of the IDP camp markets are being used to 
market other stolen commodities such as spare parts from stolen vehicles. This is a clear 
example of the shadow or parallel economy interacting with the war economy. (Smith 
and Fadul, 2009) 
To be clear on this point, the analysis here does not imply the luxury that Hassan, Omar, 
and several of my other informants believed in adequately described the camp economies around 
Fasher. However, in and around these locations of displacement, temporary and fragile 
economies crop up that cannot be lived in without navigating the larger networks of economic 
affiliation and rapidly shifting political and military constellations that converge, even briefly, to 
constitute them. The notion that this was investment from the capital, and that refugees tied 
money into the Scheme was, from this perspective, all the more plausible. 
“The president even told the mukhtarbin that if they wanted to make money, they don’t 
go out, go to Fasher;” A taxi driver and friend, Taha, told me when I explained my work sitting 
with him waiting for a fare. Mukhtarbin was a local term for traders who went out of Sudan to 
make money – working the circular gulf migration circuits, and feeding the unaccounted stream 
of remittances from Northern Europe, for example. To the Rahma maket?63 I was amazed; 
wallahi? Really? Mercy is such an odd word. Almost everywhere it gets used, it throws a 
shadow of force. Nevertheless, it takes its place as a favorite adjective of the government for 
measures taken for the benefit of its people.64 It was the first time I queried the work this naming 
did. 
Aid economies create the condition for re-determination of values that forge complex 
relationships between present and future gains, between livelihood (inhabited economic 
                                                
63 See footnote chapter 1. The fact that the Lagna Shaabia had started also as a “mercy 
Committee” – a mediator between centralized government and communities not easily fit into its 
laws – seems not to have been remarkable to Telha, but the notion that the intention of 




practices) and the circulation of value. Politically and economically complex conditions become 
an object of intervention, and intervention demands socially extruded spaces, kept at subsistence 
by aid, which only re-emerge as socially complex when the complexity of emergencies are 
overcome. Hence, the optics through which Darfur, much of South Sudan, and increasingly the 
Nuba Mountains are seen fall out of phase with the people and social worlds into which they 
intervene. These are places of deep political turmoil, depredation, and precarity, but the 
complexity of their emergency is as political, and thus social as the notion of crisis (Roitman, 
2013a, 2013b).  
What we fail to see if we accept an image of intractable catastrophe is that these 
catastrophes may not be predictable, but they are eminently tractable, and small differences in 
how people behave within them are constantly changing the most basic elements of their 
unfolding. The mawasir is an example of a sort of avalanche effect, where small beginnings lead 
to massive consequences. It is the dual (and increasingly inseparable) dynamics of conflict and 
aid that drives increasingly volatile relationships between objects of value and the people who 
traffic in them. Likewise, economies of aid are not temporary surrogates passively 
supplementing an ailing socio-economic structure. (Is any supplement ever passive?) They 
deeply reconstitute the social imaginary (Taylor 2004) by which people make lives work in 
Darfur – the dual income strategies, trading of cooking fuel and ration cards, speculations on aid 
flows, and myriad other examples mentioned in this chapter. Furthermore, as I have tried to 
show, this reconstitution is driven in part by aid economies that have little relation to economic 
worlds that are apprehensible from the ground. In myriad ways, intervention reorganizes logics 
of entitlement, and ultimately intervenes into a fundamental social practice of recipients – 
namely, the determination of what value is and how it is distributed. Elyachar has observed 
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similar dynamics in Egypt under very different conditions, and calls, rightly, this intervention 
into the determination of value a form of dispossession (Elyachar, 2005, 2012). 
This is, like problems of causality, a problem that goes to the very inception of occidental 
social theory. For Aristotle, transactional elements of the social that expose little of the social 
worlds that they create have been a core political concern.65  This is not a modern phenomenon. 
However, economic narratives, even the nuanced forms we are given in early economic 
anthropology, have carried forward the assumption that abstraction and economic speculation are 
the primary vehicles of risk. In this chapter, I have instead drawn attention to the dynamics of 
base materialist speculation. The details here contradict narratives of abstraction, as we see 
evidence of deeply embodied economies generating conditions of complex speculation. This is a 
precarious, non-contractual speculation, which does not depend on complex financial 
instruments, but is based on limited streams of information about shifting grounds of value. It 
obtains at moments where the political economies of rumor (the phatic labor taking place in the 
asuaq) are picked up by brick maker’s unions, or taken as impetus for migration of families, or 
entire groups. Even before the crisis has been called, and the emergency named, the speculative 
work of simply expecting fluctuations in weather and rainfall is a highly complex work of 
thinking with and acting on the future that does not rely on the instruments of abstraction. One of 
the critical differences involved in invoking crisis is the telescoping of time that crisis 
imaginaries involve. When considerations of extreme important are collapsed into a hyper-
saturated presence, the very basic act of speculating (in the older, not the financial sense) – of 
                                                
65 The sense of this obscurity is part of Aristotle’s distinction between commerce and economy, 
the latter of which he sees as “natural” as it works through the management and circulation of 
what Marx, who derives his critique of the money form as a potentiator of indefinite 
accumulation, call the concrete sensuous. The money form is, of course, only one mode of 
obscuring the logics that make value do work in the world. 
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acting prefiguratively on conditions one imagines will obtain in the future – is a capacity denied 
those inhabiting crisis. They are literally figured as incapable of seeing futures.66 
In stark examples of mass phenomena – such as the report of entire forests stripped of 
their saplings to feed the brick-kilns of Nyala on the rumor that the headquarters of the 
UNAMID mission were moving there in 2008 – we see how crisis becomes, once operational, a 
center of strategies of making and keeping a living, and thereby of social and cultural 
transformations of the deepest kinds. Adam, who grew up outside of Thun, the forest outside of 
Nyala, was certain the stripping would force him to move the family. “It will wash away 
everything. The forest was all we had.” The UNEP’s Post Conflict Environmental Assessment 
features brick livelihoods as one of the major dimensions of local livelihoods built around what it 
calls the “relief economies” of Darfur.67 
Living as a beneficiary of aid demands pre-emptive thinking on the logic of crisis 
management. These converge with a mobile, temporary economy of care that dominates local 
economies both structurally and quantitatively. Both are speculating on and shaping the 
dynamics of crisis and crisis management. What we have seen here is the emergence of a form of 
speculative investment in crisis (by both the recipients of aid and those that fund and distribute 
it) that binds crisis and livelihood into a troubling knot. Damage becomes a site of value, and 
volatility a normalized indicator of potential profit.68  
                                                
66 The colonial verso of this denial is the fascination afforded acts of divination and prophecy as 
a non-modern form of future making, but to establish that parallelism would stretch the 
boundaries of this essay. 
67 http://www.unep.org/sudan/post-conflict retrieved October 10 2013. 
68 This notion of investment in damage is, of course, already deeply involved with various 
conceptions of legal and political victimhood. The monetization of damage is not what’s novel 
here, as forms of past damage are made the object of translation into present-day debt. 
Affirmative action was once framed this way, reparations demands still are. What is novel, 
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At stake is nothing short of the futures both of individuals and populations. In the 
invitation to forgo more localized strategies of navigating the constituent events that makes up a 
crisis is an invitation to place belief in a high-risk endeavor, to lay stakes on a political and 
economic future to come. The valorization of risk entails precisely a logic of risking the present 
for the future – a change in the metaphysics of accumulation that invite an investment in crisis 
itself. It asks people to sacrifice present habits, political sovereignties, and existing relationships 
of trust to a future that is being constantly deferred, as the texture and pulse of the souq slowly 
bends to the rhythms of a different order of circulation. 
What is so different about a pyramid scheme in the shadow of aid is the total 
subsumption that the extractive investment scheme finalized. In pyramid scheme, including the 
Madhoff affair that several Darfuri informants referenced as a comparative foil, investors may 
lose “everything.” But that everything is figurative, the economic loss does not hit people who 
have leveraged, literally, their last site of residence or their last means of livelihood. The 
consequences of defrauding, or of extracting the last investment, from people who are living on 
the outskirts of cities as political enemies of a government actively engaged in bombing their 
home-fronts are not simple different in scale. The phenomenon of expropriation turns out, in the 
structure of a self-fulfilling prophecy, to obtain the collapse of economic subjectivity and 
survival that the figuration of crisis proffers. 
And furthermore, on the phenomenology of these investments before collapse, the very 
condition of crisis, with aid as the last remaining economy of scale (which the mawasir was 
meant to supplement), leave little alternative strategy of survival but investing in the volatilities 
of crisis, in whatever guise these present themselves. Unlike the crash of large-scale pyramid 
                                                
however, are livelihoods built on the speculation on the futures (and pasts) of aid (Brown, 1995; 
Meister, 2011; Teitel, 2005; Ticktin, 2006, 2011). 
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scheme like the Madhoff scheme, not to follow the strategies of investment that bring short-term 
gains in El Fasher is to risk ones life before one has invested. In other words, risk in crisis is an 
existential condition as much as it is a phenomenon that comes with financial stake. When this 
condition is met with economies of crisis management (and economic interventions prevail in 
Darfur, where the military presence of Blue-Helmets hardly suffices to patrol the outskirts of 
towns), the existential risk of living in the precarious emerging worlds of displacement and 
depredation merges with the economic structures (and investments) that are afforded to manage 
that crisis. Economies and existential conditions become proximate precisely because the 
sociality of crisis demands total investment. 
And while the mawasir presents us with a powerful demonstration of this dynamic of 
crisis, the life worlds that aid builds are proliferating on both sides of the soon-to-be international 
border between North and South Sudan. Indeed, as some of my informants are still hoping for 
returns on their investments to come from recently concluded special prosecutions on the 
mawasir, the future of Bentiu in South Sudan, built under the dual pressures of nearly four 
decades of war and aid economies, lies in a state of suspension. We will turn, in Chapter 4, to 
this capital of a state infelicitously called Unity State, which attests not only to what sudden 
shifts between conflict, aid, and peace leave in their wake, but to the futures with which a 
humanitarian imaginary is, I fear, not yet equipped to deal. 
Burnt Fingers 
The concrete shape and signature of the souq I began this chapter with did not imply that 
it was somehow more real in the way it constituted the commitments to value that people 
organized their livelihoods around. Nor was the souq more isolated from the political landscapes 
Fasherites navigated, as I began to see tastes, and changing desires in the objects bought and sold 
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there. What was different was that the mawasir as market had obscured, as much as possible, the 
traces of its presence in the city, and it was only indirectly, in these conversations, that I saw how 
robust the transformation of economic imaginaries had been and continued to be, post-collapse. 
Then, suddenly, a few evenings after Selma told me of the mawasir as though it had been 
a form of disarmament, a certain wall seemed to drop, ever so briefly, and for a moment I was 
given a glimpse of things I probably should not have seen – a short glimpse of unmistakable 
evidence of the mawasir's political and practical dimensions. Around 9 or 10, a friend Ibrahim, 
who had mentioned in a vague way that he would put me in touch with one of the wakil involved 
in the mawasir, calls to meet me, as soon as I can make it, without saying why. We meet on the 
Southern side of the city, on a day when the electricity has gone dark. Ibrahim tells me the wakil 
had heard of my work and wanted to meet. Moreover, he was still an active police officer, and 
had been (as I had heard many wakil were) active police throughout the scheme. 
We drive in the car of one of Ibrahim’s friend’s, a man I don’t know, past um defasu 
market, a smaller souq in which mainly staples are sold. We turn left past the erstwhile 
headquarters of the IOM (which was moving headquarters based on security pre-requisites). We 
get out of the car shortly after, where the streets have gone dark, and walk towards the hum of a 
generator and the only illuminated house on the street. At the door, a man with graying hair asks 
us in and warmly greets and shakes Ibrahim and my hands (neither touch the right shoulder of 
the other). He introduces his grandson and asks us in for tea inside the hosh. His wife brings the 
tea. We make small talk. How long had I been in Sudan? How did I like the people? How did I 
find El Fasher compared to Khartoum? We drink the first sips of tea and begin to talk about the 




He begins to explain that many people got what they needed from the mawasir. After a 
few questions about the topic of my research, he gets up and walks indoors to the room adjacent 
to the Hosh, and I look at Ibrahim, who seems just as confused as I am by the abrupt departure. 
After a moment the officer returns, leafing through an oversized blue ledger; 
“I want to show you some of these people, I have them here;” 
He sits back down, running his finger along a margin of the ledger line for line. He doesn’t make 
any effort to hide the ledger, and I can read that he has recorded the names, phone numbers, two 
different entries of Sudanese pound payments (The left hand column higher than the right), and 
the object bought or sold, described in the simplest terms. Car, apartment, car, petroleum, etc; 
“You must talk to the victims, find what has been done to them. This was a legitimate 
market, and then the rebels came and they invested a large amount of money, and then they 
pulled it out all at once.” 
“Why?” 
“To undermine the market.”  
We were talking with Ibrahim translating, but I hear either mufalis “broke” (in the fiscal 
sense) or iflasahu – to make broke or bankrupt. He continued to search his register for the 
appropriate name, occasionally mentioning that one or the other was a good contact for me. Then 
he hesitated. When he suddenly said it would be best if he contacted people and then put me in 
contact with them, it took a moment to realize that what he was rethinking was the entire notion 
of discussing the mawasir and what it looked like from the perspective of a wakil. I am still not 
certain why he agreed in the first place. 
The officer promptly stood up and took me by the wrist and began to walk me from the 
Hosh to the main gate. It’s not a remotely impolite gesture, something akin to saying,  
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“come, let me show you something.” 
“So you would prefer I call you tomorrow to get in touch with these customers?” 
“Inshallah, yes.” 
“Shall I take your phone number, or give you mine?” 
“You can call Ibrahim inshallah, he will tell you how to contact me.” 
It was the last time I saw the officer. Ibrahim continued to contact me, but the fallout of 
the meeting went further. Suddenly, neither Selma nor any of my other contacts returned calls. 
When I did reach someone, the one or two times I managed, it was always at a bad time. Like the 
security man with patent leather shoes who arrived at El Shifa’s ruins, National Intelligence and 
Security Services had re-emerged as a red thread that both bound together and bisected my 
research work. I left the city, on the advice of a friend, a few days later, hoping to come back 
“When my fingers cooled down,” as he said. 
Perhaps by now that kind of research would be possible. But before leaving Darfur for 
the final chapter on the south, I want to turn in the following chapter to the effects of accusations 
and denials of genocide in the region, to illustrate that next to the apprehension of indirect 
violence treated in chapter 1, and the effects of economies of aid that attend a highly publicized 
crisis, the form or recognizing violence itself has profound ancillary effects on how people 
recognize their social role as people under a humanitarian gaze. 
***
Chapter 3: Never Again Here and Now. 
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I want to see politics, insofar as this is conceivable, with eyes relatively unclouded 
by the philosophical gaze. 
      -Hannah Arendt 
 
Purity, Language, and a Neighborhood of ‘Genocidaires 
July 2007 
 
Five men sitting at sunset in front of a dukan (small store) on the South side of El 
Fasher (the capital of North Darfur) begin a conversation about the violence that has 
drawn outsiders like myself and other researchers in. 
“Do you know about the Janjaweed?” asks the one.  
“They’re men with guns, no?” We respond, wanting to be told. 
“Yes, and they fight the Africans here.” 
“They are not Africans?” 
“They are Arabs.” 
“Where are they from?” 
“Darfur, they are from Darfur.” 
A uniformed man: local, but contracted to guard the building that we’re staying 
in, approaches from behind; 
“No, they are not. The janjaweed are whites sent from Khartoum to kill negroes.” 
We’re a bit surprised;  
“White, like me?” I ask; 
“No, no, they are whites because the pure Arabs are white.” 
“But what do you mean by pure?” 
“You are from where?” One asks, 
After a series of questions, we get to the heart of the matter: where is my mother 
from, where is my father from? 
“They are both born in Germany;” I explain; 
“Oh, you are German;” the man smiles; 
“then you understand the meaning of pure…” 
 
This is my first visit to Darfur, in 2007, to see dialogs between different warring 
factions begin to take shape. 
March 2010 
 
My United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) flight to Nyala has been 
re-routed over El Fasher and so I arrive just before sundown at the Nyala airport. The 
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four UN land-cruisers waiting outside the airport are indistinguishable, and Abdullah, the 
driver scheduled to meet me is nowhere to be seen.  
I approach a vehicle that is still idle, and ask the driver whether he could take me 
to the World Food Program headquarters (where I’ve arranged to spend nights). I 
mention the names of contacts, explain that I’m delegated to work observing a UNDP 
conference on microfinance and environmental impacts of conflict in Darfur. Neither the 
driver nor the passenger react. I try again in Arabic, explaining simply where I was going, 
and that I needed to know how to get there from the airport. 
Without turning to me, the driver simply responds;  
“Why do you people assume everyone in this country speaks Arabic? Come get in 
the car.” 
After a brief drive he nods towards the WFP headquarters off the side of the road. 
“Here you are.” 
March 2011 
Around ten in the evening, on the Northern Side of El Fasher, I’m in front of the 
wooden door to the single clay-walled room I’ve moved into in El Fasher for a more 
extended stretch of research. The electricity is off that evening, and I’m reading with 
several candles laid out in front of me in the sand of the hosh. The wall of the courtyard is 
just outside the pale of the candlelight, but with the clear night, the ambient light of the 
sky marks out the silhouettes of the few trees and surrounding buildings (none more than 
a single floor high). 
There’s a cat on the wall. It looks large for a cat, and is making to jump into the 
courtyard. That’s an extremely large cat, I think, as it extends a limb down. But this is 
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not a cat. The foot, once illuminated, is clearly a person’s foot. He (I presume) is 
lowering himself down the wall. I jump up, running at him, bellowing, and pick up the 
brick with a candle on it. The figure tilts backwards, over the wall, before I reach the 
perimeter. “Dik shinu?” I yell ‘what do you want.’ It makes little sense. Nevertheless, the 
yelling seems to have helped. 
I call the man who rents the two-room house I’m residing in, and explain to him 
that somebody tried to climb the wall. I tell him I think it was a kid, trying to scare me 
(perhaps having heard there was a khawaja who had moved into the neighborhood).  
“Stay there” Hussein, who lives in the second room, tells me, and hangs up the 
telephone. He is employed by the UN, and works night shifts several evenings a week. I 
put on a shirt. Moments later, there is aggressive and vigorous banging on the corrugated 
iron door that leads out the northeast side of the courtyard.  
“khawajah, ya khawaja! kulu tamam? ana mustafa… Hussein has explained you 
have a thief.” 
I open the gate. Outside, seven or ten men are standing at the crossroads onto 
which the door opens, each holding a large club, all but one dressed in a white jalabiya. 
In the background, a women dressed in a darker toned tawb is less visible.  
“wen al harami;” (where is the thief) the man closest to me, probably in his 60s, 
demands, and looks past me into the courtyard. 
I explain that the man had been on the wall, that I had scared him, and that he had 
fallen backwards over it. I produce an electric torch, and the men go about inspecting the 
sand of the road around the compound, drawing circles around footprints and discussing 
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in groups of two or three. Mustafa, the oldest by my estimation, and first to knock, comes 
to explain to me; 
“There are two of them, a child and a man, a young man. They have gone. 
Tomorrow, the police will come and look for them. Tonight, my son will sleep in your 
room so they will not come back.” I explain that I’m not terribly concerned, that I 
assumed that they were children wanting to scare me. Mustafa insists. I have only one 
mattress, which I offer his son, who prefers the ground and will not hear of me giving up 
the bed. He laughs when I tell him I often sleep outdoors. 
The next morning, I have a meeting on the far western side of town, in a 
neighborhood just between the military hospital and an open field that are the last parts of 
El Fasher before a lengthier stretch of road that leads out to the UN Compound, referred 
to by international workers as “super camp.” Following a wave of kidnappings, 
employees of various UN agencies are slowly being gathered into the neighborhood just 
adjacent to the camp, or the camp itself. The process is taking some time. I am meeting 
with an Ethiopian woman, employed by the African Union, who I know from my first 
visit to the region. We spend some time discussing her last years of work, and she asks a 
bit about my research in Fasher. I tell her the story of the “break in,” and she scolds me 
not to assume that children climbing walls are out to scare me. She offers to look for 
other accommodations. 
“Where are you staying?” she asks. 
“I’m just north of the central Souq, a few housing blocks in from the OCHA 
compound;” I explain, referring to the Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs. 
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“Oh, that’s why everyone came out so fast. You’re fine out there man, as long as 
you haven’t had any trouble with the neighbors.” I found the notion strange; I had only 
been in town a few days. 
“If they had your back, you’re cool man;” She continues, her 20 years in the 
Midwest of the US exposed in her idiom and accent. “That area’s Janjaweed controlled. 
If you’re moved in there, that’s about as safe as you can get. None of them are going to 
let you get touched.” 
The area was mixed, but several of my informants confirmed that, while it was 
not a significant center for rizeigat leadership, this was the most staunchly rizeigat 
controlled area in the city. The rizeigat are one of the baggara tribes known for strong 
participation in the Janjaweed militias at the height of the conflict. 
…and what remains? 
This chapter treats the stakes of genocide accusations and their refutation in the 
context of the insurgency and counterinsurgency in Darfur from 2003 through to the 
present. Rather than sift through the different positions in the debate regarding Darfur, 
which would largely revisit questions about evidence, numbers, and what is made to 
count, the chapter asks what the evaluation of political violence as genocide does to 
change the status of the acts, the agents, the bystanders and the victims involved in this 
conflict. Its central question is what the historical itinerary of the concept has done to 
change what the accusation does when it circulates internationally. 
To ground the analysis, the first section of the chapter treats three pieces of 
ethnographic material. First, it treats the initial genocide indictment against Omar Al 
Bashir by the head prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and the expulsion of 
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NGOs from Darfur in its wake (which were condemned by the same prosecutor as a war 
crime), revisiting questions of critical infrastructure and how units of responsibility are 
understood. Second, it treats the debates around the status of violence in government 
circles in the capital. It briefly treats the reversal of gaze involved in the observations of 
Darfuri informants (a number of them marked as perpetrators within the genocide 
narrative) as demonstrations in Lybia turned toward brutal counterinsurgency, 
intervention, and civil war. 
From there, the chapter will turn to several prevailing legal and theoretical 
versions of what constitutes genocide, and see how these confer different political status 
to violence in Darfur and change the ontological status of the event, by restructuring the 
kinds of subjects involved.  
Finally, it will turn from these ways of framing Darfur to a conclusion that poses 
the question whether a single and consistent concept of genocide can respond to the 
political violence that it refers to. This critical look at the social effects of legal framings 
focuses closely on the two core questions of the current definition of genocide: the 
question of the “intent” of perpetrators, the collective status of victims “as such.” I argue 
that these lead to an inevitable comparative aporia by which each genocide is compared 
to an ideal type but needs to be treated as radically singular at the same time. The 
conclusion posits that the genocide concept operative today has become so bound to 
particular historical instantiations that the moment of accusation (of evaluation) 
restructures the logics through which people apprehend and articulate their position vis-à-
vis political violence. As such, the way genocide is framed undermines the work of 
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putting perpetration in the past that is (or was) its central function, by invoking these 
pasts into the present in the mode of repetition.  
To elaborate the social structures of this proposition, it will focus on the notions 
of pure subjectivity, the problems of language, and the transformation of perpetration 
from a set of acts to an identity. These are the three troubles that the opening vignettes of 
this chapter entail. I will demonstrate that these problems have been at the core of what 
constitutes a unit of protection in early conceptions of genocide prevention (Lemkin’s 
elaboration of units of responsibility), in attempts to reconstitute a notion of the political 
in the aftermath of radical atrocity (Arendt’s political theory in the wake of Auschwitz), 
and continued attempts to come to terms with the persistent failures of “never again” 
liberalism in the present. 
In an interview in 1964, Hannah Arendt was asked by Günther Gaus whether she 
missed anything about the Europe she knew before Hitler. Whether she believed anything 
was left “I have no nostalgia.” She responds. Then, reflecting briefly, she says; “and do 
you know what remains? Language remains.” Taking her observations of the role of the 
‘mother tongue’ among refugees she knew in the wake of war, I argue that while it likely 
gives excessive relevance to native language to frame language as the final remaining 
anchor, the question of language still strikes at the heart of one of the profound 
interventions that giving a positive legal status to violence makes. I will argue that the 
language used to contain violence – a key avenues for comprehending and coming to 
terms with violence – becomes ossified with this elevation to legal status. The breach 
with local idioms and notions of violence that this entails is one of great failures of the 
current projects of genocide prevention.  
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‘Not Worth the Paper it is Written On:’ Accusations, Denials, and Consequences 
of Genocide Indictment 
In March of 2009, the ICC issued its first warrant of arrest against president Omar 
Al Bashir, which excluded three separate counts of genocide requested by the ICC head 
prosecutor (these were added via a second warrant in July of 2010). Before the much-
anticipated warrant was issued, Bashir made clear that “any decision by the International 
Criminal Court has no value for us, it will not be worth the ink it is written with.” But his 
response in form of the expulsions was clearly a response to a deeply felt impact. The 
question is whether its cause was the indictment itself, or rather a long-standing conflict 
with the humanitarian operations of Darfur. 
Within less than 24 hours, he announced the expulsion of 10 NGOs, and by 
March 9th, the suspension of the operating licenses for 13 of the largest international 
NGOs operating in Sudan, and the dissolution of an additional 3 local NGOs. In the 
ensuing weeks, the UN Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs tried to 
negotiate settlements. But international condemnation pre-empted these negotiations. 
By March 20th, the UN Security Council met, and, while refusing to pass a 
resolution to condemn the expulsions, the meeting functioned as a clearinghouse for 
Jeremiads. As we saw in chapter 2, the humanitarian economies in Darfur are significant, 
and are deeply interlaced with critical life support infrastructure. However, adaptation 
and flexibility in the face of precarious fluctuations are difficult to understand from a 
distance. Before more than anecdotal assessments, Susan Rice, at the time US 
Ambassador to the United Nations, strongly condemned the expulsions for their 
deleterious effects on critical infrastructure. According to a release of notes by the 
Security Council (meeting 9622), Rice emphasized that; 
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Time was of the essence given the shortage of water that had caused 
the spread of meningitis.  The lack of health care was preventing 
patients from receiving treatment, and the United States was deeply 
concerned that meningitis and other infectious diseases would 
continue to spread in the camps…. The United States supported 
urgent efforts by UNAMID to provide immediate relief but its 
efforts could not even begin to fill the gap left by aid groups.  With 
every passing day, President Bashir had used increasingly menacing 
rhetoric for his campaign while UNAMID continued to operate 
under dangerous conditions. 
It is a rather telling coincidence that Rice raises the specter of meningitis here, 
while she was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during Operation Infinite 
Reach (the strike on the El Shifa factory). Despite the mounting evidence, from credible 
diplomatic and medical authorities that El Shifa produced the nearly the entirety of 
Meningitis vaccinations on the market in Sudan in 1998, no attempts were made to 
replace those medicines in order to maintain critical life support infrastructures. Ten 
years later, the expulsions have her deeply concerned, and are also highlighted by one of 
the most high profile humanitarian agencies in the country, Medecins Sans Frontieres, 
who mention the outbreak in camps that house nearly 100,000 IDPs.  
Despite the fact that there were 118 iNGOs operating in the region at the time of 
the expulsion, the 13 NGOs expelled were estimated by the UK Ambassador to the UN 
John Sawers as amounting to somewhere between 40-50% of humanitarian capacity.69 
That estimate is likely true, given the scale of the several of the groups on the list. But the 
notion that the drop in their capacity would fall on an immediate collapse took into 
                                                
69 The groups ordered to leave were Action Contre La Faim, Care International, CHF 
International, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, MSF France, as well as 
its Dutch wing, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam, Padco, Solidarits, and both UK 
and US Save the Children (Voice of America, UN Calls on Sudan to Reverse NGO 
Expulsions Order, Nov. 2, 2009). 
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account only the scale and impact of the aid economies (which, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
is indeed staggering), but not the flexibility that develops under conditions of precarity 
and speculation. Early rumors, rather worrying, circulated among groups like the WHO 
and WFP (neither of which, as UN Agencies, were expelled) that there were massive 
population movements towards remaining fuel supplies (critical to run the water pumps 
drawing deep bore holes for potable water).  
By the time initial Assessments by the US Agency for International Development 
were released, (three weeks after the expulsions), much of the information they used was 
still predictive, and while those predictions were dire (and plausible if we grant the 
assumption that the so-called “capacity gap” would not be filled), they were speculative, 
and far more tentative than initial predictions. Significantly, it was clear that the World 
Food Program could organize with “local food relief committees” for a two-month period 
of supply. More significantly, international employees cycling through Khartoum on their 
way out the country were telling different stories.  
Many were concerned by the expulsion, and to be certain, there was good reason 
to be, but they also had a better sense of the flexible aid economies in Darfur than home 
offices. Most had taken advantage of the difference between international and local staff 
(a two-tiered employment system by which local Sudanese staff are often not afforded 
the long-term security nor the pay scales of the internationals, but often spent much more 
time in the organization). At least three regional directors I spoke to described that they 
had done an expedited training of their local staff, and then transferred what they could to 
them. Though the Sudanese Humanitarian Affairs Commission impounded considerable 
stocks of these non-food items, it was clear that there were rapid attempts to keep the aid 
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economy running. As anecdotes about what people in Khartoum were calling “capacity 
transfers” circulated in the headquarters of the capital, the UNHCR put out its own 
reports, which were more sanguine than USAID reports in the short-term; “The Sudanese 
Authorities, some national NGOs, and interim arrangements… are being used to cover 
the most immediate and urgent life-saving needs” (UNHCR Sudan Operations Situation 
Update, No. 95, March 2009).  
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, in the meantime, explained to the Voice of America that 
he believed that “expelling [the NGOs] is confirming the crimes” (Voice of America, 
Nov. 2, 2009). The prosecutor, who saw (and denounced) the effects of his indictment 
(and immediately began to work for the second warrant, which added three counts of 
Genocide to the initial list of charges), felt the indictment was still more important than 
the critical infrastructure – even as he named the expulsions as a further war crime. Five 
months later, charges of genocide were added by the ICC. Seemingly surprised by the 
flexibility of aid economies, and their unpredictable fluctuations, Toby Lanzer, the UN 
Humanitarian Coordinator for Darfur, acknowledged that the impact of expulsions was 
drastically different than anticipated. “We were very, very worried;” he told Radio 
Netherlands Worldwide;  
We thought, now we don’t have partners to distribute food to 1.1 
million people, we don’t have UN partners to carry on healthcare 
programs for 1.6 million people or to maintain access to clean 
drinking water for over a million others… The government of Sudan 
stepped in and really took on a lot of the work that has been carried 
our by the organizations that were expelled from Sudan. 
Paradoxically, the expulsions forced us to work closer together [with 




Lanzer may well overlook another critical reason for the averted catastrophe. While the 
aid economy was a critical dimension of what allowed people to continue their livelihood 
as it had been transformed by crisis and aid (so critical that the Sudanese government was 
not willing to gamble on the consequences of its collapse), a large part of its continued 
efficacy seems to have been the adaptability of the economy under the pressure of the 
expulsions. 
A former employee of OCHA identified a similar sentiment over dinner in 
Khartoum roughly six months later. “The kind of scarcity in terms of basic subsistence 
that we were expecting didn’t come about. But in the week after the expulsions, I sat 
down in my meeting with Hasabu and told him that his biggest problem was how he 
would deal with tens of thousands of people who were suddenly left without a job. The 
next day, he had armed guards surrounding his office and we wouldn’t be let in.” He’s 
referring to Hasabu Mohamad Abdel-Rahman, who was commissioner of the 
Humanitarian Aid Commission that engineered the expuslsions, and has since risen to the 
rank of Second Vice President in the president’s post-election cabinet. Indeed, much of 
the early bridging of the capacity gap had been filled by volunteer workers who remained 
behind carrying out aid tasks without pay. 
We can learn several things from the expulsions. First, they are proof of the 
flexible precarity that marks the analysis of aid in the preceding chapter. They have also, 
arguably, been the most persistent practical effect to date of the indictment of Bashir by 
the ICC (and the subsequent addition of Genocide charges just after Bashir’s re-election). 
The effects of the indictment were a radical upheaval in the socio-economic dimensions 
of the crisis in Darfur. But the waxing and waning of cycles of counterinsurgency in the 
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region, which continued as I conducted my research, seemed to continue relatively 
independently. Fatalities from armed conflict spiked around elections in 2010, but soon 
waned again, with unpredictable rhythms of increase and cessation since the indictment.  
The legal approach to the crisis, in short, did little to tamp down the atrocity-
based counterinsurgency that had waned below their 2004 peak long before indictments 
were handed down. Perhaps more troubling, the ICC indictments seems to have been 
more or less tone deaf to the complicated causes of violence and depredation than even 
the humanitarian apprehensions described in Chapter 1. While Rice and others suddenly 
turned attention to life-supporting medical infrastructures, in contrast to the way the latter 
were never registered in the context of the US strike on El Shifa, this attention proved 
uninformed about the complex relations that are the difference between adaptation and 
devastation, between collapse and re-organization. While genocide is a legal and political 
category, the kind of violence that the indictments condemned was not impacted as a 
consequence of the arrest warrants. Despite initial fears, the indictment seems to have had 
more effect on the ontological evaluation of what the war in Darfur consisted of than on 
the actual course of the war itself. Its ancillary effects, in turn put at risk what had 
become, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, an economy of scale with which 
regional economic relationships have been so entangled that it cannot be quickly undone. 
On both the economic and the ontological level, the event of the indictment had little 
deterrent effect on the policy of war, but had serious indirect effects on those trying to 
survive it. 
‘Atrocities in Darfur Have Taken Place, On That We Can All Agree’ 
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Back in Khartoum, a political officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to whom 
I had been introduced through a common friend, invited me to give a talk on my research, 
and in particular to discuss the debates about genocide accusations, to “a gathering of 
committed intellectuals.” It was only after I agreed that I learned that the man in question 
had a relatively high position in the Ministry, and that the “gathering” I had agreed to 
present for was at the Diplomat’s Club. The moderator, and my primary interlocutor for 
the event, was to be Rahmatallah Mohamed Osman, Undersecretary of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
The content of the talk itself is not the topic here. What was remarkable was that 
even at very high levels of government, few in attendance at the diplomat’s club that 
night wanted to dispute that atrocities were committed in Darfur. But the status of those 
atrocities as genocide was at serious issue. This is significant because it raises a larger 
question around genocide accusations. If that designation does not (as Mahmood 
Mamdani has elaborated in great detail in “Saviors and Survivors”) indicate a greater 
scale or speed of political violence, what does the accusation do? I will argue in the final 
section of this chapter that Mamdani’s observation that “genocide has become a label to 
be stuck on your worst enemy, a perverse version of the Nobel Prize…” is correct. But I 
want to argue further that the conditions of possibility for that perversion are the political 
history of the concept. That history has led to two central problems at the center of legal 
definitions of what distinguishes genocide: namely, intent and the destruction of victims 
as a group “as such.” 
On May 3rd, 2010, at the Diplomats Club in Khartoum Ithnein (Khartoum 2), I 
presented a more basic thesis that the genocide designation did little to help us understand 
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the violence taking place in Darfur. The fact that naming the conflict a genocide did not 
have clarifying effects, however, did nothing to mitigate the government’s part in that 
war: an atrocity-based and civilian targeting counterinsurgency. As the presentation drew 
to a close and discussion began, two men stood up and walked out before engaging in 
discussion, visibly displeased. The first question was directed at the role of the 
international media in framing the violence as genocidal, at which point a friend and 
journalist working in Sudan for years left the room, displeased for exactly the opposite 
reason. 
But the remarkable texture of questions was their general agreement about the 
untenable pitch of violence that has continued, in different forms and intensities, to take 
place in Darfur. The most pugnacious questions came from a middle aged diplomat, who 
asked; “I wonder what our speaker has to say about the fact that it is now, when Darfur 
has returned to a condition of normalcy, that the international community has chosen to 
accuse our government of genocide. And further, how can we call this genocide, when 
most of those displaced have taken refuge in locations controlled by the government.” 
It was the closest anyone came during discussions that day to a denial of the 
Sudanese government’s responsibility in the atrocities. When several follow up questions 
echoed my initial response that I did not, from what I had seen and understood, consider 
the conflict in Darfur to resemble anything like a state of normalcy, the Undersecretary of 
Foreign Affairs intervened. “I hope that our speaker is not under the impression that I do 
not believe atrocities are taking place in Darfur, I believe they do, I believe that on that 
we can all agree. Why we are singled out for mistakes that were made during a 
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complicated war as the worst of criminals is the question that I believe many here would 
like a perspective on.” 
In the course of that discussion, I heard a different trouble with the genocide 
accusation than I expected. It was not the fact that the government was being accused of 
waging a dirty war that troubled these diplomats. It was that genocide was no longer a 
war, no longer a form of political violence, but rather the worst form of criminal violence. 
Rather, it was an identity as genocidaire that many diplomats objected so radically to. Its 
counterpart – the identity of victim – was deployed by one of the participants in the 
discussion (not an incumbent of a political position) who clearly felt that atrocity was to 
be emphasized. “I wonder whether our speaker has any sense, regardless of what we call 
the violence of Darfur, how this country should deal with a massively traumatized 
population in Darfur?” 
That genocide accusations tend to turn acts and events into stable identities is one 
of the dynamics that Mahmood Mamdani has traced, both in the context of the Rwandan 
genocide and in the context of Darfur. I do not want to repeat that argument here, except 
to indicate that, indeed, the stakes (and dangers) of the genocide accusation lie in this 
ossification of political violence into hardened criminal identities. However, outside of 
government circles, where these identifications are felt perhaps more strongly, two layers 
of ossification are added to this political identity imputed in genocide accusations. These 
two are, I submit, the grounds that give the politics of identification the enduring force 
they have. 
The first is a sense that the accusation changes the historical ground against which 
one’s actions in a conflict are represented – how violence is made meaningful. Violence 
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in a civil war is an ontologically different act from violence in a genocide, and that 
ontological difference has to do with an emplotment of those acts into a historical 
process. This is not a difference in meaning exclusively, because it binds together the 
identity, act, and the way in which the acts that take form as political identities are carried 
into the future, often across generations (as we shall see in Chapter 4). 
To illustrate that point, I want to show the ambivalence of my Darfuri informants 
in their relationship to the Lybian insurrection, and Ghadhaffi’s role in it. This reversal of 
gaze, in which judgment rebounds on the ongoing violence locally, will be the 
ethnographic core of the following section of this chapter (section iii). The discussion in 
the subsequent section will treat different implications of historical contests about how 
genocide is to be identified (Section iv), and conclude with an interrogation of the effects 
of the clauses of intentionality and the work of the “as such” in the operative definition 
proffered by the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide, a convention that arguably 
does more to shape the humanitarian imaginary at work than the Universal Declaration of 
Humani Rights itself. 
‘We Are All Janjaweed Here’ 
This is how the man who shared his home with me explained why there was no 
more concern about the thief. “You see,” he continued, and called for someone called 
Isma’il over the hosh wall. A small boy, no older than five, came running from up the 
road, and ran into Hussein’s arms; 
“mashallah, zeik ya waled, anta janjaweed, mish?” (Praises, how are you son, 
you are Janjaweed no?” The kid laughed. “You see, we are all Janjaweed here, it’s what 
we are, we say it like jokes to each other,” Hussein explained. The neighborhood was 
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actually entirely heterogeneous as concerned ethnic designation. There were two 
Zhagawa families living immediately adjacent to Hussein’s compound, at least one 
Masalit household around the Corner. A Fur woman came in every several days to do 
laundry for a few Sudanese Pounds. The man selling water with his caro (a donkey that 
drew water in oil tanks) lived in Zam Zam, the largest camp for displaced. Still, the 
response to the break in, and the consensus of locals who had lived in Fasher for a long 
period, confirmed that, mixed as the neighbor may have been, this was an area politically 
in the hands of government aligned militias.  
Within a week, Hussein sat in the hosh anytime that he was at home, watching a 
battery-powered radio in his hands and listening attentively to the news coming out of 
Libya. I had arrived in El Fasher about one week into the insurgency against Gadhafi, and 
by the time I had settled in to stay with Hussein, Gadhafi had begun to deploy his air 
forces against demonstrators in both Tripoli and Benghazi. As the international 
intervention began, and reports began to come out of Libya about massacres committed 
by so-called mercenaries presumed to have been fighting on Gadhafi’s side in the 
insurgency, what was actually going on on the other side of the border became, at least 
for a while, the topic of conversation in cafeterias and the central Souq. 
“Ghadhafi Majnun,” Hussein kept saying the first days of Gadhafi’s brutal 
counter-offensive; “But he is fighting a war. Inshallah he will lose, but do you believe 
that this is genocide? Do you believe that he is trying to kill all Libyan people?” 
I explained that the critical issue for me was not whether or not Ghadhafi intended 
to destroy all of his enemies, but that what were seeing was unlikely to be affected 
positively by the kind of intervention proposed. Nevertheless, as the attacks became more 
 
148 
and more common, and more and more brutal, passions in El Fasher rose to a peak. 
Hussein refused to take a position, and kept repeating, as though it would make some 
difference in the logics of the attack “Ghadhafi majnun yani… lakin…” Others were not 
so restrained; 
“This is exactly what was happening here;” Taha explained to me. “There was a 
revolution and the government came and began to bomb us. You still see the airplanes 
every day that fly out from the airport. But why did nobody want to help us? Why was 
there no bombing for us?” I could only assume Taha believed there was an effective way 
to bomb government forces in Darfur. On the counter position, others felt that this was 
the fate that they had narrowly averted. Tahir, who had worked with the telecom 
providers around the central Souq, was dismayed “The United Nations (sic) is making a 
big mistake. They talked about doing this here. Can you imagine? Every camp here, we 
are surrounded by rebels. If they bombed us, there would be nothing left.”  
In the meantime, internal situation reports showed that the Government of Sudan 
was taking up positions along the Sudanese-Lybian border to deal with the influx of 
Lybians (that never obtained) and simultaneously resumed the bombing campaign against 
rebel-controlled areas close to the Lybian border within a week of NATO operations (UN 
SITREP, classified). When I asked about the level of fighting around El Fasher, which 
was by no definition high, I never spoke to a single Sudanese informant who confirmed 
it. Hussein, Tehla, and Omer all said that gunshots were soldiers celebrating , firing their 
weapons when a shipment came in to a checkpoint. The University of El Fasher 
announced a full ban on political activities, which prompted student demonstrations. 
These were fiercely guarded and then beaten back into the city center by Police and 
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National Security services. UN classified documents reported 2 dead, and a dozen injured 
in live-ammunition shootings. When I spoke to a friend from the International 
Organization of Migration in El Fasher on the topic, he responded “we are too used to it 
by now. But imagine the UN was doing here what they are doing in Lybia. We would all 
either be fighting on their side, or die with the government.” 
I asked him about those who did not fight on either side of the insurgency. 
“It was a different war here. We don’t have any ocean, and the country was not 
split in half, it’s all around. Some people fight, some don’t. But there is no place for us to 
go. If it turns into a war like Lybia, many more people will die.” 
“What do you mean a war like Lybia.” 
“Lybia is a war where one side will win. There is no choice for them. Here, it is 
not possible. Nobody can win, nobody can lose… the best thing for anyone fighting here 
is if the negotiations go well.” 
When You Come Back Next Time, Will There Be 14 Armed Groups 
I had observed one round of these Negotiations in El Fasher a few years before, as 
a guest of the Darfur Darfur Dialog and Consultation team. While it seemed that the 
insurgency and counterinsurgency erupting into a full-blown civil war in 2011 in El 
Fasher was a focus around which Fasher’s Residents made their own sense of the logic of 
intervention, they were clear that this was a different kind of conflict. These differences, 
it seemed, consisted in the scope of those involved, and in the motivations for fighting. 
Darfur had seen insurgencies periodically, the most recent preceding one in ’96. None of 
the previous insurgencies had taken the scale of the current war, nor attracted the kind of 
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international attention the war that began in 2003 was getting. That attention, I argue, has 
been as much a factor in what makes this war so different.  
Comparisons only have limited value here (particularly across historical spans). 
But clearly, the Lybian civil war was fought with different stakes and intensities before 
any talk of intervention began. Nevertheless, there is something telling in the 
observations of Darfurians who see more flexibility in the war and intervention that they 
are dealing with, and the sense that with a full-blown intervention like the one in Lybia, 
the positions for non-combatants become more difficult. The hardening of political 
positions into legal and political subject positions at the bargaining table, subject 
positions that continue to have deep socio-economic stakes, had already been part of what 
intense peace agreements had underscored. 
The moment genocide fell as an accusation the ethnicized politics that had been a 
part of the political fabric of Sudan for generations took on different order. As I 
suggested above, the political status of these events takes even greater profile if it is 
inserted into the larger historical arc of the genocide concept. Second, the legal status, 
and the kind of personhood assumed in the accused ‘genocidaire’ (and by association 
those in that leader’s allegiance) is solidified by the accusation. Negotiating, under the 
premise that a party has the intent to radically destroy of the other is a profoundly 
different exercise than negotiating among parties to an insurgency. 
In 2007, peace agreements focused on the possibilities of demobilization. But in 
the backdrop, a different kind of polarization was also brewing. “The Fur, who are 
bearing the brunt of this war, are refusing to speak to any of us, or to others from Dar Fur, 
without interpreters,” one African Union rule of Law Officer explained. “It’s crazy, most 
 
151 
of them speak Arabic fluently, and use it when they are not in negotiations.” What had 
started as an insurgency that, ideologically speaking, aimed at ending the ethnicized 
hyper-accumulation of wealth by a small sliver of elite (ethnically marked as 
predominantly ja’ali) in the north was unfolding, as the economy of intensive 
peacekeeping was revving into full swing, into an intensification of investment in ethnic 
positions. This was likely over-determined – the result as much of the extreme brutality 
with which the Bashir regime responded to this insurgency as it was the result of the high 
stakes of a settlement. 
“The trouble is,” a tribal Sheikh from one of the towns (as opposed to the camp 
sheikhs who are part of the condition of the conflict to begin with) explained; 
“For 40 year, delegations have been coming to Darfur, and they 
have not brought peace, but they have always brought aid. Now the 
African Union has been here for four years. And already while some 
people are claiming to fight for Darfur, they are really only fighting 
for the power after peace and aid in war.” (public negotiation, 2007, 
via interpreter). 
Or, as one woman put her simple question to the negotiators with a sharp gallows 
humor: “It is good that you want there to be peace. But before your last peace agreement, 
we had four armed groups instead of two. We welcome peace, but tell us, after the next 
peace agreement, will we have two more armed groups, or eight? Then we prefer not to 
make any more agreements.” Still, by and large, participants in these 2007 negotiations 
agreed that the conflict had significantly abated since 2004. But their central concern was 
security, which seemed to refer to a different condition than conflict. “The biggest threat 
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to the security now;” one Democratic Unionist Party Member said during the discussions; 
“is the number of IDPs in the camps.”70  
As negotiations unfolded along these lines, animosities on the streets, already 
long ethnicized, were beginning to harden as identity became articulated with residency 
in camps and identity cards that entitled residents to the aid flows on which so many 
depended. Even in 2007, the rumor that Felata were being systematically transported into 
Darfur and being given identity cards was circulating in El Fasher. By 2011, as Lybia 
unfolded, Rizeighat to whom I spoke feared, explicitly, that they were caught between all 
fronts. As one admitted combatant told me; 
“They [the central government] will need us again. In the meantime, we know 
they have no respect for us even when we fight. Those of us who did not fight are 
suspicious to the UN, to the internationals, to everyone. Are we the ones doing the 
kidnappings? Are we the ones responsible for the attacks on peacekeepers?” Because he 
keeps referring to the collective stigma, it is worth noting that he refers to “those of us 
who did not fight.” He is referring to a collective sense of what being a non-combattant 
zaghawa means, though he intimated he was a member of the militia, speaking to what it 
means to be a member of the Janjaweed.  
In an odd parallel, pointed out by Mark Duffield in the context of the South, the 
NGO refusal to deal with the ethnicized political environment they engage (not 
recognizing the difficulty of being poorly aligned in a particular area), mirrors a pretense 
that ethnicity and political affiliation are kept sufficiently “separate” by governments 
                                                
70 The irony of that distinction is that camps had very quickly become aligned with one or 
the other combatant party, so that, again, the condition of displacement, political 
allegiance, combat, and economic stability were all complexly intertwined.  
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instrumentalizing the former. As the NCP claims to fight only a counterinsurgency, 
charges of genocide became more formalized and vociferous between 2007-2010. 
Ironically, they were all but lacking at the height of the counter-insurgency in 2004, and 
several groups have retreated into a position of agnosticism regarding the designation. It 
was as though the accusation had been passed down, and could be left hanging, like a 
speech act that actualized its own efficacy. 
The question this begs is what the significant ethical and political differences 
between these positions are. Like the diplomats who were willing to accept all charges of 
atrocity as long as genocide was not at the center of the charge, it seems that, indeed, 
naming precedes content. The evidence that the counterinsurgencies in Darfur began and 
continued sporadically even after a relative cessation of hostilities, to target civilians 
based on their ethnic belonging is rather difficult to refute. Does ethnicized targeting 
make genocide? Or conversely, is it more acceptable when the intent to destroy is 
missing? 
Counterinsurgency and Modern War 
Preparing the brief against the United States for War Crimes in ‘Indochina’ for 
the Russell tribunal, Sartre comes to the conclusion that all modern counterinsurgency 
amounts to genocide. He argues that it is industry, in its capacity to produce “devices that 
kill on an ever more massive scale…” that has made it “more and more difficult to 
distinguish between the front and the rest of the country, between combatants and civilian 
population” (Sartre, On Genocide, P. 14). Sartre goes on to include legal codes of 
inheritance that break up ownership structure (as witnessed in colonial Algeria) as 
manifestations of cultural genocide. Insofar as his argument stops there, he is, in his 
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definition, on the polar opposite end of limiting genocide to acts of bodily violation. 
Where humanitarian responses to El Shifa radically limit the ways in which infrastructure 
can be seen as a unit of life, exactly there Sartre, writing in 1967, extends the life-unit of 
a world to be protected against attacks on its law, inheritance schemes, and industrial 
infrastructures. He all but indicts modern warfare as falling within the genocidal category 
by definition.  
But, as Sartre acknowledges at the beginning of the article, belligerent acts aimed 
at total destruction of a particular people in a particular place are not new only because it 
took so long to elaborate a juridical concept. And, turning to Vietnam, he admits that 
where facing a ‘people’s war,’ “total genocide then emerges as the absolute basis of anti-
guerilla strategy;” He continues: 
One may conclude: faced with the People’s war— A product of a 
time, a reply to imperialist aggression and a demand for sovereignty 
made by people which values its unity— two attitudes are possible. 
Either the aggressor withdraws and makes peace, recognizing that a 
whole nation is rising up against them; or else, aware of the 
uselessness of classical strategy, he has recourse, if he can do so 
without damaging his interest, to extermination pure and simple. 
There is no third choice; but this choice, at least, is always possible. 
Troubling as Sartre’s concept of a ‘people’s war’ is, he does identify a 
fundamental problem in the codification of the conduct of wars. A similar problem is 
pointed out by Carl Schmitt, who argues that the moment in which an international 
regime attempts to codify the conduct of war, it automatically entails the most barbaric 
consequences reserved for precisely those who know longer follow established rules. It 
is, ironically, also shared by the legal masterpiece of Raphel Lemkin, perhaps the most 
ardent legislative critic of the state exception as proposed by Schmitt and deployed by the 
Nazis. It seems that between Sartre, Schmitt, and Lemkin, we are faced with a shared 
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definition of genocide that includes far more than what recent legal elaborations of the 
concept have allowed. Where Sartre may reduce the concept to absurdity by including 
every form of irregular and modern warfare within its pale, Schmitt thinks that the 
legislation of any act undertaken by a sovereign state is itself the precondition for the 
most barbaric forms of violence.  
Is there really no third alternative, as suggested by Sartre? One of the common 
misconceptions about Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe is that it was written 
primarily in order to document, and subsequently produce a legal protection against the 
biological exterminations perpetrated by the national Socialist regime in Germany against 
Jews, gypsies and all others the Nazis defined as that it is enemies to their people (Volk). 
However, the section of Lemkin’s text dedicated to physical extermination of the people 
is in fact rather limited. His definition of genocide, in turn, is even wider than Sartre’s;  
Genocide is effected through a synchronized attack on different 
aspects of life of the captive peoples: in the political field (by 
destroying institutions of self-government and imposing a German 
pattern of administration, and through colonization by Germans); in 
the social field (by disrupting the social cohesion of the nation 
involved in killing or removing elements such as the intelligentsia, 
which provide spiritual leadership…; in the cultural field (by 
prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and cultural 
activities…); in the economic field (by shifting the wealth to 
Germans and by prohibiting the exercise of trades and occupations 
by people who could not promote Germanism ‘without 
reservations”); in the biological field…; in the field of physical 
existence (by introducing starvation rationing systems for non-
Germans and by masked feelings, mainly of Jews, Poles, Slovenes, 
and Russians)… 
 
Lemkin takes the concept so far, that even the most ardent pacifist would have 
trouble signing on to certain dimensions of his definition. For example, when he includes 
the concept of moral genocide, defining it as; “… by attempts to create an atmosphere of 
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moral debasement through promoting pornographic publications and motion pictures, and 
the excessive consumption of alcohol…” The category has been stretched beyond any 
recognition. This overreach notwithstanding, it is important to note that Lemkin spends 
700 pages on the laws of occupation, contractual instruments calibrated to disenfranchise 
occupied populations, and any acts taken in order to deliberately undermine the 
infrastructures that support the lives of the occupied. While a legal implementation of his 
notion of genocide whole cloth would have essentially outlawed not only all forms of 
warfare, but myriad practices common to most welfare states, his definition may arguably 
be the only comprehensive and honest definition of all acts that can, given the right 
conditions, further the intentional extermination of a people and their way of life.  
If we take these three positions – Schmitt’s, Sartre’s, Lemkin’s – provisionally as 
marking out the territory on which debates about genocide unfold, inaugural legal 
documents like the United Nations Declaration on the Prevention of Genocide or the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights add a dimension that leads us into something of a 
double bind. Either every act of warfare declared illegal under conventions of war can be 
sufficient to constitute an act of genocide, or the legal category itself becomes 
meaningless, given that there is no way to distinguish between acts of war and genocide – 
particularly when dealing with counterinsurgency. We begin to understand, how the 
genesis of the legal concept prefigures and authorizes the use of the concept at both sides 
of parties in conflict, each denouncing the genocide of the other – or contesting its 
applicability to their case. 
Rather than expand the definition of genocide to include all acts which fall under 
the laws of war as forbidden acts, as long as these are perpetrated with intent and an 
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explicit target, the legal debates around the concept may lead us to a simpler, if more 
troubling conclusion. Namely that under conditions of contemporary warfare, in which 
every attempt has been made on paper to protect civilian infrastructure, life, and 
livelihood, it has become all but impossible for states to wage wars without breaching 
these conventions. Or, placing the responsibility not on the law, but using these legal 
definitions as a way of diagnosing practices of modern warfare, we could be compelled to 
say that modern warfare by and large organizes its targeting around ethnically, nationally 
or politically defined enemy classes. This conclusion follows from the historical 
observation that since the WWII, and arguably long before, it is only the most uncommon 
and smallest part of warfare that is waged between regular armies recognizing each other 
on a battlefield. What, then, becomes of the laudable desire to distinguish, Insofar as that 
may still be possible, between wars deliberately waged in order to destroy civilian 
infrastructure and ways of life, and those, like every counterinsurgency in recent history, 
that commits similar atrocities but with the classic animus of a reason of state? 
Between Inner Drive and Radically Other: Failures of Genocide Prevention 
A humanitarian officer for the US Embassy with considerable experience in 
Sudan illustrated well how wide the gap between a humanitarian codification of genocide 
and its conception by the “experts” on the ground proves to be. In a conversation between 
two businessmen, one a high-level World Food Program logistics officer, a few Sudanese 
locals, and one or the other NGO worker, a visiting researcher asked the US American 
humanitarian officer how he would solve the crisis in Darfur. 
“I think it’s actually quite simple, personally. We just need to convince the 
nomads that there’s no way to sustain their lifestyle. If we get the Misseriya, the Baggara, 
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all the nomads, not just here but in the transitional areas71 to accept parcels of land, and 
convince them that livestock is totally unsustainable in deserts with climate change, 
there’s no more incentive for conflict” (Private conversation, February 2011). 
She was not alone, but she was in strange company. The last time that I had heard 
that suggestion – sedentarizing nomads – was from an NCP minister low enough within 
government ranks to be diplomatic. I pointed out that, strictly speaking, she might want 
to consider that the proposal was, by the definition of both the Rome Statute and the UN 
Declaration for the Prevention of Genocide, a derogation of the way of life tantamount to 
genocide, and certainly a breach of cultural rights under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.  
“That’s the most preposterous thing I’ve heard anyone say, there are no rights to 
herding animals anywhere in international law, it’s just laughable,” responded my friend 
from the World Food Program. 
“He’s actually right,” one of the NGO workers added, “it would prevent them 
from practicing their way of life, and it’s definitely a forcible population transfer.” 
Without flinching, the Officer for the American Embassy interjected, “again, 
personal opinion, but I think one of the best things we can do is to force unreasonable 
people to stop doing stupid things.”  
“Hear, Hear;” the member of WFP responded.  
The compatibility of this UN Officer’s commitment to rights while advocating 
rights violations is not surprising, given the limits of how humanitarian thinking 
                                                
71 He is referring to the areas between North and South Sudan, not yet separated, but also 
awaiting demarcation, that had seen decades of conflict over migration rights, and the 
mobilization of the Murahilin as proxy troops during the North-South Civil Wars. 
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apprehends emergency. That despite her role as an officer presumably of expertise in 
genocide prevention and in charge of direct dealings with the classified evidence 
gathering conducted by the US in Darfur. However it does seem that a single overarching 
definition of genocide, may be incompatible with the complex differences between 
different acts of political violence. I want to close this discussion, and begin my transition 
to chapter 4 on Bentiu, by focusing on the core definition of the genocide convention, and 
how it invites misapprehensions. Article 2 defines genocide, succinctly, as;  
Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as 
such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group. 
With the clause of intentionality, the legal definition stipulates that an act only 
constitutes genocide if one can apprehend the destructive intent, i.e. the radical interiority 
of the perpetrator, or, the even more elusive group psychology behind acts. While there 
are relatively elaborated ways of establishing intention within legal traditions of criminal 
law, overt and clear instances of political violence in which perpetrators manifest their 
intention (documenting their intentions, leaving orders for extermination, or identifying 
their targets) are exceedingly rare. At the other pole, the condition that the group under 
attack is being targeted “as such,” opens up the need to ascertain the radical alterity of 
victims in the mentality of the perpetrator. 
Conceptually, what this definition demands of genocide legislation is to combine 
radical interiority and radical exteriority and demonstrate a method of apprehending them 
both in extremities of violence. There may be few acts of political violence that fit that 
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bill. But this definition solidifies the poles of victim and perpetrator into radically 
irreconcilability. Take, for instance, the evidence of atrocities that specifically target 
Zhagawa or Fur civilians. A condition of counterinsurgency makes the intentionality to 
attack these people as such rather than under the assumption that they are critical to the 
insurgency. This distinction is, virtually undecidable by outside adjudication.  
However, once these are framed within the poles of genocide, each of which 
focus on the identity rather than the acts that constitute the conditions of political 
violence, ossify the victim and perpetrator into irreconcilable binaries. Language, and 
purity of shared pasts (historical identities) are mobilized by political violence, but they 
are not necessarily solidified by that violence. With legal definition, they become non-
negotiable, and any form of reconciliation can take place only despite of, not in dialog, 
with past positions. Each of the vignettes that open this chapter demonstrates the 
beginnings of that process, and the way in which these things work.  
This is the double edge of language that Arendt refers to in her 1967 interview on 
German TV. Unlike some of her compatriots, Arendt says how critical language was: she 
“held onto her German in the bitterest of times;” she explains, “I mean, it was not, after 
all, the German language that went mad.” But then she acknowledges that she knew other 
refugees, fleeing the brutalities of the Nazi regime, who took a different attitude towards 
the language that she felt carried so much for her. “One can lose ones mother tongue, and 
those that do so speak a language where one cliché follows the other because the essential 
productivity that one has in one’s own language is severed from your person, one is 
severed from that productivity because on has replaced it with this other language.” 
“Was this a problem of disavowal?” her interlocutor, Günther Gauss asks; 
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“Yes, and in the form of a shock. And the decisive moment for us was not 1933, it 
was the day we learned of Auschwitz, in 1943… before that we simply thought we had 
enemies. Of course one should have enemies, it is the most natural thing on earth. But 
that was something different, and I am not talking about the number of dead, I am talking 
about the techniques and the treatment of the corpses… these are not details I need to 
indulge anymore. There something happened with which none of us will ever be 
finished.” 
There is plenty to find wrong with her arguably fetishistic relationship to a 
“mother tongue.” Perhaps the most important fissure to point out in her estimation of the 
importance of language here is that is comprises its own disavowal in precisely the 
gesture that attempts to suppress disavowal. I take her position on language as a critical 
component of continuity with the past as a recognition of the ultimate indistinguishability 
as identities or as persons rather than as acts of perpetration between perpetrators and 
victims. To be certain, there is irreducible distinction, but that distinction is in the acts 
and the conditions of injury. If these are incorporated as identities (thus associating the 
german language with the perpetrator, or internalizing the condition of defenselessness to 
any victims targeted as such for Nazi extermination), the result is nothing short of a 
severing of profound parts of ones self-recognition. The Nazi regime had already done so 
in perpetration. I read Arendt’s position as a refusal to continue. 
However, I see a double edge in that refusal. On the one hand (to borrow the 
language of Abraham and Torok in The Kernal and the Shell) she has tried to maintain a 
relationship to her past as a whole object, recognizing that constitutive parts of herself (in 
this case her mother tongue) are connected to past perpetrations. On the other, she seems 
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altogether too sanguine in being able to separate the affordances of language from the 
past, while maintaining a firm break from those in her social world who had betrayed her. 
She disavows, in this attempt, the continuities in the social world to which she returns 
(even as she is so firm in seeing the political continuities after denazification), a symptom 
of the separation she forges between the social and the political that troubles a good 
number of her later texts. 
I would like, instead, to claim that political and legal interventions into political 
violence need to be attended to for the social consequences they have. The language 
within which one can, from that point forward, describe perpetrations becomes a 
grammar in which prefabricated notions of perpetratorship undermine the resources both 
perpetrators and victims have to describe events of political violence. In genocide 
accusations and denials, a condition of non-compossibility (Arendt’s claim of the 
relationship between Eichmann and survivors) between the existence of the perpetrator 
and the victim as identities opens, and as such, the accusation may well do more to 
impede processes of reconciliation than it does to provide tools for placing the past firmly 
in the past. Echoing Arendt’s refusal to find comfort in the philosophical tongue, I want 
to suggest that it is perhaps precisely the legal paradigm of genocide that acts, at present, 
as the philosophical veil that blinds us to the politics so critical to understanding political 
violence. 
With that precaution in mind, I turn to my final chapter, on Bentiu, a place that 
has, since the research I conducted there, been virtually destroyed, and has been the 
location of some of the worst ethnicized massacres the South has seen in decades. 
***
Chapter 4: Ungovernable Unity. 
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This chapter turns to Bentiu, South Sudan, in order to conclude with a place 
profoundly remade under the dual pressures of war and aid. I turn to Bentiu because it is 
a place that has barely emerged from generations of virtually uninterrupted conflict, 
where the blind spots, misapprehensions, and evaluative failures of humanitarian aid can 
be seen over several years. I turn to Bentiu also with a certain pessimism about what the 
condition of life in this border town means for the future of Sudan. In particular, I turn to 
Bentiu with a fear that this is a place in which the futures of subjects and social worlds 
forged under pressured of aid might be foreshadowed. I am relatively certain that the 
worlds that emerge from the aid economies of Darfur will be different for myriad 
reasons, not the least of which being the sheer scale and temporal scope of the way 
Bentiu has been made over and unmade by war. However, after giving considerable 
attention to the representational strategies and rubrics of value with which aid traffics in 
Sudan, I turn here to a place where economies of aid have all but collapsed. 
The chapter traces four central themes. One is the suspension of a social world 
between war and peace – a suspension in which the assumed binary between war and 
peace does not hold. A second theme is the economic and social correlate of the first: the 
assumption that a latent form of civil society and governance is simply submerged under 
a cover of war, and is ready at hand the moment conditions of conflict abate. Third, the 
chapter treats the ways of living, and ways of dying, that have become the norm for South 
Sudanese adults navigating between war and a peace marked by anomy and debt (save, 
perhaps, for the high-ranking politicians). 
Coping with these ambivalences, a memory forged in conflict and informed by its 
logics of evaluation is more readily at hand for many residents of unity state. Thus, a 
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citizendship crisis (indeed, a crisis of political identity) around what it means to be a 
Southerner rends the social world, exposing not only the deep enmities along ethnic 
identification we have seen hardening through years of civil war (that in the 90s was 
perhaps more of a south-on-south civil war than one between the North and the South), 
but also between southern combatants versus southern refugees. Here again, the identity 
of the southerner is not only ethnicized, but entangled with economic and political 
integrations and allegiances that make unity both illusory and, as the title suggests, 
ungovernable. 
In the Shadow of the Baobab Tree 
Some time before I first visited in Sudan, I was attracted to the possibility of 
comparing the long-term effects of Operation Lifeline Sudan with the more recent 
expansion of aid economies to the west, in the three states of Darfur. Then, in my early 
months in Khartoum, before my first trip South, and just after my second of four trips 
into Darfur, I met a professor who had been charged, a little over a decade earlier, with 
writing an assessment of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). OLS had been a joint 
operation of UN and NGO operations, which provided support to both the Government 
and Rebel Controlled areas in the wake of the famine of the mid 80s. Established in 1989, 
it was plagued by operational troubles from the start, and it has been criticized from all 
sides as having become integral to the strategy of war of both insurgents and the Northern 
Army. 
The assessment this professor was to write would have been the first of its kind – 
an assessment of the overall impact of such a large-scale aid endeavor over its first five 
years of existence. It was published, eventually, in very different form, for reasons that 
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will become clear. We spent several days meeting, talking about economies of aid, and of 
the difficulties of working volatile fields, but never really got to much talk about OLS. 
When I deliberately steered us in that direction after a few days, the professor simply 
explained, “Well, we did what we could.” With a team of people tasked to do work both 
out of Lokichogio – the headquarters of the operation – and in its different field sites, they 
produced a sizable report. However, given that OLS was the largest Aid Operation to 
have been undertaken under a single umbrella (rivaled only by operations in Biafra), the 
professor was unhappy with the results. 
“Thing is, it’s impossible to put a lot of the simple things together, basics – 
budgets, employment records, that sort of stuff.” 
The professor pulled out a computer and scrolled through a relatively well- 
organized digital archive, and then pulled up a picture. In the center of a lush forested 
area, off at a distance, was a shipping container, overgrown with vegetation. We zoomed 
in, and the container, shot from the side, with doors swung wide open, had been 
punctured from the inside where a young baobab tree (the kind that destroys planets in 
the Little Prince) burst through the corrugated metal sheeting roof. The third and last shot 
was of the inside of the trailer, a massive trunk and sinuous roots growing out of a mess 
of filing cabinets and paper. 
“That’s the archive of Five years of OLS. They’re the first things you leave 
behind.” 
 If anything is emblematic of the precarious mix of memory and forgetting that 
marks humanitarian attitudes to temporality, it is this image of a physical archive that 
could have served to reconstruct, in part, the historties of lives lived in extreme precarity. 
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Instead these traces have been left to decay in a field station, as security or shifts in 
attention dictated that the materials be left behind. OLS was established in 1989, and any 
documentation of basic needs and movements during that time would constitute (if it 
were not decaying in the shadow of this baobab tree), a critical archive for the “New 
Sudan.” But such absense is resonant for much of the archival memory available in South 
Sudan; the archives and agreements that constitute the sovereign functioning of a state 
are, for a region that has not had a steady national archive since independence, missing.72 
I turn in this final Chapter to Bentiu, the capital of Unity State, at the border between 
North and South Sudan, as a description of a city built around a refrain that runs through 
this thesis – of a call for attention to that which is not seen, which is rendered missing, a 
call to look for what hides in the blind spot of humanitarian optics. 
From the perspective of humanitarian endeavors, Bentiu is a city built around 
such absences, blind spots, elisions, and also a site of ingenious ways of making life 
around these gaps. In the arch of the manuscript, I have followed the itineraries of 
humanitarian logics as they transform how people determine political values, economic 
values, and ontological categories (like violence, peace, war… relief). In the previous 
chapter, I turned to the transformation of the very status of events under humanitarian 
evaluations of violence, and here I want to turn to a life world rendered in the image of 
the kinds of value transformation that this thesis has, thus far, been concerned with. 
OLS has long since given way to other aid endeavors. I know people who work to 
dig Hafir or drinking wells along the border, and there is still a UN garrison outside Rub 
                                                
72 Not least because the South Sudanese national archive is itself in a similar state of 
decay – weathering badly in the oscillating wet and dry seasons in a provisional vault, 
that was for several year a tent, in Juba. 
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Kona, woefully understaffed, with a small flower garden that the soldiers and staff keep 
hydrated through the dry season. But these belong to a later stage of aid, and since this 
chapter was first written, the UN headquarters a bit closer to town was over-run, in one of 
the worst massacres the border region has seen since the post-independence wars. In the 
words of one humanitarian envoy, speaking in early April 2014 “now there is nothing 
left, the city has been burnt entirely to the ground.” Two weeks later, the massacres in 
Bentiu continued, including one raid on a hospital, and one on this particular aid 
compound. The last two weeks of Bentiu could fill this chapter, but without being there, 
they would be nothing but a chain of platitudes about the violence of African cities. 
Bentiu has often, in its last 40 years of history, been proven to be a brutal place. But it is 
anything but is not a place to be described in platitudes. 
The genuine complexities that make Bentiu so different than El Fasher, and most 
other places I have seen in Sudan, are left to unfold along their own trajectories 
ungovernable by both aid and an independent SPLM. And yet, Bentiu is also a city that 
shares the hallmarks of any place living the history of war and its aftermath. I am not 
certain that the problems I have raised in the preceding chapters – e.g. notions of 
obscured chains of causality and units of responsibility – are as useful as concerns life in 
Bentiu, Unity State at present. In part, that is because these concerns assume an intensive 
humanitarian attention to a place (which may have returned in the weeks of April 2014), 
but that were for the last decade suspended. Bentiu instead demonstrates more about the 
humanitarian imaginary from its blind spots, and the world-making force of this way of 
seeing. I read Bentiu as a place where the logics of aid, peacemaking, and humanitarian 
relief are so overstretched that the pervasive conditions I observed there illustrate the 
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limitations of these logics powerfully. It is a place that seems a harbinger of some of the 
worst-case scenarios of life after the time of aid: a living between archipelagos of security 
and exclusion. 
In a stunning turn in Joao Biehl’s Vita, he begins his section on the medical 
archive with the question; “what caused Catarina” (the woman who’s trajectory toward 
what he called a zone of social abandonment he so meticulously recounts). Here, I ask, 
“what caused Bentiu”? But there is little help from the scant archive of this place that is 
itself so internally fractured – a place of disappearances and forgetting, as much as it is a 
place suffused with inextinguishable traces of violence and its memory. Even in the dry 
season, one of the most common things one finds on the dirt road are spent machine gun 
shells, and the only landing strip in the city is rumored to have been built over a mass 
grave. So Bentiu is a place that proves that every disappearance stays lodged in the 
history of the place. Telling the story of how the place came about, as the more pedestrian 
details decay in the Southern Sudanese National Archive or in the shipping container 
devoured by the baobab tree, may be more difficult. 
There are two civil wars, an embargo, and a humanitarian apprehension of war and 
aid that we have seen misrecognizing the social dynamics of the worlds it engages. But in 
Bentiu, and with Operation Lifeline Sudan, both the northern government and combatant 
groups incorporated aid directly into their war strategies. No matter its pre-existing flaws, 
a humanitarian logic met a form of pressure – a crisis in which crisis management itself 
was an important factor in war strategy – which no relief operation could be adequate to. 
As Douglas Johnson has pointed out, “since 1989, the government has manipulated 
the international relief effort to further both its economic and strategic goals in the war, 
 
169 
but it has also tried to harness the active collaboration of relief agencies through the 
ideology of development itself…” (Johnson, 2003: 144). He explains that in this context, 
both the government-backed militias in the south and the SPLM have targeted 
populations receiving aid in order to keep military control over the transformations in the 
political economies of the south happening during the war. Far from seeing themselves as 
neutral, the only way in which aid agencies could respond was to maintain a sense of 
their role as temporary life-saving interventionists by simplifying the political terrain – 
essentially seeing their work as the only viable alternative.  
Mark Duffield goes a step further, identifying how the work of NGOs, while failing 
to recognize massive transformations affected on the ground, simply ignores other 
subjects of aid; “From the moment that NGOs first encountered southerners in North 
Sudan, they were transformed into IDPs. At a stroke, all sense of history and cultural 
difference was lost.” Meanwhile, in the south, where Southerners are deeply marked by 
political identity and indelibly politicized (either by choice or by will), the same aid logic 
shifts to its mode of apprehending conditions of violence; “Thus, reflecting the way that 
liberal peace understands conflict, the war is held to have had a Hobbesian effect on 
social solidarity. In this case, the conflict has ‘been a traumatic experience undermining 
and destroying normal Dinka community structures and traditions” (Duffield, 200: 212-
213. Quoting the UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit). If El Shifa’s dead have 
disappeared behind a screen of unrecognized structural violence, the violence of Bentiu 
has been so glaring that, like an over-exposed image, none of its details are to be made 
out – the displaced in the north are treated as automatically deracinated, the residents of a 
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combatant south as no longer in full possession of their social world, as the result of the 
traumas of war. 
Both Duffield and Johnson’s observations point to an important observation – that it 
is more accurate to describe aid as caught, in places like Bentiu, within its own frame – 
unable to apprehend a conflict in which it is a structural part.73 Whichever description fits 
best, unlike the previous chapters, here a coherent account of humanitarian activities at 
work producing life world dissolves, fractured by classic old dynamics of war economies, 
of metastasized violence, and of multi-generational factionalisms. And the participation 
of aid practitioners is often left little choice but to reify these categories, operating on and 
with them to the point of full complicity. 
Bentiu is a social space riven by the contradictions and conflicting values that we 
have seen humanitarian imaginaries struggle with in the rest of this thesis. It is, in 
addition, a place where two generations have grown accustomed to the value of combat 
and war. Its borders are still frontlines, and are rapidly becoming frontiers at the time of 
writing. Its cities are still “occupied” from the perspective of at least one party in contests 
over land use and ownership, and its interim years of peace were barely that. To 
apprehend the realities of Bentiu requires abandoning many of the core assumptions 
about social worlds of conflict that inform Humanitarian optics.  
In turning to Bentiu, I borrow St. Exupery’s explanation for his clumsy drawing of 
the Baobabs. If the image of Bentiu here is fractured, at moments, by one or another 
jagged detail, then to quote that parable “I have tried… when I made the drawing of the 
                                                
73 For a meticulous account of aid as a strategy of the wars of both the north and south, 
with a particular focus on labor pools see The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars 
(Johnson, 2005), and Famine Crimes (De Waal, 1997). 
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baobabs I was carried beyond myself by the inspiring force of urgent necessity.” I borrow 
this formulation also because it resonates with a St. Exupery quotation David Keen 
deploys when describing the politics of humanitarian information. For him, however, the 
critical point is not how information is destroyed, lost, or neglected, but how it is made to 
count. Thus, he recounts the story of the Turkish astronomer, rather than the baobab. 
Indebted to the Future, Moored to the Past: Demobilization and the Oscillation 
Between Civilian and Military Economies 
End of March 2011 in Unity state, the dry season, and Gabriel is amused at how 
bothered we are by the sun. He knows Bentiu well, and is negotiating with the Southern 
Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) for the use of some workshop 
facilities to discuss the coming referendum. With the first presidential election less than 
two weeks away, it is not unremarkable that the referendum on Southern Independence 
looms larger than the election immediately at hand on everyone’s minds in the city. More 
remarkable, if not surprising, is the political authority the SSRRC’s weilds in Bentiu.  
The SSRRC is the “operational wing” of South Sudan’s Ministry of Humanitarian 
Affairs and Disaster management now that independence has taken effect. But already in 
those pre-independence days, the SSRRC had a putatively humanitarian mandate to assist 
with the “relief, repatriation, rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration,” of South 
Sudanese returning from exile, and an ambit of political responsibilities that included 
issuing travel documents. Post independence, the SSRRC has become responsible for 
coordinating reconstruction and development plans by both the Government of South 
Sudan, the United Nations and “other agencies,” and for that vague and crucial task of 
“Risk Reduction Management.” Both before and after independence, the SSRRC is the 
organ of the Southern Sudanese government that manages humanitarian governmentality, 
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with all the power and negotiating capital involved. As such, the SSRRC is the Southern 
Equivalent of the Humanitarian Aid Commission, which presided over the expulsion of 
NGOs from Darfur in 2008. The parallel between the two is structural, as welfare 
payments made to Southerners living in the displacement camps around Khartoum were 
paid out by the northern Humanitarian Affairs Commission, rather than by the Ministry 
of Economic Welfare (Pantuliano et al. 2011, 23). 
The SSRRC also has had a dubious record of dealing with the difficult task of the 
returns of long-displaced Southerners, in cooperation with the International organization 
of Migration and the United Nation High Commission for Refugees.74 These southerners 
are caught between an intractable vise of political identity, discussed below. They are 
neither properly Northern nor properly Southern, and that double-disenfranchisement has 
to do with complex economic identifications that far outstrip the work of the SSRRC to 
manage these southerners. However, as a relatively decentralized organization (the 
SSRRC has a strict central mandate, but its incumbents in a given area are all too often 
local strong-men, appointed by virtue of their proximity to powerful actors in the region), 
the commission more often than not mirrors these logics of politicized identity. Half a 
year before the referendum, and the Government of South Sudan was pushing many 
displaced Southerners to return to the “New Sudan.” As I conducted research in the Peri-
Urban camps surrounding Khartoum, many Southerners still living there reported that 
checkpoints had been set up on the major roads, and those who had found their return 
home less than successful were nevertheless blocked from “re-returning,” as one 
International Organization for Migration put it, back to the North. 
                                                




Stories of War and Debt 
My friends and I are, after about an hour, still in the area outside of the SSRRC 
Commissioner’s office. On that day in March, the commissioner expressed his power by 
being importantly inattentive, and asks us to step outside his small office while he 
consults his superiors about the cost of facilities. The late morning sun leaves a small 
strip of shade by the side of the two room shack, and we tuck into it, everyone worried 
that we’ll be asked to pay a bit more money than the conference hall, vehicle, and 
organizing space we want should cost. Gabriel is already cursing; uncharacteristically 
agitated by the man we are negotiating with, a member of Mayor Taban Deng’s 
entourage. I’ve known Gabriel for a few weeks by now, but weeks during which we have 
spent enough time held up at checkpoints or navigating one or another drunk armed man 
that I know he tends to laugh his way out of agitation quickly, but not here. 
Gabriel’s mother, wife and two-year old daughter all live in Bentiu. He is 33, and 
returned to Bentiu town after the settlement of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
whereupon he met his mother for the first time since leaving in the night, without 
warning, to join the SPLA in the bush.75 He couldn’t have been much more then 15 when 
he went, and in the weeks before national elections as we visited him at home, he pointed 
out a meter high sapling in his Hosh (inner courtyard) that he planted after meeting his 
mother for the first time in more than a decade. “We were so happy to see me;” he 
explains, “we planted the tree to celebrate, it’s growing also, with my family.” I might 
                                                
75 “The bush is a place, a time, and a condition. It is the way many of my informants in 
the south referred to their time in war. “I know him from the bush,” is as much location 
as a reference to war. “Do you want to go back to the bush?” refers only to the latter. 
“We were in the bush” is often an explanation for special habits – washing often but with 
no soap, so that the enemy could smell neither body nor perfume as you marched. 
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have understood ‘we were so happy to see me’ as a mistake in Gabriel’s English idiom, 
and perhaps it was just that. But as I saw on several other occasions, it seemed that for 
Gabriel (and not only Gabriel) it was less that the past was another country, but that the 
soldier he had been was a different person. At the moment I made nothing of it, but after 
several more uninterrupted days together, it seemed to me that returning home, Gabriel 
was happy to see himself. By necessary corollary, it also seemed he was not pleased to 
see anyone else he knew from his time in “the bush.” 
Gabriel, who would have been a hypothetical “stakeholder” in the SSRRC’s 
mandate to re-integration, was also anything but happy to be beholden to them for 
meeting space. As we waited in the strip of shade, our conversation turned to the life of 
former combatants in these post-CPA years. He and I had spoken over long stretches 
when we were left along travelling or taking care of a task about life after the war, and he 
took my interest in his stories as a general interest in the lives of other men like him in 
Bentiu. He also understood that, in some ways, his story was exceptional. Few who had 
survived the war as long as he had were not deeply embedded in the SPLA structure. For 
that matter, few had survived as long as he had and started a family so soon. 
“There was a man I was with in the bush,” Gabriel starts in out of a pause “he came 
back and didn’t really know work, but he wanted to start a family. He borrowed a lot of 
money to build a house and start a city life, more than he should have, and he couldn’t 
pay it back. People he owed money to kept coming and asking for it, and people in town 
talked about his debt. He got up one day, got his uniform and his military equipment out 
of the closet, and put it all on, like when you are going to march. He met some people he 
knew and told them; 
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“‘if they come around looking for me to get their money, tell them that I went to 
cross to the other side of the river, and that they can look for me there but they won’t find 
me to collect their money on the other side;” 
“…He walked into the river to his waist and then kept going until he drowned.” 
Gabriel finishes. 
The image of a man choosing his military equipment as deadweight to die with, an 
accumulated burden from past combat to weigh him down, is deceptively 
straightforward. But the story offers other interpretive registers that index more fine-
grained complexities of living suspended in the transition between war and peace. This 
man has never really stopped being a soldier, but his existence at peace is furlowed to 
precisely the military commanders (now party members) who had given commanding 
meaning to his life during the war. He was, quite concretely, incapable of living in the 
present or of returning to his military past.  
Comparing other stories to this, the first of several tragedies of peacetime I heard in 
South Sudan, I am struck by how many of these stories begin as a story of debt, and 
coping with the incommensurate notions of value and productivity that prevail in combat 
and in civil life. These are stories about a civilian existence that is not ready-at-hand, as 
though it had remained dormant, prone for reactivation at the cessation of hostilities.76 
This is not the only Southern Sudanese man who implicitly conveyed that the return to 
military life (or a military death) is figured as a kind of absolution from the burdens of 
                                                
76 This assumption of a dormant “civil society” lying prone underneath the weight of war 
is the political corollary to assumptions that war economies are simply a cover for a 
world ready for the re-production of exchange markets we saw in chapter 2. 
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civil life. And it is one of so many stories punctuated by a river, with temporal as well as 
transcendental significance given to the “other side.” 
Moreover, reflecting on this move to “the other side” in the context of the 
racialization that draws a fault line between southerners who lived out most of the war 
years in the north and those that fought in the south,77 this story demonstrates a crisis of 
subject positions situated within conditions of peace. Those rifts are so deep as to have 
led to displaced southerners in the North to attacking other displaced southerners who are 
more economically integrated into the northern economy as Jalabin78 during the riots 
after John Garang's Death.79 It is no wonder how troubled peacetime is on the frontlines 
of the war in the South.  
Furthermore, Bentiu was always under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces 
during the war, despite key victories by the SPLA, like their sack of the Chevron 
Headquarters in 1985. In the river as frontline, we see a dual problem of returns. 
Southerners returning south after their long stay in the north quickly become a source of 
re-emerging conflict over citizenship.80 Simultaneously their return to a pacified south on 
the brink of a re-emerging border war with its neighbors makes them resident enemies on 
both sides of the border, no longer southern, and never having become northerners.  
                                                
77 See Chapter 4, as well as the accounts of the “Black Monday” below. 
78 A Southern term for northerners that also refers to their dress and their status as 
merchants. 
79 See accounts of “Black Monday” in Khartoum below, pp 26-29. 
80 I rely on Mahmood Mamdani’s concepts of political identity and his account of 
citizenship crises in both chapters 3 and 4 to describe these dynamics in detail. 
(Mamdani, 1996; 2001) 
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But in concert, the details of Gabriel’s story (and those of others) also resonate on 
more surprising valences, particularly when we consider that the burden of debt is figured 
as the peacetime counterpart of the weight of military equipment. South Sudan did not 
see much of the supposed peace dividend expected from the signing of the Machakos 
Protocols and the CPA. In Bentiu Town, for example, where many adult men complain 
that only the slimmest number find employment in the oil sector. Many prefer to speak of 
their work as soldiers as their primary employment, and are waiting for the next war, 
which by now seems to have come. This identification marks a failed arc of transition. 
Simply put, the notion that there is a civil society, and a civilian economy, submerged 
beneath the weight of warfare and simply waiting to re-emerge, is a fiction implicitly 
embedded in a humanitarian imaginary that sees itself as a sort of midwife of the future. 
Even when, paradoxically, practitioners are aware that they are creating new economies, 
the language is the language of re-emergence. 
The period of the civil wars overlapped with the transition from agriculture as the 
major export of Sudan to oil. But even during the dominance of agriculture, the 70s-era 
mechanization of agriculture, with massive production schemes in centralized areas, 
meant that to find work, for many men and women in Bentiu, meant moving, often taking 
the form of displacement or of itinerancy. Many of those agricultural schemes began to 
fail (their boom in the 70s came just before the Sahelian Famine of ’84). In South Sudan, 
a place with massive amounts of arable land, agriculture is only slowly picking up again 
after the wars. In fact, after the grain and oil available in the markets of Rub Kona (just 
across the bridge from Bentiu), most available produce comes form Uganda. 
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Aggravating these problems is the sense that it is best to deal in short-term gains 
in this period of “interim.” Bentiu itself is the capital of a state that is, unlike the 
government or the majority of South Sudan’s localities, Nuer-Dominated. The tension 
between certain faction loyal to Riek Machar and those still employed by the SPLA who 
remembered his betrayals (he switched sides at least three times during the war, and 
presided over one of the most infamous massacres of Dinka – the primary ethnic group 
staffing the SPLA – in Bor) were still high. As were tensions between supporters of 
Angelina Teny, the wife of Machar, and those who opposed her bid to win Unity State’s 
governor’s seat away from the incumbent Taban Deng. These tensions run so high that it 
makes little sense to say much but that the next war would come just around the corner. 
In fact, two weeks after this field visit, elections took place, leading to immediate 
violence. Within days, Gabriel’s wife and Daughter were housed with me in Khartoum. 
To the best of my knowledge, when they left, the two headed straight to Kampala, 
Uganda as the fighting never promised to abate. 
A time between two wars is not a time to begin to settle into business that 
becomes unviable in wartime. Setting light to crops and homes was a strategy of both the 
Northern army and the Pro-Northern militias in the south, as well as splinter factions of 
the SPLA in the south. All too often, attacks on economies and massacres happened in 
tandem. They do not equate, or perhaps even compare, but they are of a strategy of war in 
which civilian life is a primary target. 
This interim period has also shown a flurry of another kind of activity. While 
most residents of Bentiu (and indeed, much of the South) have simply continued to live in 
this interim, hopeful but tentative regarding the future, members of the SPLM’s single-
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party state has had a kind of economic boon. The high profile oil concessions, dormant 
and left with unclarified extraction rights, began production again with the CPA. Much 
more quietly, a massive boom in land speculation has begun. In ventures that range from 
agribusiness to maintain food security for Qatar and Saudi Arabia (in need of increased 
arable land), to bio-fuel investment, to ecotourism, reliable estimate are that between the 
three-year period just before independence, from 2007 to 2010 alone, upwards of 8% of 
the total land mass of south Sudan was transferred, by sale or other legal (or semi-legal) 
mechanism, to foreign land speculators. David Deng of the South Sudan Law Society 
fears that actual land transfers, whether legal or not, may hover more around 15% or 
more of the new nation’s total land mass – all transfers made during the interim period 
between CPA and independence.81  
Few of these ventures have any short-term hopes of employment for most 
southern Sudanese. If the Chinese construction projects in the capital are any indication, 
there may even be a preference to import labor forces (or, from the perspective of china, 
export them), than to hire locally. And then, if conflict continues to flare and abate as 
unpredictably as it has since independence, the future of these endeavors is, at best, 
uncertain. Still, they are viable investments for large-scale international land speculators. 
That land would not be so easy to transfer, under dubious ownership, were 
southern Sudanese cultivators returning to the fields. But many still don’t see past the 
next growing season, and mobile agriculture (like animal husbandry) is much more 
sustainable than land cultivations. The transition from the second civil war, in much of 
                                                
81 David Deng, Private Conversation. Also, see Understanding Land Investment Deals in 




the south, seems to mark a transition from a labor of combat to a future perpetually 
deferred. Economic aspirations are held in place by governmental and nongovernmental 
promises to realize the future South in which people can find sufficient work outside the 
army (promises quickly fading during the first years of independence). In 2010, there are 
the real-time oil revenues, of course, the percentages that the SPLM was slated to receive 
every year. But even these remain immaterial for most southerners, as the profits have 
been channeled towards services and interim endeavors of governance whose benefits for 
the population remain conspicuously absent. For the vast majority of the population, the 
peacetime economy is suspended, spectral, or fleeting at best.  
For ex-combatants, the sense of being suspended is personal. War was not 
preferable, at least not for most. It was, however, concrete activity, and many seem to 
have resigned themselves to waiting for the next war to come.82 In Bentiu peace was an 
existential problem for many of my interlocutors. There was no nostalgia for war to speak 
of, but the status, not to mention a livelihood that “the bush” meant for many soldiers, 
had left a palpable sense of lack. There was no desire for war, but without new 
                                                
82 Though “work” and “labor” are not terms that I heard used for combat (I don’t speak 
Nuer or Dinka, and the Juba Arabi dialect is much faster and more difficult than the 
dialects I heard in the north), it was tempting to see war as a surrogate for these. I am 
thinking here with Marx’s critical perspective on world making activity alienated from 
the world maker, and a bit with Hannah Arendt in Vita Activa. But I do not want to use 
those terms, partially because I do not want to dignify killing, and in part because I don’t 
believe they fit conceptually. Still, in the absence of world-making capacities, destructive 
activities seem to become a sort of surrogate status. Better a soldier than a bum. From the 
perspective of a generation that has internalized the values and inhabited the worlds made 
by nearly four decades of war, thinking war and peace next to one another invites a 
binarization that I want to avoid. This is less because of a theoretical commitment, than 
because of the ethnographic details that E. Valentine Daniel referred to as “the fog of 
peace” in a conversation about my time in the South. For generations raised on war 
economies, the two realms constitute each other in ways that make sharp distinction 
difficult to sustain. Indeed, these distinctions often blur analysis of the conditions at hand. 
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meaningful ways of making a living (re-) emerge, peace will remain little else than a 
condition of suspension. There was little work, and again, hopes and desires of those I 
spoke to revolved around a promised future to-come after independence, or expectations 
revolved around a fatalistic speculation that this interim would only lead to the next war, 
and the question would become, yet again, irrelevant.   
“Since the war ended we have no work;”  
one Dinka man told me in the pub over several strong ales.  
“What work did you do during the war? I asked; 
 “We were soldiers.” 
With independence, over half of the Government of South Sudan’s spending was 
going to paying the SPLA – an indicator not only of persisting militarization of the state 
and its economy, but also of the need to pay soldiers at a time when myriad fronts of the 
former military are turning against the new state. The “unemployed” I spoke to might 
well have been militia members, or people who were not being paid for other political 
reasons. One thing was clear, even uniformed men, presumably still prone for 
mobilization, were fighting about the material and political logics of this unsteady peace. 
Turning to the markets and merchants in and around Rub Kona, we see that this sense of 
suspension is not reserved only for those who fought. The displaced southerner who spent 
the war in the North was by certain important criteria, no longer considered Southern by 
his neighbors. 
There is little sense of nostalgia about the past in the statement “we were 
soldiers,” but there is a sense that the past was a time in which the work of a soldier gave 
meaning to an imagined future. Violent, volatile, and interminable, war itself is, by 
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definition, an existential problem. An ultimate insult in political discussions, which were 
interminable in Bentiu around in that period just on the cusp of elections and looking 
forward to the referendum on independence, was the rejoinder “what, do you want us all 
to go back to the bush?” The most vitriolic iteration I heard was from a professor to an 
active military officer who argued that disarmament was a premature suggestion. The 
response looks more disturbing now, in retrospect on the nearly 12 months of fighting, 
than it did then; 
“No, I do not want to go back into the bush” the officer responded, “I want to 
fight in the New Sudan.83” 
That seemed to sum up a contradictory attitude rather well. While the war in the 
Bush was horrific, horizons of liberation, independence, and attendant notions of standing 
“shoulder to shoulder” with the north – a phrase that condensed dignity, sovereignty, and 
self possession for supporters of secession – gave meaning to even the most violent 
actions. The meeting several times a week, in the Green Village Restaurant, of injured 
and amputated veterans was not a meeting of nostalgic warriors. Even the renegade 
generals, whose investment in combat cannot be doubted, are clearly more invested in 
fighting for a different peace than in the perpetual existence in war. But in palpable ways, 
a structure of investiture, a set of habits, and a reliable way of making a living in killing 
and staying alive had ended with the war. There was no peacetime world to return to for 
many, not even for Gabriel, who sat next to me in the Green Village as a group of 
soldiers walked in.  
                                                
83 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the slippage from the Rhetoric of the New Sudan 
under John Garang’s leadership – when separation was explicitly not the intention of war, 




“Oh” he said, throwing a side-glance at the group; “that man, I don’t remember 
his name, Valentine maybe. I haven’t seen him since the bush. I thought he died the last 
time I saw him. He’s still alive… ah. my.” 
Despite casual, drawn out ‘oh’s and a pensive look, he didn’t budge, and a friend of his 
and I looked at him, neither of us knowing war.  
“For gods sake Gabriel, go and say hello;”  
his friend, who had spent the wars in universities in the north said.  
Gabriel’s expression was like the one he made when he could feel us ready to pay 
a bribe. He rattled more than shook his head, and grunted a no, didn’t talk for the rest of 
the meal, and walked out and across the one tarmac road in the town before he started 
talking again. It could have been that there was some personal disagreement, but over the 
weeks I spent with him daily, Gabriel avoided old combatants. The more I learned about 
him, the more it became clear that every one of his arrangements was to avoid those with 
whom he had fought. Gabriel’s comment “we were so happy to see me;” came back to 
mind, and I believed again that the apparently faulty grammar was more than a mistake.84 
We Are the Government; Get This Man Another Beer 
The institutional and personal status that comes with war could, of course, be 
turned against itself. Beginning to see killing, and the theft and depredation of war, as 
your primary world-making activity, is an activity that peace agreements are engineered 
to overcome as quickly as possible. This is an economy, both of destructive desires and 
material need, which wrests control of material goods of self-possession from others to 
                                                
84 Here, I follow Both Veena Das, and E. Valentine Daniel, in their commitment to 
Wittgenstein (via Cavell) and Peirce, respectively, in seeing that “verbalized desires” are 
necessary to become literate in the relationships people forge their subjectivities around 
but must fold (and often conceal) within their everyday. (Daniel, 1996; Das 2007). 
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assert its productivity (and dominance) by killing, displacing, looting. It is a common and 
sinister tropological parallel that seems to re-occur all too often between work and 
killing.85 The trouble is, the absence of a positive evaluation of killing does not lead to 
the sudden re-emergence of other forms of meaningful life. Perhaps this is best illustrated 
in more banal examples of the spoils of war. In the long conflicts to which the civil wars 
of South Sudan belong, frontlines have little meaning other than the control of economic 
circulation, or the sheer weight of their symbolic value. 
In another story of Gabriel’s time in the bush, he recounts a moment in which his 
military unit took a town from the SAF, and in the aftermath of the battle requisitioned a 
lorry filled, it turned out, with beer. They arrived in the town and sat down in a pub, as 
residents who had heard of the sack of the town slowly came through to see their new 
government. 
Gabriel recounts how; “a man came in and said ‘are you the government.’ But he 
didn’t believe us when we said we had beat the soldiers in the town. After a while, my 
friend went to the truck with him and said to him ‘see, we have their truck, so we beat 
them, so we are the government.’ And my friend gave the man a beer.” Gabriel is 
laughing. 
“Throughout the night,” he continues, “men from town came in and asked ‘are 
you the government’ and somebody at the table would just say; ‘get that man another 
beer.’”  
                                                
85 That tropological gesture deserves an investigation of its own, but to clarify the point, I 
will simply point to two very different contexts and modes in which it has been deployed. 
One is the doubling of labor in death camps of the Shoah, where labor was both killing 
and, famously, the promise of freedom. Another is the reference of the interahamwe of 
Rwanda, and in particular the announcers of the Radio Mille Collines, exhorting killers to 
“do the work.”  
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Of course there are much more sinister spoils of war. The killing and 
displacement of civilians becomes in protracted wars a macabre kind of tender in itself. 
More unique to the Sudanese civil wars is the diversion of aid goods and the systematic 
channeling (by military means) of subsistence commodities to structure and maintain 
advantage in war mentioned above.86 
Nevertheless, there are the long stretches of conflict in which military 
sovereignty, however fleeting, makes and remakes regimes of value, establishing by force 
what will count as important, how it is legitimately distributed, by whom, and to whom. 
This theme will be familiar by now from previous chapters. But to be clear, the violent 
dispossessions, sometimes directed at something as banal as truckload of beer, produce, 
in conditions of war as in conditions of structural violence regimes of political 
entitlement (those with the beer are the government). Moreover, they can produce 
ontologies of land by which rivers take different names, and a southerner suddenly is not 
a southerner. This is primitive accumulation that penetrates to the level of expropriating 
determinations of meaning and identification from the people dispossessed. 
The argument of my thesis thus far has been that the logics of humanitarian crisis 
management have been most robustly involved in these politics of re-evaluation. But as I 
have argued throughout, something is made eminently clear in the case of Bentiu: that the 
logics of value that are entailed in aid and in war partake in the same condition of 
desperation and volatility. Opposing intentionalities notwithstanding, there are places 
they meet, tragically, connected materially in the bodies and socialities of the person or 
                                                
86 There is ample literature on this use of aid as a strategic instrument of the wars. See, in 
particular Douglas Johnson The Root Causes of the Sudanese Civil War. See also Karim, 




group subjected to them. Receiving aid in the heat of war all too often makes recipients a 
target or a traitor. Combat, on the other hand, disqualifies them from receiving aid. But 
neither can function without the other, and as new rubrics of value emerge around a 
speculation on the intersection of violence and aid, a world emerges in which few people 
can imagine living with either of the two mutually constitutive (yet contradictory) 
positions missing. The intervention into values, as these are supported by relatively low-
tech but complex and dynamical war economies, has brought virtually every southern 
Sudani either to a frontline or into some de facto position of support vis-à-vis the SPLA 
or its rival militias. The civil wars and their intractable logics determine the life worlds 
for everyone in the theater of war, and, volatile as these logics may be, they are legible. 
What makes Bentiu significant is that despite strategic importance and 
international presence, the alternative rubrics of value and evaluation that we have seen at 
work in chapters 2 and 3 have not, for myriad reasons, taken hold here. It is the hope of 
brokers of peace agreements (from the quote of OLS and UN worker at the beginning of 
this chapter, into those that follow from the UNDP Demobilization, Disarmament and 
Reintegration unit) that this immediate and material relationship to goods, subsistence, 
value, and wealth that dominates in war is swept away with the cessation of hostilities. 
Or, put more precisely, the hope is that the logics of entitlement and accumulation can be 
civilized (in contradistinction to militarized). Good governance can sustain the 
relationship between political power and economic force, even when a state fails to 
ensure the welfare of its population. But good governance can only obtain after the knot 
that binds governance to the gun and the gun to livelihood and wealth has been cut. A 
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lorry of beer, as thin a reed as it may be to rest claims of governance on, must be replaced 
by other forms of legitimacy.  
But what remains to fill the gap?  
In the story of our insolvent ex-combatant, the exigencies of mechanisms of debt 
fill the vacuum. The immediate dividends of family and home are obtained by leveraging 
against a future that is presumed to come. But this replacement is, obviously, an uneasy 
one. From the national level down to the person, the period since the CPA has been a 
period in which almost all economic growth in Sudan (if you don’t count re-armament) is 
being leveraged against a potential future. Donor logics, UNDP demobilization drives 
that exchange guns for payment and vocational training, and the decision to take the 
South (and as we saw in chapter 1, even the southern neighborhoods of the north) out 
from under the yoke of embargo have all been investments in a potential future. 
By leveraging against the future, debt generates an economic identity that remains 
attached to the debtor’s legal person (or, perhaps, just persists in the memory of intimate 
creditors, as was the case with the low-level combatants who spoke to me about their debt 
in Bentiu) after the activity that incurred the debt is passed. Our soldier, emblematic in so 
many ways, invests integrity into the expectation that a future prosperity would come, 
underwritten by pacification. The sheer weight of that “mortgaged integrity,” combined 
with the absence of any real prospects of regaining meaningful command over his 
livelihood, leads him to make the contradictory gesture of choosing the tools of his 
military life to escape the weight of civilian life, and commits suicide. 
It is tempting to read this through the lens of Durkheim’s classifications as a kind 
of Anomic Suicide, and certainly there is a crisis of investiture involved here, in which 
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the lack of integral status disturbs our soldier. But that investiture crisis, including the 
debt burden allegorized in our soldier’s story, affects many Bentiu residents without 
driving them to suicide. The figures of the river, which condense frontline, enemy 
territory, the future, and death into a single metaphorical crossing to “the other side,” also 
complicate the category. There is something else afoot here, a liminal space between 
peace and war that will not easily submit to either.  
In the formulation “he did not know work,” Gabriel presents an observation that is 
commonplace, but critical. Human work is not an empty unit of the capacity to transform 
ones environment according to want and need. It is moored to habits and skills, and most 
particularly to the expected temporal scales of the cycles between investment and benefit, 
that differ substantially between peace and wartime. It is given texture by different 
rubrics of values, and by gendered and all-too-often ethnicized logics of who will work, 
may work, and can work, which in their turn determine who belongs, who has fought, can 
fight, or will be killed. 
The logics that organize access to work in this interim period are determined, in 
part (and only in part, mind you) by different relationships to the realities of combat. The 
northern traders of Rub Kona control the market in part because they had the initial 
capital to invest in stocking a store with goods, and were willing to stake their future on 
it. As a southern informant in the market explained to me over tea “I own a stand here, 
and really the market was given back to us southerners after the war. But none of us had 
the money to buy goods to sell. And even if we had, why would you want to be a 
merchant in the market in wartime? If you are allied with the one faction, they will expect 
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you to give them things for free to support them. If you are allied with another faction, 
they will come and take your goods because you are an enemy. Either way, you lose.” 
There are, in other words, those who can manage to fill the gap of this interim. 
However, the economic logics of war mark even their activities, be they southern ex-
combatants who do not trust in the temporality of peacetime investment; women who are 
given privileged access to Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration of the United 
Nations Development Program, but have an uneven place in combat; or miseriya whose 
age-old work as herders is tarnished with the murahilin militia services some of their 
members rendered to the north during the wars. 
Again, wartime and peacetime are not only two different fields of activities, to 
which one can, or perhaps needs to, adapt. They are differently structured conditions of 
livelihood with incommensurate temporal scales and radically different schemes by 
which work, productivity, value, and legitimacy are organized. One of the failures of 
transition thus far has been the failure, on many levels, to do the slow, piecemeal work of 
confronting how these temporal scales and value schemes have changed people’s habits, 
expectations, and ways of living together. It is remarkable that in what I have called the 
“time of crisis,” there is a constant work of re-evaluation being done that accompanies 
humanitarian operations. Whether intentional or unwitting, and we have seen examples of 
both, this re-evaluation seems relegated to the period of crisis in the humanitarian 
imaginary. In this interim period, it maintains momentum in vocational trainings and 
capacity building exercises. But the bitter irony of the humanitarian optic at work in 
Sudan is that the moment hostilities are put on hold the structural violence occluded by 
war re-emerges, often in more vital forms, having taken momentum from the logics of 
 
190 
open conflict. And at precisely that moment, continued attention to these modes of 
violence seems to wane. Perhaps, to turn on St. Exupery’s phrase in the opening pages of 
this chapter, they have tried, and are suddenly no longer driven by the inspiring force of 
urgent necessity. 
Furthermore, the failure of peace is not manifest only in absence of peacetime 
infrastructure – which is painful enough. It is also felt in the sudden loss, for the rank and 
file of the SPLA, of a war economy into which their lives were, during conflict, deeply 
bound. That disappearance effectively renders the shock of demobilization a double 
shock. It also renders ex-combatants powerless to shape the conditions of their peacetime 
existence. They have learned the rare skill of shaping a world in war, and in too many 
cases, that skill, and the way they plied it, is now shaping their present more than the 
limited horizon of possibilities for the future. In fact, the very structure of Southern 
Sudanese citizenship – and the status of a person as properly southern, has become 
inextricably articulated to the activities of wartime. The return of southern Sudanese to 
“the new Sudan” in the roll up and immediate wake of independence underscores this 
fact. I spoke with a mother of one of the larger families selling goods inside Soba Aradi87 
who described the experience of her neighbor.  
She and her family wanted to return home, to the house that they 
had lived in before they came north. They came back a few weeks 
later. They had come to their house. There was a sign above the door 
‘liberated in 1994.’ The family living there said it was not their 
home anymore, that they made they did not defend it, that they did 
not fight for liberation. 
                                                
87 One of the largest displaced neighborhoods treated in Chapter 4, but not, by most 
accounts, the most aggressive. The woman who is speaking is the same who scorned 
microfinance as an unnecessary infusion of liquidity into a place where many people 
don’t use currency within the camps. 
 
191 
Even more remarkably, these divisions ran down the line of Southerners’ 
recognition of one another as janubin or genuine southerner. Because this is such a 
profound example of the traffic between economic entitlement and the status of the 
person, it is worth spelling out in detail. It is also an example of re-evaluating the status 
of persons, the full ramifications of which we are only seeing unfold now in the south.  
Deim, the Khartoum neighborhood where I kept a home base throughout 
fieldwork, is a neighborhood populated mainly by Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Southern 
Sudanese families. It had once been a stronghold of a several resistance groups, including 
a notable contingent of the communist party, until the latter was purged (its members 
disappeared or killed) under Jaafar Nimeiri in the early 80s. Because it is on the wrong 
side of a major intersection, is relatively poor compared to its surrounding 
neighborhoods, and borders a major military neighborhood, UN employees are not 
allowed to live there. 
The day the news broke that John Garang, the architect and military leader of the 
SPLA/M strategy in the south, had indeed died when his helicopter crashed (three days 
earlier, it turns out) on his way back from Uganda, riots broke out in the north. It was 
August first, a day known as Black Monday in both the north and the south. In Khartoum, 
the suspicion that Garang’s helicopter had been deliberately downed led to several days 
of riots, mainly by groups of Southern Sudanese living in the peri-urban neighborhoods 
around Khartoum (see chapter 4) moving in and burning and looting businesses and 
homes in the city center. But the attacks were far from indiscriminate, nor where they, as 
many have reported, primarily Southern on Northern violence. Of course there were 
government targets and homes of elite families that came under attack, but the pattern of 
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attacks in Deim were different. As neighbors reported, groups of men moved 
systematically from house to house, but were guided by others who knew the 
neighborhood.  
These latter stood in front of the homes (often not much more than a single thatched 
room) of Ethiopians and Eritreans, and told crowds to move on. The habesh was not the 
enemy. Instead, they moved on the homes of southerners who lived in the area 
(considerably better off than those living in the peri-urban neighborhoods), and the row 
of businesses on the main street sahafa zalat, that were mainly southern owned. My 
neighbor, an Ethiopian woman, explained that they claimed that these southerners “were 
not Janubin.” Rather, on account of having “become rich from the Jalabin economy, they 
had become Jalabin.” The very integration into northern infrastructure was ethnically 
marked, so that even neighbors living within an hour’s bus ride from one another began 
to attack each other, the one no longer southern because in their neighborhoods and 
stores, the National Electrical Company kept the lights on (at least some of the time). 
The Future, the River, and the Logics of the Frontier 
A few days after Gabriel has told his story or the beer lorry, we are sitting in Census 
Hall in Bentiu with some 75 or so payam administrators, members of various advocacy 
groups from the area, and political authorities of various stripes. The question on the table 
is “how do we imagine the post-referendum future?” 
One after another, people stand up to speak to a schedule of grievances and 
obstacles that need to be addressed before the future can come. At one point, Philip 
Aguer, who has of late become the press spokesperson for the SPLA, takes over 
moderating the discussion.  
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“We are not here to talk about what has happened or the problems of the present. 
We are all experiencing a kind of conflict memory, and in conflict memory, you can’t see 
past your last injury, and the one before that. We want to know about the future;”  
“Imagine you are standing at a river that you cannot cross and looking at the other 
side. You can’t know what it looks like, but we want you to describe it. That’s what it 
means to tell us about the future. Like during the war, everyone was dreaming about a 
peaceful Sudan. Now we have eight months until 2011. You are dreaming now about that 
year from this year. It is you who must think how to build peace in 2011.” 
Already then, it is clear that the man who speaks eloquently about the task of 
thinking the future has conflicting allegiances. In his capacity as Colonel Philip Aguer, a 
different future was already impending. He was, within a year after the meeting in Census 
Hall, more and more frequently tasked to articulate a politics informed by “conflict 
memory”– a fact of which he is, I think, painfully aware. Bentiu, which erupted into 
street skirmishes just after I left, is bombed from the air for the first time in 2011. That is 
not the future anyone imagined, and Philip Aguer is in uniform giving official 
condemnations. 
The river carries so many meanings it is hard to keep track: the other side, a 
frontline, a crossing from this world into death. Here it holds a special double meaning – 
representing on one hand a peacetime horizon of possibility, a frontier, a line of 
contestation; and, on the other, a boundary between warring groups in the not-so-distant 
memory of those present. In fact, any fair map of the area acknowledges that the famous 
river in question has two names. Southerners, both Dinka and Nuer, call it Kiir simply 
meaning river. North of the river, it is know as bahr al arab the river of the Arabs. 
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It is, in many ways, emblematic of the political realities of Unity state suspended 
between war and peace, which is anything but unified. In Bentiu, political dynamics that 
are suspended between militarism and peacetime are becoming a permanent condition. 
We see competing allegiances and identifications activated and rendered dormant 
depending on whether one is speaking as a civilian or a combatant. We see that everyone 
has an identity for peace and an identity for war, and can inhabit the one set of values 
during conflict and another during peace. This should not be mistaken to mean that 
everyone is a peacemaker during peace and a combatant in war. Quite the contrary, the 
shifts are deep, and as multifarious as the people who inhabit them. 
When Peter Gatdet declared his defection in the Mayom Declaration recently, he 
announced, “Our nation has groomed a monster… what we have seen in the six year 
interim is the absolute failure of good governance.” Accusing the SPLM of electoral 
fraud, he avers, “we in the SPLA know the truth.” He affirms his commitment to the spirit 
and letter of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and within the week has mobilized his 
fighters to attack the government’s army in Mayom. Curious in all this is that Peter 
Gatdet, killed just shortly after being given amnesty in exchange for demobilization 
speaks very poor English, leaving one to ponder where the rhetorical flare and references 
to good governance come from. 
Peter Gatdet is not new to navigating these conflicting alliances. Having joined 
Paulino Matiep and Riek Machar in fighting against the SPLA during the second civil 
war, he was reintegrated into the SPLA with the signing of the CPA. Some claim that his 
allegiance is firmly with the SPLA until the fighting starts, at which point he fights for 
the North. Others claim that his allegiance stems from being a Nuer in a Dinka 
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Dominated South, fighting in a Majority Nuer Unity state that happens to be one of the 
richest states of the south, in terms of resources. 
But perhaps choosing between one version of Peter Gatdet or the other is a 
simplistic perspective. The history of both Wars, as well as of the time Gatdet refers to 
dismissively as “the interim” has demonstrated that the meanings of the allegiances and 
identifications that inform political and military decisions are constantly being 
negotiated. In a crude sense, this complex and processual re-negotiation means that it is 
as reasonable to claim that identity (ethnic, political, or economic) determines your 
friends and enemies as it is to claim that your acts in war will recast your affiliation. 
Neither statement in fact makes much sense in the absence of the other. 
Immediately after Gatdet’s defection – during which (testament to the shared 
condition of volatility and shifting allegiances) he is rumored to have taken between 4-6 
thousand SPLA from Division 4 in Unity state with him – Taban Deng announces that 
the state would commence with the first conscription since the signing of the CPA. 
Though the immediate motivations for conscription most certainly are Gatdet’s defection, 
Deng doesn’t fail to add that the conscription will be beneficial because the men will be 
paid and it will prevent them from being idle.  
As the machinery of the war starts rolling, allegiances fragment and are re-
interpreted, as cattle raiding by the miseriya spikes drastically and unemployed men are 
conscripted into the SPLA to ostensibly protect the south from northern agents. Within 
weeks the road that runs between the Thar Jath Oilfields and Bentiu Town – the road on 
which the market of Rub Kona lies, now reportedly empty of northern merchants – is 
mined. By the end of May, when the SPLA has gained significant victories against Gatdet 
 
196 
in Mayom, the first, contested reports that the SPLA has burned upwards of 7,000 homes 
in Mankien in reprisal for the defections begin to circulate. 
If these accusations are true, are the SPLA burning southerners’ homes to protect 
the south from itself? 
The absurdity of the question should underscore the futility of the exercise of 
reading clear allegiances, values, and identities in a condition of suspension between war 
and peace. It is the curse of axiomatic transitions, the ones that point to good governance 
as the way forward, that contrary to what we believe, war is not the absence of 
governance any more than it is the absence of economy. Rather, there is a governance of 
war and of peace that intersect and shape one another, just as there are economies of war 
and of peace that intersect and shape one another. Without taking seriously the messy 
details of conflict as a logic, demilitarization will indeed be condemned to the “interim.” 
***
Conclusion: Where to Begin? 
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 …Condemned to the Interim? 
 
The preceding chapters are bound together by a sense of suspension, perhaps best 
tied together by the concluding sentences on Bentiu “…condemned to the interim.” Here, 
I want to point to some of the ways in which these suspensions may look as more lasting 
ways of living humanitarianism as, to quote Fassin “a moral history of the present.” The 
ethnographic material that is the core of each chapter opens a question regarding the 
values that drive and limit really existing humanitarianism as it works in Sudan. 
They are values that define crises as threat to livelihood and define aid as 
providing just such livelihood in a provisional way. They are values that operate within 
well-defined strategies of measurement, and selective genres of evidence. But they are 
also values based on the explicit or tacit assumption that, once livelihood is secured, the 
population will return to a certain normalcy: that civil life has only been interrupted by 
crisis. 
The thesis questions the assumptions of this evaluative logic, but tries to avoid 
stopping at identifying the failures of aid guided by those values, an attitude that is 
current among many critics. In the perspective of my explorations, the tragedy of 
humanitarian aid, and of the legal, economic, and social activities that are its repertoire, is 
only slowly emerging toward a self-reflexive moment in which it sees how irreversible 
and significant its world-making force turns out to be. Many critical inquiries into the 
practices of humanitarianism in the present have narrated a history of failures, tragic, 
comical, and otherwise. 
Philip Gourevitch, as an extreme example, structures his We Wish To Inform You 
that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families around the Dante’s Inferno. With a 
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quote from the latter text opening each section of his account of the Rwandan genocide, 
we have the events of ’94 narrated to us by an anonymous humanitarian angel (in the 
body of witness) descending into the Inferno and rising back out, ending in a sort of 
purgatory, just after the return of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). Here, the horrified 
humanitarian conscience, in the form of two humanitarians recounting an RPA reprisal 
massacre in one of the Refugee Camps of Burundi leaves us desperate, stranded with no 
sense of good or evil, with no moral high-ground, no ultimate foundation for hope… 
simply one large Grey Zone, an archipelago Hotel at its center, the exception that proves 
the rule.  
This narrative of failed humanism stops short of asking the most difficult question 
regarding really existing humanitarian practice 25 years after the end of the cold war. It 
fails to also ask the positive question: what does the world look like that is brought about 
by the robust force of humanitarian practice? Failing to ask that question – the question 
of what the world emerging here will look like, in its details, leaves these critiques 
themselves suspended between two conclusions: Either humanitarian practice will find 
correctives to its own initial missteps, or it will collapse under the weight of its failures.  
The sense of suspension that abides through the preceding chapters is motivated 
by the conviction that neither outcome needs to be or become the case. The suspension I 
address in these chapters is not an interim moment between failure and redemption. 
Rather, I have given accounts of lasting worlds caught between crisis and recovery, 
between war and peace, between passive victim and actively coping agent, between the 
emergency and a return of some imagined prior, between the time of crisis and the time 
of the future. 
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But what future comes after the humanitarian emergency? In chapter one, I 
described a perpetual suspension of the status of uncounted attritions that escape the 
humanitarian apprehension of the ethical acts that are its purview. That suspension has 
continued. It has continued not only regarding the bombing of El Shifa, which was 
judged by the decisions of two US circuit courts to be “non-justiciable.” To protect the 
separation of powers that guarantees democratic war making, the decision to bomb a 
civilian factory must stay, so the logic of the US courts in which the cases were heard, 
outside the purview of the law. That is also the logic that lets consequences of this kind 
remain under the radar of the humanitarian perspective. 
In chapter two, in the urban center that El Fasher has become, economic actors 
struggled to make sense of emerging logics of value and economic subjectivity that did 
not seem ready to be carried in a determinable direction. With the counterinsurgencies 
continuing, and the United Nations/African Union hybrid mission turning increasingly to 
the south, the future of how life will be made economically viable in this city-cum-
company-town remains open. Initial indications are that the rebels of at least one of the 
several factions in this last insurgency, the Justice and Equality Movement, have begun to 
emerge in South Sudan as important fighting forces. If the generation now in their early 
20s, the generation that has grown up largely around the cities and in the context and 
pressure of an aid economy, is expected to make a livelihood, they will avail themselves 
of a centralized urban economy and the economic possibilities that such a social 
constellation affords. What kinds of subjectivities will have to emerge to replace those 
sustained by the aid bubble remains to be seen. 
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In chapter three, in turn, a sinister logic unfolds by which genocide accusations 
provide added momentum to the identities and the international targeting it tries to 
diagnose. El Fasher’s residents are living in a social world remade by aid and are 
simultaneously looking for ways to build a more permanent world around the new 
economy constellations they now navigate, knowing full well that humanitarian aid will 
soon depart. They are also living in the wake of genocide accusations, accusations that 
have taken ethnicized violence and elevated it to an “as such” that genocide legislation 
was calibrated to end. The counterinsurgency has not ended, but the condition of imputed 
genocide seems to hover in a state of legal aufhebung or sublation, inscribed in some very 
lasting ways onto the social body, but also permanently spectral – with indefinite and 
indirect consequence. 
Finally, in chapter four, I offer an account of the conditions of a place where these 
ways of living caught between the humanitarian crisis and the future had become the very 
way of life for a city, and then began to falter. Since that chapter was written, Bentiu has 
been all but burnt to the ground. Worse still, the specters of genocide that seemed to 
remain in suspension in Darfur have taken the concrete form massacres here, masacres in 
which the intentionality and as such of ethnic cleansing are one step short of explicitly 
declared. While so much in Bentiu has remained suspended, precisely that event which is 
the limit case of all humanitarian catastrophe has come out of suspension. But it has done 
so on the grounds of UN bases, in the shadows of fortified oil infrastructure and behind 
the walls of aid compounds. Ethnic cleansing, it seems, has returned to Bentiu under the 
shadow of an impending humanitarian emergency in temporary suspension – and perhaps 
precisely that suspension must be looked at as one of its conditions of possibility. 
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The future, it seems, is not one that can be imagined to return from the 
humanitarian emergency to a new full normalcy, nor return fully to its logics of rescue. 
Rather, as Michael M.J. Fischer observes in Anthropological Futures; 
Iraq joins Kosovo, Albania, Afghanistan, Sudan and Palestine in 
becoming exemplars of the late 1990s shift from pre-1970s cultural 
paradigms of state-led modernization – Western, socialist, and third-
world varieties; and their dependency theory critiques – to 
emergence of less explicit and less culturally justified global 
regimes of North-South governance through networks of 
nongovernmental organizations, donor governments, military 
establishments, private companies, and mercenaries. (Fischer, 2009: 
41.) 
In Sudan at least, one of the lessons to be extrapolated from this manuscript is that 
humanitarianism as a powerful world-making force is not going to fold under its failure 
or transform, through self-correction, into a self-contained modality of governance. I 
would even suggest that the ethnographic material treated here invites further 
ethnographic investigations of how humanitarianism will continue to work in practice. 
Many of my conclusions are as tentative as the world they speak about, and the world 
they speak to, but the problems they attend to are recalcitrant. In most cases, I hope the 
conclusions themselves turn out to be wrong, that a world being made in the shadows of 
international crisis management can find footing in a way of living not suspended 
between conflict and its management. But to understand more of that emerging world, 
more of its central traits and tenets deserve investigation. What follows are some 
suggestions of the conceptual contours of future points of inquiry. 
Abstract Humanity and the Measurement of Crisis 
I suggest in chapter 1 that a humanitarian imaginary focused on the images of 
crisis and the protocols of intervention leaves remains ambivalent in the face of very 
similar forms of violence – treating one and not the other. On the one hand, critical 
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infrastructures of life support will be apprehended as units of life, protected by the logics 
of humanitarian intervention. On the other, they can be rendered all but invisible under 
certain strategies of measurement, and when acts of ethical imagination are foreclosed. 
The image of injured bodies, of intentionally inflicted injuries, and metrics of attrition are 
certainly part of how this imaginary separates what acts are registered as significant, and 
what events are made to count as relevant. 
However, the practices of representation that are deployed by contemporary 
humanitarian imaginaries invite empirical investigations that would bring the structure of 
this social imaginary into contrast. Such inquiries would question the location of the 
figure of the human within the increasingly complex humanitarian forensics that support 
it that figure would not be the destitute form of bare life threatened, but the concrete 
person in his or her relation to abandonment and care, as agent, coping and asserting him 
or herself under the conditions of crisis (or, as Povinelli reminds us, the unexpected 
benefits of being left behind by certain forms of law).  
The Human in the Anthropocene? 
One critical avenue of inquiry, treated infrequently in the context of the 
ethnographic discipline, is the way in which the human at the center of humanitarian 
logics is situated vis-à-vis environmental and climatological dynamics that unfold on a 
time scale different from that of the humanitarian emergency. Ethnographies beginning to 
address this problem would pose questions of how to adequately relate the urgency of the 
politics of rescue, using a logic that will not be displaced by geological catastrophe, with 
the slower dynamics of the latter. De Waal, Mamdani, Abdul-Jalil, Bromwich, and 
Tubiana have all identified the ecological dimension that has exacerbated the current 
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conflict in Darfur. Meanwhile, with the expansion of the deserts accelerating at an 
alarming rate in the Sahel, the African Union has proposed the production of the “great 
green wall” to stem desertification on the southern edge of the desert, a project that would 
involve planting and maintaining a massive stand of Gum Arabic trees along that latitude. 
How these environmental interventions such on a grand scale, intended as much 
to manage the dynamics of climate change as it is to stem the environmental causes of 
complex emergencies, will interact with the political faultlines in this contact zone, 
cannot be answered by abstract analysis. Like the initiatives accounted for here, which 
are on a smaller and more localized scale (if an annual tripling of national budgets for 11-
14 million people can still be called a localized scale), the dynamics of how such an 
initiative will impact lives lived across the “green wall” raises issues of economic 
subjectivity, regimes of political and economic entitlement, and the contingencies of state 
and military powers with which people in the Sahel constantly contend.  
Archipelagos of Humanity 
As we saw in Chapter 2, the rapid urbanization of several city centers in Sudan 
are entangled with the economies of humanitarian aid in ways that have by now formed 
the economic and political expectations of a generation. These entanglements are likely 
to continue, and intensify, as privatized security and ethnicized organizations of life in 
shifting centers of power take more robust form.  
Will the resource-corridors of places like South Sudan become archipelagos of 
security, and will these sustain a modicum of stability within an increasingly destabilized 
rural context? These questions become critical, particularly for ethnographers interested 
in the question of “endurance” in the continued world of abandonment. As I have 
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suggested in Chapter 4, the binary of war and peace falls short of conceptualizing these 
phenomena. While ideal oppositions between civil society and conflict, displacement and 
stability, agreement and force have ceased to operate as the central ways that residents of 
places like Bentiu structure their imaginations of the future, what conceptual structures 
take their place? As they fall short, what kinds of accounts can be given of the social 
worlds that are lived and constituted in these locations? 
Contrary to all humanitarian imaginaries, in places like Bentiu and, perhaps, 
places like Darfur, a threshold is fast approaching (or may already have passed) in which 
peace, not conflict, is the problem. If the contradictory condition in which neither war nor 
peace represent sustainable modes of life proves to be more wide-spread, will 
humanitarian practice make peace with conditions of conflict, so long as these remain 
“organized,” or their dynamics contained? 
The Makings of a Humanitarian Future 
One of the strongest overarching arguments of this thesis is the argument that 
humanitarianism should not be understood as responding to, or even forming, conditions 
of bare life in a state of socially extruded emergency. Rather, my work treats 
humanitarian practice as a dispositif that combines legal, social, economic, and 
environmental interventions to apprehend a condition of precarity. However, more than 
deploying the multiple strategies many critics of the humanitarian international have 
identified, I argue that humanitarianism begins to make its object of intervention by 
defining the very human condition that it diagnoses as intolerable. In other words, really- 
existing humanitarianism has proven a self-authorizing and self-fulfilling form of social 
encounter. As it enters a stage of increasing self-reflexivity, both insofar as the security of 
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humanitarian actors becomes a central concern of protection itself, and insofar as a 
critique of humanitarian practice becomes an increasing component of interventionist 
activities on the ground, will the world forged under this social imaginary change 
significantly? 
One can perhaps better pose the question thus: will the ways of being human in 
the context of humanitarian values change as humanitarian practice reorganizes itself vis-
à-vis the larger environmental and geopolitical contexts into which it is by now firmly 
inserted? Will core concepts that inform humanitarianism remain obstinate in the face of 
unfolding dynamics of force that consistently undermine and overwhelm humanitarian 
practice? Will the way humanitarianism’s current logics become subsumed under logics 
of environmental governmentality and securitization that seem to constitute an ascendant 
paradigm of crisis management? Or will crisis itself become a value in its own right, 
undermining the centrality of the figure of humanity to be protected, and giving itself 
over to more efficient management of conditions of volatility and displacements? 
The field material presented here has consistently run up against the moments in 
which humanitarian principles are undermined, and give way to a kind of split in the 
subject of humanitarianism itself. That fissure has in the past run along civilizational 
lines. But will that fissure now run down through the center of the figure of the human as 
such?  
This text has given account of a humanitarian practice, in different contingent 
moments and locations, caught in a form of suspension, at a particular moment in Sudan. 
But I want to suggest that this way of being “caught” between universal humanitarian 
values and contingent (local) ways of inhabiting that practice is not so fleeting. Rather, 
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the kinds of subjects caught between invisibility and overexposure, between scarcity and 
speculative economy, between war and peace, between the accusations of international 
law and an evacuation of the very center of that law may be the subject positions 
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